DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-POLITICAL SCIENCES

SEMESTER -III

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

CORE 302

BLOCK-2

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FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

BLOCK -1

Unit 1: Comparative Methods and Approaches

Unit 2: Comparative Method and Strategies of Comparison

Unit 3: Formal: Institutional Approach

Unit 4: Political Systems and Structural Functional Approach

Unit 5: Culture-centric and Political Economy

Unit 6: New Institutionalism and Comparative methods; advantage and problems of comparison

Unit 7: Development: Theories of Modernization

BLOCK -2

BLOCK 2 : COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Introduction to the Block

Unit 8 deals with by the decade of seventies of the 20th century, the theory of the stages of economic growth became redundant and the structural internationalist theory became prominent.

Unit 9 deals with Post development theory is one of the most compelling—and controversial—fields of thought in contemporary development studies. This body of literature became prominent in the 1990s and has since sparked fierce debate and attracted much attention, both positive and negative.

A unit 10 deal with Federalism is a dynamic theory of nation and state building. It is primarily a theory about institutionalized political cooperation and collective co-existence.

Unit 11 deals with contemporary democratic and authoritarian forms of government, a broad classification of political systems regimes that has been adopted since the inter-War period.

Unit 12 deals with Comparative party system. The role of party system in the operation of democratic polity is now generally well recognized by Political Scientists and politicians alike. Democracy, as Finer observes, "rests, in its hopes and doubts, upon the party system."

Unit 13 deals with moral issues posed by revolutions are both practically important and theoretically complex. There are also interesting conceptual questions as to how to distinguish revolution from resistance, rebellion, and secession, all of which also involve opposition to existing political authority. Unit 14 deals with the Comparative analysis of SAARC and its political knowledge and also with the concept which related with the comparative studies with the Regionalism Defined.

UNIT 8: UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY THEORY

STRUCTURE

8.0 OBJECTIVES

In this chapter you will critically analyze and evaluate:

- To know Theories of Underdevelopment
- To discuss Baran's Views on Underdevelopment
- To discuss the contributions of dependency theories;
- To analysis dependency theory as articulation of the poorer nations; and
- To understand the relevance and critique of dependency theory

8.1 INTRODUCTION

By the decade of seventies of the 20th century, the theory of the stages of economic growth became redundant and the structural internationalist theory became prominent. The structuralism approach looks at development in terms of the power relationship between different nations and between different people within the nation.

Now let us turn to the theories that generated as a response to growth model of development. The present unit deals with dependency theory which was developed as a critique of western oriented development model. Dependency theories were one of the strongest critics of the growth oriented theories which came largely from Western nations. The dependency theory, which came from the Latin American world, in that sense, is critique, which was from the south on the richer North. There are minor variations between the theories. What we will attempt in this unit is to try and present the core essential features of dependency theories. We will also examine dependency theories for the implications it has on economies of Third World countries and whether it has any relevance to present economic disparities between the richer Northern nations and the poorer Southern nations.

8.2 THEORIES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The theory visualizes development as a process in which less developed countries are caught up in dependence and dominance relationship with rich countries and these subordinate countries suffer from institutional and structural constraints.

There are two views regarding how dependence of underprivileged countries upon the fortunate ones is treated as destined in the modern approach of economic development:

(a) One viewpoint is that not only the rich countries desire to have their hegemony over poor countries but also that the elite of a country, such as landlords, businessmen, bureaucrats, trade union leaders and entrepreneurs, support the sly intention of rich countries because they are

rewarded for doing so. Todaro quotes a statement from Theotonio Dos Santos of Latin America, which is one of the most forceful statements regarding dependency nature of development:

… Underdevelopment far from constituting a state of backwardness prior to capitalism is rather a consequence and a particular form of capitalist development known as dependent capitalism… dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others.

A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of dominant countries which may have positive or negative effect on their immediate development.

In either case the basic situation of dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited. Dominant countries are endowed with technological, commercial, capital and socio-political predominance over dependent countries.

(b) The other view that Todaro calls the "false paradigm" model is that the underdevelopment of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is result of the inappropriate and faulty advice provided to them by the assisting agencies like UNESCO, ILO, UNDP, IMF etc.

The intentions of the advisers may not be doubted as they are well-meaning experts but they are often ignorant of the existing situations of the target countries. The policies based or. their meticulous expert advice prove inappropriate and reinforce the existing power structure and cater to the interests of powerful groups as these countries are beset with the acute problem of social, economic and landed inequalities.

Thus, both the views of structural internationalist model emphasize that the development would be more meaningful when the attention is drawn

not only to the growth of GNP but rather to the planning of poverty reduction and employment to all.

The process of development is dualistic in nature. There are countries which have confined themselves to proceeding faster upon what has widely been accepted as the path of development and there are other countries which have not yet confined and refuse to move as fast as the former. These situations have naturally moved ahead to form dual societies: one treated as superior and the other inferior.

The theories of underdevelopment are essentially dependency theories. This model relates to the scholars like Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein and H. Magdoff. Paul Baran, in his work The Political Economy of Growth (1973, first published in 1957), pioneered the theory of underdevelopment.

This model views underdevelopment of the less developed countries as a consequence of the fact that the developed rich countries exercise dominance and imperialist assertion over the former. In his book Dependency is dead: Long Live Dependency and Class Struggle written in 1974, Frank under-lines the growth of class struggle between the rich and poor nations, which would aggravate due to aggressive policies of the former.

Samir Amin's contributions Class and Nations: Historically and in Current Crisis (1979), Crisis of Nationalism and Socialism (1982), De-linking: Towards a Polycentric World (1990), Euro-centrism (1989) and Mal-development: Anatomy of a Global Failure (1990) are replete with evidences that bear out the role of rich countries in underdevelopment and backwardness of the colonial less developed countries of the world.

Modern economic history, as most of the social science literature, has been so written in the beginning as to establish the supremacy of the West. The Eurocentric interpretation asserts that the development of the

Asian, African and Latin American countries is a result of positive contribution of the West.

Indian and Chinese contributions to the development of Europe have been ignored. The other side of 'Europeanism' was 'orientalism', equally contemptuous of the non-Western world and, therefore, was criticized by Edward Said and Samir Amin (1989) in their writings against Euro centrism. Europeanism is reflected even in the Marxist conceptualization of The Asiatic Mode of Production.

1. CLASSICAL MARXIAN THEORIES

Although there does not exist a systematic Marxian theory of development, the theory is implicit in Marx's study of the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production in his 3 volumes of Capital. Marx traces the development of the capitalist mode of production from the pre-capitalist era of feudalism. Capitalism first emerged in Europe and was imposed, often violently, on other regions of the world. Earlier mercantilist forms of outright plunder and violent expropriation of land gave rise to the process of "primitive accumulation". However, Marx argues that the prospects for the development of capitalism crucially depend upon the pre-existing modes of production. He supports this thesis by comparing feudalism with what he describes as the "Asiatic" societies. Whereas the dissolution of feudalism was favorable for the expansion of capitalism in Europe, the opposite is the case in Asia. The reason for this contrast was that feudalism had already developed forms of private ownership, while the Asiatic societies were principally based upon the communal ownership of land.

In Europe, the process of primitive accumulation involved the creation of wage labour, which migrated from the rural hinterland to the industrial regions. The eventual triumph of capitalism will depend largely on the historical conditions, which either promote or retard the development of a market economy. Marx also stressed other factors: the influx of precious metals from the "new world", the slave trade and the growth of

merchant capital (Braudel, 1984). The original Marxian theory had envisaged that capitalism would eventually become the dominant economic system on a world scale. The dynamic "inner laws" of capital, driven by the profit motive and accumulation, attracts into the ambit of world trade, all other pre-capitalist societies.

Marx's earlier writings on colonialism focused on British colonial policy in India. By the nineteenth century, the British East India company had ceased to be profitable as a solely mercantilist enterprise and became a publicly-listed company. As merchant capital, its role in India was wholly destructive because it failed to create the conditions for the growth of capitalism. As soon as it became a capitalist enterprise, however, it acquired the role of industrial capital and began to sow the seeds of capitalist enterprise in India itself.

In other words, Marx argued that the introduction of capitalism in India was a necessary evil. Even though the initial impact of colonial trade was destructive for India, the growth of capitalism would eventually benefit the Indian colony. Furthermore, Marx considers the "Asiatic" mode of production as "pre-historical" in the sense that it had remained in a state of primordial animation and stagnation until contact with European capitalism.

The other major classical Marxian source on the theory of imperialism and underdevelopment is V.I Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin was influenced by the British historian, J.A. Hobson, Nikolai Bukharin's Imperialism and the World Economy, and Rudolf Hilferding's Finance Capital. Imperialism is simply defined as the "monopoly stage of capitalism" in which finance capital plays a dominant role as it merges with industrial capital. Furthermore, Lenin highlighted the crucial importance of the export of capital, the escalation of rivalries between competing monopolies and the territorial division of the world between the major imperialist powers.

2. NEO-MARXIAN THEORIES

The failure of capitalism to encourage economic development in the former colonial regions as Marx had envisaged, gave rise to the neo-Marxian theories of underdevelopment. Despite the diversity of views within the neo-Marxian paradigm, there is a consensus that the modern capitalist system can be divided into an advanced "centre" or metropolis, and an underdeveloped "periphery". The causes of this underdevelopment become the central focus of analysis. Lenin and Bukharin's theories of imperialism provide the initial inspiration for this revival of interest. Another important source has been Rosa Luxemburg's The Accumulation of Capital, in which she poses the problem of the "realization" of surplus value from Marx's reproduction schemes in volume 2 of Capital. Luxemburg posed the problem in terms of the relationship between the capitalist and non-capitalist sectors of the economy and argued that capitalism required the non-capitalist sector as an outlet for its surplus in order to expand.

Perhaps the most influential of the neo-Marxian current has been Paul Baran's seminal work, The Political Economy of Growth. In Paul Baran's analysis, the causes of underdevelopment are attributed to the legacy of imperialism. To highlight this hypothesis, Baran compares the Indian economy, which had been dominated by British colonialism, with the Japanese experience, which had been relatively free from foreign domination. He then analyses the "distortions" caused by colonialism and argues that foreign outlets for investment were essentially governed by the problem of "surplus absorption" within the imperialist centers. Baran's analysis also prefigured the "dependency" theorists by asserting that these former colonies are condemned as suppliers of commodities for the world market. The failure to develop a domestic market and the growth of luxury consumption by the privileged oligarchy or the "comprador class," merely perpetuates this underdevelopment. Baran's central argument was that economic development was not possible under these conditions of neo-colonialism

3. DEPENDENCY AND THEORIES OF DUALISM

Dependency theorists assign a modernizing role for post-colonial states to induce the process of development. Underdevelopment is viewed as an externally-induced process which is perpetuated by small but powerful domestic elite who form an alliance with the international capitalist system. The "development of underdevelopment" is therefore systemic and path-dependent.

In the study of international political economy, the concept of "hegemony" has acquired a strategic meaning. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the term applies to one country or a group of nation-states, which form a dominant power bloc within a definite hierarchy of nation-states. In the "world system" literature this configuration is viewed as a zero-sum game between the dominant core, satellite and peripheral states (Wallerstein, 1979 & 2003). A more sophisticated theory of Unequal Exchange was developed by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972), who argued that the international division of labour dictates that the poorer countries produce mostly commodities but high-wage countries produce manufactured goods. Unequal exchange is not so much a consequence of differences in productivity between countries but by the fact that wages are lower precisely because these countries have been designated by the international division of labour to specialize in the production of commodities.

From a historical perspective, capital accumulation has been governed by the law of uneven development. The spatial dimension of economic development has been characterized by a core/periphery configuration (Lewis, 1956). One of the seminal theories of this process of circular and cumulative causation was developed by Gunnar Myrdal who argued that capital movements tend to increase regional inequality by concentrating in the more developed regions (Myrdal, 1957). These are identified as the centrifugal, "spread effects" caused by economic expansion in the core regions which diffuse technology, capital investment and a modern infrastructure to the outlying, less developed hinterlands: "In the Centre's of expansion, increased demand will spur investment, which in turn will

increase incomes and demand and cause a second round of investment and so on. Saving will increase as a result of higher incomes but will tend to lag behind investment in the sense that the supply of capital will steadily meet the brisk demand for it" (Myrdal, 1957, p.28). However, the opposite logic of cumulative causation is evident in the less developed regions. These are identified as the "backwash effects" which merely reinforce the structural and socio-economic disadvantages of these regions.

8.3 BARAN'S VIEWS ON UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Paul Baran is of the view that capitalism, due to its inherent characteristics, exploits the Third World. It is in the interest of the capitalist world to keep the backward world as an indispensable hinterland. These less developed countries were the source of raw material and extracting economic surplus for the rich countries.

Most of the colonizers, according to Baran, were "rapidly determined to extract the largest possible gains from the host countries and to take their loot home" (1973: 274). Likewise, the per capita income, which is in paucity as compared to the rich countries, is a result of the capitalist development in the West.

This economic standoff could be got rid of through socialist economic system. Baran was a promoter of the Marxist approach to economic planning. He believed that the existing class structure of the Third World countries has also been responsible for their dependent situation.

The surplus of such countries was largely wasted, first by the 'lumpen-bourgeoisie' which included moneylenders, real estate agents and others who are considered to be non-productive and parasitic, and secondly by domestic industrial producers who were monopolistic, and believed in discouraging competition.

Baran is completely socialistic in his view and considers the present pattern of development to be capitalistic which is certainly exploitative. He wishes a society which is free from exploitation and that could be possible only in the socialist economy.

Baran's obsession for the Soviet model of economic development forces one to consider him to be as Utopian as Marx and Gandhi whose approaches have been possible to contem-plate but impossible to implement.

There are numerous, competing theories that inform the study of development economics. We will examine three major theories. The approach will be eclectic in the sense that each theory will be examined in terms of its insights into the development process as well as its major weaknesses.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

ii) Check your answer with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1. How do you know Theories of Underdevelopment?

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8.4 DEPENDENCY THEORY: THE BEGINNING

Dependency Theory developed in the late 1950s under the guidance of the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch. Prebisch and his colleagues were troubled by the fact that economic growth in the advanced industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in the poorer countries. Indeed, their studies suggested that economic activities in the richer countries often

led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. Such a possibility was not predicted by neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth was beneficial to all, even if the benefits were not always equally shared. Prebisch' s initial explanation for the phenomenon was very straightforward: poor countries exported primary commodities to the rich countries, who then manufactured products out of those commodities and sold them back to the poorer countries. The "Value Added" by manufacturing a usable product always cost more than the primary products used to create those products. Therefore, poorer countries would never be earning enough from their export earnings to pay for their imports. Prebisch' s solution was similarly straightforward: poorer countries should embark on programs of import substitution so that they need not purchase the manufactured products from the richer countries. The poorer countries would still sell their primary products on the world market, but their foreign exchange reserves would not be used to purchase their manufactures from abroad. Three issues made this policy difficult to follow. The first is that the internal markets of the poorer countries were not large enough to support the economies of the scale used by the richer countries to keep their prices low. The second issue concerned the political will of the poorer countries as to whether a transformation from being primary products producers was possible or desirable. The final issue revolved round the extent to which the poorer countries actually had control over their primary products, particularly in the area of selling those products abroad. These obstacles to the import substitution policy led others to think a little more creatively and historically at the relationship between rich and poor countries. At this point dependency theory was viewed as a possible way of explaining the persistent poverty of the poorer countries. The traditional neoclassical approach said virtually nothing on this question except to assert that the poorer countries were late in coming to sound economic practices and that as soon as they learned the techniques of modern economics, their poverty would begin to subside. However, Marxist theorists viewed the persistent poverty as a consequence of capitalist exploitation. And a new body of thought, called the world-systems approach, argued that poverty was a direct consequence of the

evolution of the international political economy into a fairly rigid division of labor which favored the rich and penalizedd the poor.

8.5 HOW CAN ONE DEFINE DEPENDENCY THEORY?

The debates among the liberal reformers -Prebisch, the Marxists -Andre Gunder Frank, and the world-systems theorists –Wallerstein (see Box 9.1) was vigorous and intellectually quite challenging. There are still points of serious disagreement among the various strains of dependency theorists and it is a mistake to think that there is only one unified theory of dependency. Nonetheless, there are some core propositions which seem to underlie the analyses of most dependency theorists. Dependency can be defined as an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences—political, economic, and cultural—on national development policies (Sunkel 1969: 23). Theotonio Dos Santos emphasizes the historical dimension of the dependency relationships in his definition: [Dependency is]...a historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economics...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected (Dos Santos 1971: 226). There are three common features to these definitions which most dependency theorists share: First, dependency characterizes the international system as comprised of two sets of states, variously described as dominant/dependent, center/periphery or metropolitan/satellite. The dominant states are the advanced industrial References nations in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The dependent states are those states of Latin America, Asia, and Africa which have low per capita GNPs and which rely heavily on the export of a single commodity, or a few commodities, for foreign exchange earnings. Second, both definitions have in common the assumption that external forces are of singular importance to the economic activities within the dependent states. These external forces include multinational corporations,

international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialized countries can represent their economic interests abroad. Third, all the definitions of dependency indicate that the relations between dominant and dependent states are dynamic because the interactions between the two sets of states tend to not only reinforce but also intensify the unequal patterns. Moreover, dependency is a very deep-seated historical process, rooted in the internationalization of capitalism. Latin America today is, and has been since the sixteenth century, a part of an international system dominated by the present developed nations. Under development in Latin America is the outcome of a particular series of relationships to the international system (Bodenheimer 1971: 157).

Box 9.1: World–Systems Theory In the 1960s international financial and trade systems were beginning to be more flexible, in which national governments seem to have less and less influence. These were the new conditions under which the Third world was trying to elevate its standards of living. It is this which made people like Immanuel Wallerstein conclude that there are new activities in the capitalist world-economy which cannot be explained by old theories. This school originated in Fernand Braudel Centre for the study of Economics, at the state University of New York at Binghamton. Having originated in sociology it extended its impact to anthropology, history, political sciences. Wallerstein and his followers felt that there were wider forces in the world that impacted and influenced small and underdeveloped nations and the nation-state level of analysis is no longer useful to explain conditions in underdeveloped countries. The factors that had greatest influence on small countries were new global systems of communications, the new world trade mechanisms, the international financial systems, and transfer of military links. These factors have created their own dynamic at the international level, and at the same time, these elements are interacting with internal aspects of each country.

In short, dependency theory attempts to explain the present underdeveloped state of many nations in the world by examining the patterns of interactions among nations and by arguing that inequality among nations is an intrinsic part of those interactions.

8.6 STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF DEPENDENCY: IS IT CAPITALISM OR IS IT POWER?

Most dependency theorists regard international capitalism as the motive force behind dependency relationships. Andre Gunder Frank, one of the earliest dependency theorists, is quite clear on this point: historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole" (Frank 1973: 3). According to this view, the capitalist system has enforced a rigid international division of labor which is responsible for the underdevelopment of many areas of the world. The dependent states supply cheap minerals, agricultural commodities, and cheap labor, and also serve as the repositories of surplus capital, obsolescent technologies, and manufactured goods. These functions orient the economies of the dependent states towards the outside: money, goods, and services do flow into dependent states, but the allocation of these resources is determined by the economic interests of the dominant states, and not by the economic interests of the dependent state. This division of labor is ultimately the explanation for poverty and there is little question but that capitalism regards the division of labor as a necessary condition for the efficient allocation of resources. The most explicit manifestation of this characteristic is in the doctrine of "comparative advantage". Moreover, to a large extent the dependency models rest upon the assumption that economic and political power are heavily concentrated and centralized in the industrialized countries, an assumption shared with Marxist theories of imperialism. If this assumption is valid, then any distinction between

economic and political power is spurious: governments will take whatever steps are necessary to protect private economic interests, such as those held by multinational corporations. Not all dependency theorists, however, are Marxists and one should clearly distinguish between dependency and a theory of imperialism. The Marxist theory of imperialism explains dominant state expansion while the dependency theory explains underdevelopment. Stated another way, Marxist theories explain the reasons why imperialism occurs, while dependency theories explain the consequences of imperialism. The difference is significant. In many respects, imperialism is, for a Marxist, part of the process by which the world is transformed and is therefore a process which accelerates the communist revolution. Marx spoke approvingly of British colonialism in India: England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia (Marx 1853). For the dependency theorists, underdevelopment is a wholly negative condition which offers no possibility of sustained and autonomous economic activity in a dependent state. Additionally, the Marxist theory of imperialism is self-liquidating, while the dependent relationship is self-perpetuating. The end of imperialism in the Leninist framework comes about as the dominant powers go to war over a rapidly shrinking number of exploitable opportunities. World War I was, for Lenin, the classic proof of this proposition. After the war was over, Britain and France took over the former German colonies.

The dependency theorist rejects this proposition. A dependent relationship exists irrespective of the specific identity of the dominant state. That the dominant states may fight over the disposition of dependent territories is not in and of itself a pertinent bit of information (except that periods of fighting among dominant states afford opportunities for the dependent states to break their dependent relationships). To a dependency theorist, the central characteristic of the global economy is the persistence of poverty throughout the entire modern period in virtually the same areas of the world, regardless of what state was in control. Finally, there are some dependency theorists

who do not identify capitalism as the motor force behind a dependent relationship. The relationship is maintained by a system of power first and it does not seem as if power is only supported by capitalism. For example, the relationship between the former dependent states in the socialist bloc (the Eastern European states and Cuba, for example) closely paralleled the relationships between poor states and the advanced capitalist states. The possibility that dependency is more closely linked to disparities of power rather than to the particular characteristics of a given economic system is intriguing and consistent with the more traditional analyses of international relations, such as realism.

8.7 CENTRAL PROPOSITIONS OF DEPENDENCY THEORY

There are a number of propositions, all of contestable, which form the core of the dependency theory. These propositions include:

1) "Underdevelopment" is a condition fundamentally different from "undevelopment". The latter term simply refers to a condition in which resources are not being used. For example, the European colonists viewed the North American continent as an undeveloped area: the land was not actively cultivated on a scale consistent with its potential. Underdevelopment refers to a situation in which resources are being actively used, but used in a way which benefits dominant states and not the poorer states in which the resources are found.

2) The distinction between underdevelopment and undevelopment places the poorer countries of the world in a profoundly different historical context. These countries are not "behind" or "catching up" with the richer countries of the world. They are not poor because they lagged behind the scientific transformations or the Enlightenment values of the European states. They are poor because they were coercively integrated into the European economic system only as producers of raw materials or to serve as repositories of cheap labor, and were denied the opportunity to market their resources in any way that competed with dominant states.

3) Dependency theory suggests that alternative uses of resources are preferable to the resource usage patterns imposed by dominant states. There is no clear definition of what these preferred patterns might be, but some criteria are invoked. For example, one of the dominant state practices most often criticized by dependency theorists is export agriculture. The criticism is that many poor economies experience rather high rates of malnutrition even though they produce great amounts of food for export. Many dependency theorists would argue that those agricultural lands should be used for domestic food production in order to reduce the rates of malnutrition.

4) The preceding proposition can be amplified as follows: dependency theorists rely upon a belief that there exists a clear "national" economic interest which can and should be articulated for each country. In this respect, dependency theory actually shares a similar theoretical concern with realism. What distinguishes the dependency perspective is that its proponents believe that this national interest can only be satisfied by addressing the needs of the poor within a society, rather than the satisfaction of corporate or governmental needs. Trying to determine what is the "best" for the poor is a difficult analytical problem. Dependency theorists have not yet articulated an operational definition of the national economic interest. 5) The diversion of resources over time (and one must remember that dependent relationships have persisted since the European expansion beginning in the fifteenth century) is maintained not only by the power of dominant States, but also through the power of elites in the dependent States. Dependency theorists argue that these elites maintain a dependent relationship because their own private interests coincide with the interests of the dominant States. These elites are typically trained in the dominant States and share similar values and culture with the elites in dominant States. Thus, in a very real sense, a dependency relationship is a "voluntary" relationship. One need not argue that the elites in a dependent State are consciously betraying the interests of their poor; the elites sincerely believe that the key to

economic development lies in following the prescriptions of liberal economic doctrine.

8.8   THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS

If one accepts the analysis of dependency theory, then the question of how poor economies' development becomes quite different from the traditional questions concerning comparative advantage, capital accumulation, and import/ export strategies. Some of the most important new issues include:

1) The success of the advanced industrial economies does not serve as a model for the currently developing economies. When economic development became a focused area of study, the analytical strategy (and ideological preference) was quite clear: all nations need to emulate the patterns used by the rich countries (see Unit 10 for more details on growth theories and its critics).

2) Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s there was a paradigmatic consensus that growth strategies were universally applicable, a consensus best articulated by Walt Rostow in his book, The Stages of Economic Growth. Dependency theory suggests that the success of the richer countries was a highly contingent and specific episode in global economic history, one dominated by the highly exploitative colonial relationships of the European powers. A repeat of those relationships is not now highly likely for the poor countries of the world.

3) Dependency theory repudiates the central distributive mechanism of the neoclassical model, what is usually called "trickle-down" economics. The neoclassical model of economic growth pays relatively little attention to the question of distribution of wealth. Its primary concern is on efficient production, and assumes that the market will allocate the rewards of efficient production in a rational and unbiased manner. This assumption may be valid for a well-integrated, economically fluid

economy where people can quickly adjust to economic changes and where consumption patterns are not distorted by non-economic forces such as racial, ethnic, or gender bias. These conditions are not pervasive in the developing economies, and dependency theorists argue that economic activity is not easily disseminated in poor economies. For these structural reasons, dependency theorists argue that the market alone is not a sufficient distributive mechanism.

4) Since the market only rewards productivity, dependency theorists discount References aggregate measures of economic growth such as the GDP or trade indices. Dependency theorists do not deny that economic activity occurs within a dependent state. They do make a very important distinction, however, between economic growth and economic development. For example, there is a greater concern within the dependency framework for whether the economic activity is actually benefiting the nation as a whole. Therefore, far greater attention is paid to indices such as life expectancy, literacy, infant mortality, education, and the like. Dependency theorists clearly emphasize social indicators far more than economic indicators.

5) Dependent states, therefore, should attempt to pursue policies of self-reliance. Contrary to the neo-classical models endorsed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, greater integration into the global economy is not necessarily a good choice for poor countries. Often this policy perspective is viewed as an endorsement of a policy of autarky, and there have been some experiments with such a policy such as China's Great Leap Forward or Tanzania's policy of Ujamaa. The failures of these policies are clear, and the failures suggest that autarky is not a good choice. Rather a policy of self-reliance should be interpreted as endorsing a policy of controlled interactions with the world economy: poor countries should only endorse interactions on terms that promise to improve the social and economic welfare of the larger citizenry.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

ii) Check your answer with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1. Discuss the Central Propositions of Dependency Theory.

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    Discuss the contributions of dependency theories.

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8.9   CRITICS OF DEPENDENCY THEORY

Dependency theories have provided an alternative approach to looking at unilinear growth models. They have critically evaluated the continued unequal relationships between countries, which have their history partly in colonialism and imperialism. While the dependency theories have provided a welcome critique from the South about the North, they were not without some shortcomings and critics. The principal criticism of dependency theories has been that the school does not provide any substantive empirical evidences to support its arguments. There are few examples that are provided but many exceptions are there which do not fit in with their core periphery theory, like the newly emerged industrial countries of South East Asia. It has also been said that dependency theories are highly abstract and tend to use homogenizing categories such as developed and underdeveloped, which do not fully capture the variations within these categories. Another point of criticism is that the dependency school considers ties with multinational corporations as detrimental, while one view has been that they are important means of transfer of technology. Another criticism which is leveled against the dependency theorists is that they base their arguments on received notions such as nation–state, capitalism and industrialization. Some of the Eurocentric biases are inherited in these theories of dependency

school: for example they assume that industrialization and possession of industrial capital are crucial requisites for economic progress. There is an inability to think beyond the state as the primary and essential agent of economic development. Also there is a Eurocentric bias in overlooking or de-emphasizing of production undertaken by women, and in not realizing the hazardous implications for the environment of industrialization and over exploitation of resources. A singular criticism, which is charged against the dependency theories, is that they do not reflect the changed socio-economic and political situations of the contemporary world. While many of the criticisms are justified, what we need to ask ourselves is whether the essential ideas and the ideology behind the dependency theory have any relevance in the present context?

8.10 RELEVANCE OF DEPENDENCY THEORIES

Increasing globalization, which appears an inevitable social condition and process, has pointed out to the interconnected nature of the world today. Never has there been so much flow of capital, finances, goods, people, and ideas and so on. Some of these interconnections had been pointed out by the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC) in the 1950s and by dependency theorists later, including the world-system theorists. "Both theories view the problems of underdevelopment and development within a global context, as interconnected economic, political and social processes. Dependency theory forecast that the world system will tend to concentrate production in the hands of relatively few transnational corporations, making the world an oligopoly market. From this, the theory also forecast a long trend to slow down production and to speed up income polarization" (Rojas 1984). The economic divide and income gap between industrialized countries and developing countries has widened continually. The polarization between North and South is more pronounced than ever. The United Nations Human Development Report, 1997 shows that the share of world trade for 48 least developed nations, representing 10% of the world's population, has halved in the past two

decades. There is a widening gap between the rich and the poor as these figures show: The share in the global income of the poorest 20% of the world's people has fallen from 2.3% in 1960 and 1.4% in 1991 to a current level of I.I %, while the ratio of the income of the top 20% to that of the poorest 20% rose from 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1991, and grew still further to a figure of 78:1 in 1994. In other words the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer (see figure 9.1). These trends show no sign of slowing down, even though the United Nations estimates in the Human Development Report that it will take only 1% of the global income and around 2-3% of the national income in all but the most impoverished countries to fund a programme to eliminate world poverty. These figures call attention to the fact that these growing disparities between people and nations have to be accounted for and analyzed (Human Development Report 1997). Since the aim of uneven development, dependency theories or world-system theory has been to account for the international political economy which is an interconnected world, there is reason to examine these theories for their rationale, though on the face of it they do not seem to be reflecting contemporary circumstances and situations and some of their formulations have been questioned. However, in the face of growing interconnected economies and political economy, it is worthwhile to critically evaluate the theories.

Fig.8.1: GDP as percentage of aggregate GDP for 156 market economies

Group of Countries	1960	1970	1980	1990	1999
Industrialised countries (21)	83.2	83.2	78.4	83.3	84.3
Sub-Saharan Africa (50)	2.5	2.3	2.8	1.4	1.1
South Asia (8)	3.9	3.1	2.2	2.0	2.3
Middle East and North Africa (9)	1.8	2.6	5.5	3.1	1.8
Latin America and the Caribbean (41)	6.7	6.8	7.7	5.9	6.7
East Asia and the Pacific (27)	2.0	2.1	3.3	4.4	3.8

Source: World Development Indicators and World Development Report, several years.

8.11 DEPENDENCY THEORY: AN OVERVIEW

Apart from all of its methodological and definitional deficiencies, dependency theory has been empirically undermined by the recent historical experience of many less developed countries. Those who may still hold to its fundamental premise that underdevelopment is a process that perpetuates economic backwardness, rather than a condition from which Less Development Countries (LDCs) can escape, simply choose to ignore recent economic history. However, it has been contended here that dependency is useful in the limited sense that it offers an international political economy framework for understanding underdevelopment. Economics alone cannot account for many of the factors that restrict economic and social progress. A reference to political economy dynamics in both domestic and international arenas is necessary. Dependency analysis rightly emphasizes the interdependence of economic and political relations in the international arena. If the political-economic dynamics it spells out are often mistaken, at least it gets the frame of reference right. In the final analysis, the study of underdevelopment is patently incomplete if we see the world through economic lenses alone. After fifty years of development experience since the discipline of development economics was born, scholars are increasingly coming to terms with the reality that underdevelopment is the result of a bewildering array of factors, not only economic and political, but also social, cultural, etc. We can say retrospectively that the dependency movement was simply too intellectually ambitious in seeking to account for underdevelopment with a general theory of political economy. As one of the pioneers of development theory, Albert Hirschman wrote thirty years ago: The attempt to produce general statements about the relationship between politics and economics is likely to produce only banality and frustration. For relationships at this level are either evident or hence uninteresting, or are as complex and dependent on so many other variables as to be unpredictable and inconclusive (Hirschman 1971: 8). It would be difficult to phrase more succinctly what has doomed dependency theory to the dustbin of history. Globalization means that Latin American economies are subjected to the

discipline of international financial markets as well as the threat of exit by local and international investors. Dependency theorists would predictably use this insight to validate their thinking by asserting that global economic integration restricts the room for maneuver of many governments in matters, fiscal and monetary. While this is undeniable, reduced freedom of policy action is not necessarily deleterious for development. In fact, many economists assert that the new discipline imposed on developing nations by international markets has weeded out the worst examples of irresponsible, populist policies of times past by tying politicians' hands. The international economic scene is quite different from when dependency tenets were first being formulated in the 1950s and 1960s. But again, it is up to Latin American governments to take advantage of the new opportunities and to limit the new risks that come with this new world economic landscape. Their policies give them some leverage as to the extent to which they want to control their individual economic destiny. That is the good news. Dependency theory, in a more pessimistic fashion, did not allow for that possibility.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

ii) Check your answer with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1. Discuss analysis dependency theory as articulation of the poorer nations.

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   What do you understand the relevance and critique of dependency theory.

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8.12 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have learnt that dependency theories have a recent origin. It was developed during the middle of 20th century in Latin America, mainly as a critique of modernization theories. They rejected the arguments of modernization theorists that modernity and development reach bottom most in its own due course. They argued that the economic activities in the richer countries often led to serious economic problems in the poorer countries. Here we have tried to define dependency theory and examined the social context that lead to the origin of dependency theory. We have also seen the central propositions of dependency theory and how they explain the causes and continuance of underdevelopment in the contemporary world. Finally the major criticisms against dependency theory and their relevance in this globalization era are also analyzed in the unit.

8.13 KEY WORDS

Globalization: Globalization or globalization is the process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments worldwide.

Dependency: Dependency grammar is a class of modern grammatical theories that are all based on the dependency relation and that can be traced back primarily to the work of Lucien Tesnière. Dependency is the notion that linguistic units, e.g. words, are connected to each other by directed links.

8.14 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

2. Can we explain underdevelopment and development in purely economic terms?
3. How do you know Theories of Underdevelopment?
4. Discuss Baran's Views on Underdevelopment.
5. Discuss the contributions of dependency theories.
6. Discuss analysis dependency theory as articulation of the poorer nations.

7. What do you understand the relevance and critique of dependency theory.

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8.16 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. The theory visualizes development as a process in which less developed countries are caught up in dependence and dominance relationship with rich countries and these subordinate countries suffer from institutional and structural constraints. Also see Section 8.2

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 8.7
2. See Section 8.8

Check Your Progress 3

3. See Section 8.9 and 8.10
4. See Section 8.11

UNIT 9: WORLD SYSTEM AND POST DEVELOPMENT

STRUCTURE

9.0   OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know World Systems Theory
- To find out the Characteristics
- To do the Criticisms of World System
- To discuss Post-development theory
- To know the Historical Survey
- To know Post-development Theory's Critique of "Development"

- To discuss the Post development Theory's Concerns About Westernization
- To describe Post development Theory's Defense of the Local and the Non-Western
- To know Post development Theory's Proposed "Alternatives to Development"
- To do the Criticisms Directed Against Post development Theory
- To find out the Future Directions to the world view.

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Post development theory is one of the most compelling—and controversial—fields of thought in contemporary development studies. This body of literature became prominent in the 1990s and has since sparked fierce debate and attracted much attention, both positive and negative. The discussion generated by post development theory has contributed not only to development studies but also to broader discussions about the so-called Third World and the future of left politics in a post communist, postmodern world.

A wide and varied range of literature is included under the umbrella term post development theory, making it difficult to define what exactly post development theory is. Perhaps the most common distinguishing feature of texts described as post development theory is their rejection of past development theory and practice and their insistence that development initiatives, on the whole, did more harm than good, hence the need for "alternatives to development." In this article, this and other key features of post development theory are outlined with the aim of providing a concise overview of this varied school of thought. The overview is followed by a summary of the criticisms that have been directed against post development theory. Finally, the conclusion offers a brief discussion of possible future directions in the field.

9.2 WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY

World systems theory was proposed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein. This lesson discusses the three-level hierarchy approach to economics, which consists of core, periphery, and semi-periphery countries, in the context of global inequality.

World Systems Theory

The **world systems theory**, developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, is an approach to world history and social change that suggests there is a world economic system in which some countries benefit while others are exploited. Just like we cannot understand an individual's behaviour without reference to their surroundings, experiences, and culture, a nation's economic system cannot be understood without reference to the world system of which they are a part.

The main characteristics of this theory, which will be discussed in more detail throughout the lesson, are:

- The world systems theory is established on a three-level hierarchy consisting of core, periphery, and semi-periphery areas.
- The core countries dominate and exploit the peripheral countries for labour and raw materials.
- The peripheral countries are dependent on core countries for capital.
- The semi-peripheral countries share characteristics of both core and peripheral countries.
- This theory emphasizes the social structure of global inequality.

Core Countries

According to the world systems theory, the world is divided into three types of countries or areas: core, periphery, and semi-periphery. Core countries are dominant capitalist countries that exploit peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. They are strong in military power

and not dependent on any one state or country. They serve the interests of the economically powerful. They are focused on higher skill and capital-intensive production. Core countries are powerful, and this power allows them to pay lower prices for raw goods and exploit cheap labor, which constantly reinforces the unequal status between core and peripheral countries.

The first core region was located in northwestern Europe and made up of England, France, and Holland. Today, the United States is an example of a core country. The U.S. has large amounts of capital, and its labor forces are relatively well paid.

Periphery Countries

Periphery countries fall on the other end of the economic scale. These countries lack a strong central government and may be controlled by other states. These countries export raw materials to the core countries, and they are dependent on core countries for capital and have underdeveloped industry. These countries also have low-skill, labor-intensive production, or, in other words, cheap labor. Periphery countries are commonly also referred to as third-world countries.

Eastern Europe and Latin America were the first peripheral zones. An example from today is Cape Verde, a chain of islands off the west coast of Africa. Foreign investors promote the extraction of raw materials and the production of cash crops, which are all exported to core countries.

World-systems theory (also known as world-systems analysis or the world-systems perspective) is a multidisciplinary, macro-scale approach to world history and social change which emphasizes the world-system (and not nation states) as the primary (but not exclusive) unit of social analysis.

"World-system" refers to the inter-regional and transnational division of labor, which divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery

countries, and the periphery countries. Core countries focus on higher skill, capital-intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labor-intensive production and extraction of raw materials. This constantly reinforces the dominance of the core countries. Nonetheless, the system has dynamic characteristics, in part as a result of revolutions in transport technology, and individual states can gain or lose their core (semi-periphery, periphery) status over time. This structure is unified by the division of labour. It is a world-economy rooted in a capitalist economy. For a time, certain countries become the world hegemon; during the last few centuries, as the world-system has extended geographically and intensified economically, this status has passed from the Netherlands, to the United Kingdom and (most recently) to the United States.

World-systems theory has been examined by many political theorists and sociologists to explain the reasons for the rise and fall of nations, income inequality, social unrest, and imperialism.

Immanuel Wallerstein has developed the best-known version of world-systems analysis, beginning in the 1970s. Wallerstein traces the rise of the capitalist world-economy from the "long" 16th century (c. 1450–1640). The rise of capitalism, in his view, was an accidental outcome of the protracted crisis of feudalism (c. 1290–1450). Europe (the West) used its advantages and gained control over most of the world economy and presided over the development and spread of industrialization and capitalist economy, indirectly resulting in unequal development.

Though other commentators refer to Wallerstein's project as world-systems "theory", he consistently rejects that term. For Wallerstein, world-systems analysis is a mode of analysis that aims to transcend the structures of knowledge inherited from the 19th century, especially the definition of capitalism, the divisions within the social sciences, and those between the social sciences and history. For Wallerstein, then, world-systems analysis is a "knowledge movement" that seeks to discern the "totality of what has been paraded under the labels of the... human

sciences and indeed well beyond". "We must invent a new language," Wallerstein insists, to transcend the illusions of the "three supposedly distinctive arenas" of society, economy and politics. The trinitarian structure of knowledge is grounded in another, even grander, modernist architecture, the distinction of biophysical worlds (including those within bodies) from social ones: "One question, therefore, is whether we will be able to justify something called social science in the twenty-first century as a separate sphere of knowledge." Many other scholars have contributed significant work in this "knowledge movement".

9.3 CHARACTERISTICS

World-systems analysis argues that capitalism, as a historical system, has always integrated a variety of labor forms within a functioning division of labor (world economy). Countries do not have economies but are part of the world economy. Far from being separate societies or worlds, the world economy manifests a tripartite division of labor, with core, semi peripheral and peripheral zones. In the core zones, businesses, with the support of states they operate within, monopolize the most profitable activities of the division of labor.

There are many ways to attribute a specific country to the core, semi-periphery, or periphery. Using an empirically based sharp formal definition of "domination" in a two-country relationship, Piana in 2004 defined the "core" as made up of "free countries" dominating others without being dominated, the "semi-periphery" as the countries that are dominated (usually, but not necessarily, by core countries) but at the same time dominating others (usually in the periphery) and "periphery" as the countries dominated. Based on 1998 data, the full list of countries in the three regions, together with a discussion of methodology, can be found.

The late 18th and early 19th centuries marked a great turning point in the development of capitalism in that capitalists achieved state society power in the key states, which furthered the industrial revolution marking the rise of capitalism. World-systems analysis contends that capitalism as a

historical system formed earlier and that countries do not "develop" in stages, but the system does, and events have a different meaning as a phase in the development of historical capitalism, the emergence of the three ideologies of the national developmental mythology (the idea that countries can develop through stages if they pursue the right set of policies): conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism.

Proponents of world-systems analysis see the world stratification system the same way Karl Marx viewed class (ownership versus non-ownership of the means of production) and Max Weber viewed class (which, in addition to ownership, stressed occupational skill level in the production process). The core nations primarily own and control the major means of production in the world and perform the higher-level production tasks. The periphery nations own very little of the world's means of production (even when they are located in periphery nations) and provide less-skilled labour. Like a class system with a nation, class positions in the world economy result in an unequal distribution of rewards or resources. The core nations receive the greatest share of surplus production, and periphery nations receive the smallest share. Furthermore, core nations are usually able to purchase raw materials and other goods from non-core nations at low prices and demand higher prices for their exports to non-core nations. Chirot (1986) lists the five most important benefits coming to core nations from their domination of periphery nations:

- Access to a large quantity of raw material
- Cheap labour
- Enormous profits from direct capital investments
- A market for exports
- Skilled professional labor through migration of these people from the non-core to the core.
- According to Wallerstein, the unique qualities of the modern world system include its capitalistic nature, its truly global nature, and the fact that it is a world economy that has not become politically unified into a world empire.

1. What do you know World Systems Theory?

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2. Discuss the Characteristics.

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9.4 CRITICISMS

World-systems theory has attracted criticisms from its rivals; notably for being too focused on economy and not enough on culture and for being too core-centric and state-centric. William I. Robinson has criticized world-systems theory for its nation-state centrism, state-structuralism approach, and its inability to conceptualize the rise of globalization. Robinson suggests that world-systems theory doesn't account for emerging transnational social forces and the relationships forged between them and global institutions serving their interests. These forces operate on a global, rather than state system and cannot be understood by Wallerstein's nation-centered approach.

According to Wallerstein himself, critique of the world-systems approach comes from four directions: the positivists, the orthodox Marxists, the state autonomists, and the culturists. The positivists criticize the approach as too prone to generalization, lacking quantitative

data and failing to put forth a falsifiable proposition. Orthodox Marxists find the world-systems approach deviating too far from orthodox Marxist principles, such as by not giving enough weight to the concept of social class. The state autonomists criticize the theory for blurring the boundaries between state and businesses. Further, the positivists and the state autonomists argue that state should be the central unit of analysis. Finally, the culturists argue that world-systems theory puts too much importance on the economy and not enough on the culture. In Wallerstein's own words:

In short, most of the criticisms of world-systems analysis criticize it for what it explicitly proclaims as its perspective. World-systems analysis views these other modes of analysis as defective and/or limiting in scope and calls for unthinking them.

One of the fundamental conceptual problems of the world-system theory is that the assumptions that define its actual conceptual units are social systems. The assumptions, which define them, need to be examined as well as how they are related to each other and how one changes into another. The essential argument of the world-system theory is that in the 16th century a capitalist world economy developed, which could be described as a world system. The following is a theoretical critique concerned with the basic claims of world-system theory: "There are today no socialist systems in the world-economy any more than there are feudal systems because there is only one world system. It is a world-economy and it is by definition capitalist in form."

Robert Brenner has pointed out that the prioritization of the world market means the neglect of local class structures and class struggles: "They fail to take into account either the way in which these class structures themselves emerge as the outcome of class struggles whose results are incomprehensible in terms merely of market forces." Another criticism is that of reductionism made by Theda Skocpol: she believes the interstate system is far from being a simple superstructure of the capitalist world economy: "The international states system as a transnational structure of

military competition was not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it represents an analytically autonomous level [... of] world capitalism, but [is] not reducible to it."

A concept that we can perceive as critique and mostly as renewal is the concept of coloniality (Anibal Quijano, 2000, Nepantla, Coloniality of power, euro centrism and Latin America). Issued from the think tank of the group "modernity/coloniality" (es:Grupo modernidad/colonialidad) in Latin America, it re-uses the concept of world working division and core/periphery system in its system of coloniality. But criticizing the "core-centric" origin of World-system and its only economical development, "coloniality" allows further conception of how power still processes in a colonial way over worldwide populations (Ramon Grosfogel, "the epistemic decolonial turn" 2007):" by "colonial situations" I mean the cultural, political, sexual, spiritual, epistemic and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate radicalized/ethnic groups by dominant radicalized/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administration". Coloniality covers, so far, several fields such as coloniality of gender (Maria Lugones), coloniality of "being" (Maldonado Torres), coloniality of knowledge (Walter Mignolo) and Coloniality of power (Anibal Quijano).

9.5 POST-DEVELOPMENT THEORY

The post development critique holds that modern development theory is a creation of academia in tandem with an underlying political and economic ideology. The academic, political, and economic nature of development means it tends to be policy oriented, problem-driven, and therefore effective only in terms of and in relation to a particular, pre-existing social theory.

The actual development projects thus initiated, by both governments and NGOs, are directed in accordance with this development theory. Development theory itself, however, assumes a framework already set in place by government and political culture in order to implement it. The development process is therefore socially constructed; Western interests

are guiding its direction and outcome, and so development itself fundamentally reflects the pattern of Western hegemony.

Development as an ideology and a social vision is ingrained in the ideals of modernization, which holds western economic structure and society as a universal model for others to follow and emulate. Rooted in western influence, the developmental discourse reflects the unequal power relations between the west and the rest of the world, whereby the western knowledge of development, approach toward development, and conception of what development entails, as well as perceptions of progress, directs the course for the rest of the world.

9.6 HISTORICAL SURVEY

Post development theory is a relatively new area in development studies. The idea that there was something that could be described as post development theory arose in the 1990s. That said, precursors to post development theory can be identified. To some extent, dependency theory can be considered to be a precursor of post development theory, because some features of dependency theory are shared by post development theory, particularly a concern with exploitation and oppression. However, as discussed by Manzo (1991) and Gülalp (1998), dependency theory shares with modernization theory "the idealized notion of development derived from the Western experience and the associated implicit longing to replicate it voluntarily" (Gülalp, 1998, p. 957). Post development theory's critique of modernity distinguishes it from dependency theory.

The first examples of what would become post development theory emerged around the 1980s with the critiques of development provided by Escobar (1984), Illich (1979), Latouche (1986), and Nandy (1983, 1986, and 1988). This kind of literature burgeoned in the early 1990s with the emergence of several scathing critiques of development in the form of books by Ferguson (1990), Latouche (1993), Mies and Shiva (1993), and Verhelst (1990), as well as volumes edited by Apffel Marglin and Marglin (1990, 1996) and Sachs (1992). In the mid to late 1990s, these

were joined by Escobar's Encountering Development (1995), Esteva and Prakash's Grassroots Post-modernism (1998), and Rahnema and Bawtree's Post-development Reader (1997). These three texts, along with The Development Dictionary (Sachs, 1992), really consolidated the post development library and attracted much attention to this school of thought. Since the 1990s, there has been continued discussion about post development theory, notably in volumes like Ziai's (2007) edited volume Exploring Post-Development and in a recent special issue on post development theory in Third World Quarterly (Volume 38, issue 12, 2017), but interest in the topic has gradually slowed down, as is discussed further below.

Like most subfields in development studies, post development theory is by no means a unified school of thought. While this term has been applied, and sometimes self-applied, in reference to the above-mentioned authors and to several others, there is much diversity in the literature. First, one can differentiate between post development literature that is mainly disseminated and discussed in English and literature that is predominantly influential in Francophone circles. While it is possible to note some differences between the two groups, there has been a fair amount of interaction between post development theorists from various linguistic groups. Consider, for example, a conference held in 2002 in Paris (titled "Défaire le Development, Refaire le Monde" [Unmake Development, Remake the World]) that brought together participants from all over the world, speaking mainly in French, but with sessions in English as well.

Second, one can differentiate different schools of thought within post development theory. David Simon distinguished between what he calls "antidevelopment" and "post development" texts (2003, p.7, n. 36; 2006, pp. 11–12). Anti-development texts present a radical and derisive critique of development, lambasting it for causing cultural destruction and dependency. Escobar's Encountering Development was identified as an example of such a text. In contrast, Simon characterized post development theory as more forward-looking literature in which new

alternatives to development are proposed. Esteva and Prakash's Grassroots Post-modernism was considered an example. The distinction Simon made was not between two sets of writers (indeed, some authors, like Escobar, have written both anti- and post development texts), but a distinction between a critical backward-looking approach (anti-development), about which he is not very positive, and a more forward-looking constructive approach (post development), about which he is more optimistic.

Aram Ziai (2004) made a slightly different distinction: he distinguished between a reactionary populist variant of post development theory and a radical democratic one. The former rejects modernity completely and advocates a return to a romanticized, subsistence-based existence. Ziai (2004, pp. 1054–1056) identified Alvares (1992) and Rahnema and Bawtree (1997) as proponents of this approach. The other variant, which Ziai believed was promoted by Escobar (1995), Esteva and Prakash (1998), Banuri (1990a, 1990b), and Apffel-Marglin and Marglin (1996), is as cautious in its praise of "the local" and of non-Western cultural traditions as it is in its criticism of modernity. Ziai argued that this variant fits nicely with the idea of radical democracy as espoused by Lummis (1996) and Laclau and Mouffe (2001), in that it favors radical decentralization and the rejection of universal models.

Simon's and Ziai's distinctions are quite different, yet both help to delineate the field of post development theory. This article, however, treats post development theory as a single school of thought, even while it is acknowledged that there are significant variations within post development literature.

Before outlining some of the key themes in post development theory, a brief comment on the intersections between post development theory and other "post" literature is necessary. Some authors, such as Power (2003) and Esteva and Prakash (1998), treat post development theory as if it were a post-modern approach to development. This is misleading because, while some of the above authors have been influenced by post-

modern writing and concerns, overall, post development theory cannot be said to unambiguously reflect a—and certainly not the—post-modern approach to development. It would be more appropriate to say that much post development theory is influenced by post-modernism, but that there is much variation in the extent of this influence. Post development theory also shares much in common with post-colonial theory, despite the surprisingly little interaction between the two, although Sharp and Briggs (2006) and Simon (2006) have written about common themes found in both post development and post-colonial writings.

Post development theory emerged out of the despair felt by many at the apparent failure of development and at the impasse with which development studies seemed to be confronted by the late 1980s (sees Booth 1985, 1994; Power, 2003, p. 83; Schuurman, 1993; Sharp & Briggs, 2006, p. 7; Simon, 1997, p. 183, 2003, pp. 5–7). Given this context, it is not surprising, then, that a lot of post development theory—particularly those texts that Simon (2006) referred to as antidevelopment writings—focused on the shortcomings of past development theory and practice. As the discussion below indicates, post development writers spend much time critically interrogating the assumptions that had informed development work and the practices that had characterized attempts to bring about development. However, in addition to such a critical interrogation, post development writers also point to some possible better ways to define and address the problems development initiatives typically purport to tackle—problems like poverty, oppression, and exploitation. In the sections to follow, key themes that emerge in post development theory are overviewed with the intention of providing the reader with a broader understanding of the arguments made by post development theorists as well as pointing the reader toward texts dealing with particular themes.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of this unit.

1. Discuss the Criticisms of World System.

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2. Discuss Post-development theory.

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3. What do you know about Historical Survey?

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9.7   POST-DEVELOPMENT THEORY'S CRITIQUE OF "DEVELOPMENT"

Post development theorists believe that development has failed, in that its promises remain unfulfilled. Here they are in agreement with most critical development theorists, who concur that since the 1980s, the so-called lost decade of development, there has been growing disappointment with the whole project of bringing development to the Third World. As Sachs put it: "The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work" (1992, p. 1). The persistence of problems like poverty and inequality after decades of attempts at

bringing about development is considered by post development theorists as testimony to the failure of development.

These theorists also believe that, in addition to its failure to bring about the benefits it promises, development causes problems of its own. Rist (1997, p. 20) argued that over and above failing to alleviate poverty in the Third World, development has increased the dependence of the Third World and resulted in the depletion of its resources, and Rahnema said, "Not only did development fail to resolve the old problems it was supposed to address, but it brought in new ones of incomparably greater magnitude" (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997, p. 378). The problems to which he referred are cultural alienation, environmental destruction, loss of self-esteem, conflict, and the creation of perpetually unfulfilled expectations.

Post development thinkers believe that the failure of development and the new problems it has apparently provoked have led to a loss of faith in development. This loss of faith is a further indicator that it may be time to call for an end to development, to "write its obituary" (Sachs, 1992, p. 1), and to proclaim a post development era. The contemporary notion of development has been delegitimized, so that it is increasingly difficult to remain convinced that poverty, inequity, and other problems can be solved by development.

One reason why post development theorists do not find the failure of past development initiatives a motivation to intensify efforts to bring about development is that they understand the failure of development to be related to flaws within the idea itself, rather than being the result of failed implementation of a basically sound idea. To post development theorists, development as an idea is deeply problematic, so that the failure of development is inevitable, and, indeed, so that the success of development would ultimately be no better than its failure. Development is premised upon shaky assumptions.

To make this argument, post development theorists stress that development is not just a set of projects aiming to address a set of

problems, but that development is a "cast of mind" (Sachs, 1992, p. 1), an "ideology" (Alvares, 1992, p. 90), an "interpretive grid" (Ferguson, 1990, p. xiii), a "discourse" (Escobar, 1995, pp. 5–6), and a "myth" (Latouche, 1993; Rist, 1997). In this way, they emphasize that development is more than just a series of policies and practices, and that the failure of development is ultimately the failure of an idea. Marglin summed this up nicely when stressing that the criticisms of development offered by contributors to a book he co-edited were "directed not at particular failures, which might be explained away as poor implementation of basically sound ideas, but at the theories which have undergirded and legitimized practice" (1990, p. 1).

Rist's The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith offered a useful discussion of this theme. Rist argued that development is rooted in a particular intellectual tradition and that the flaws in this tradition are reflected in the idea of development itself. He identified the idea of infinite progress as "an idea which radically distinguishes Western culture from all others" and also as an idea that is hopelessly flawed (1997, p. 238). The contemporary idea of development, he argued, fits into a set of Western ideas regarding the infiniteness of progress, and, given the flaws of these ideas, the idea of development is also deeply flawed. Progress is not infinite, and development, as it has been conceived, is not possible.

If, as Rist and other post development theorists argued, development's failure can be attributed to flaws in the very idea itself, rather than flawed implementation, then no amount of improved development practice will allow the problems that development purports to address to be solved. For this reason, post development theorists believe that what is needed is a new approach to these problems, one that may even reveal certain "problems" not to be problems at all and that may expose new difficulties.

One of the flaws in the idea of development, according to post development theorists, is that it misrepresents both those it labels

"developed" and those it labels "underdeveloped." For post development theorists, these labels make little sense, involve the essentialization of both those labeled developed and underdeveloped, and create false impressions about those assigned to each camp. It is important to note that, while post development theorists take issue with the developed/underdeveloped distinction, they do believe that important distinctions exist between regions classed under these headings. However, they question the explanatory value of relating the distinctions to "levels of development."

Post development theorists point out that "underdevelopment" is not an objective condition. People, it seems, came to be described as "underdeveloped" at some stage. In an account of his own experience of development, Shrestha wrote that, as a young boy growing up in Nepal, he had no idea that he was underdeveloped: "Poor and hungry I certainly was. But underdeveloped? I never thought—nor did anyone else—that being poor meant being 'underdeveloped' and lacking human dignity" (1995, p. 268). It was only in the 1950s that this word (or the local translation of it) began to take on some meaning in the village where Shrestha grew up, and indeed in many other parts of the world. Post development theorists point out that describing a group of people as underdeveloped means defining them in relation to what they are not and ignoring their diversity, so that diverse groups of people are united by their lack of something that has been achieved by others (Sachs, 1992, p. 3). Highlighting this, Esteva talked about how the emergence of development discourse meant that people

ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others' reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogeneous and diverse majority, simply in the terms of a homogenizing and narrow minority.

(Esteva, 1992, p. 7)

Development literature tends to present "underdeveloped" ways of life as absolutely undesirable and inferior to the "developed" way of life. But, Rahnema asked, "Was everything so bad in the old world?" (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997, p. 379). He referred to the work of Marshall Sahlins and others, who have shown that the lives of hunter-gatherers, who would typically be classified as extremely underdeveloped, were not as bad as they are often presented to be—in fact, Sahlins (1997) called this kind of society "the original affluent society." Similarly, in Shrestha' s narrative of his own development experience, he argued that the Nepalese economic system and values, which he had earlier rejected in favor of the "developed" way of life, had much more going for them than he originally thought. This way of life was "generally self-reliant, self-sufficient, sustainable, and far less destructive of humanity as well as nature" (1995, p. 276). Similarly, Shiva (1989, p. 10) pointed out that traditional diets, building styles, and forms of clothing are often healthier and ecologically more appropriate than their modern counterparts. The "underdeveloped" way of life cannot so easily be dismissed as completely undesirable.

Post development theorists like Rahnema, Shrestha, and Shiva cautioned that they do not mean to suggest that everything about the "underdeveloped" way of life is good and desirable. Shiva, for example, stressed that not all cultural practices are of equal value and described traditional practices like dowry, India's caste system, and genital mutilation as undesirable (Mies & Shiva, 1993, p. 11); and Shrestha emphasized that he is "not trying to suggest that whatever was old was good and desirable and that every aspect of our lost heritage should be reclaimed. . . . Nobody should be oblivious to the many tyrannical practices of our feudal-religious heritage" (1995, p. 276). However, Rahnema, Shiva, Shrestha, and others stressed that, while the "underdeveloped" way of life may have been flawed in several important ways, development discourse misrepresents this way of life when it presents it as being like life in Hobbes' state of nature—"poor, nasty, brutish and short." It is misleading to present the lives of the underdeveloped as perfect and trouble-free but, as Latouche pointed out,

"The incredible joie de vivre that strikes many observers in African suburbs misleads less than the depressing objective evaluations using statistical apparatus which discern only the Westernized part of wealth and poverty" (1993, p. 216). More positive accounts of life in the underdeveloped world are often criticized for romanticizing the poor, but post development thinkers suggest that such romanticization is no more misleading than the standard negative way in which the underdeveloped are presented in development literature.

9.8 POSTDEVELOPMENT THEORY'S CONCERNS ABOUT WESTERNIZATION

Most post development theorists are deeply critical of contemporary Western society. If developing means adopting the modern, Western way of life, then, as Sachs commented, "It is not the failure of development which has to be feared but its success" (1992, p. 3). According to post development theorists, the modern, Western way of life is not sufficiently good and desirable to function as a model for what other parts of the world ought to become. Development surely means becoming like those labeled "developed," but if this is so, then the form of development being proposed is only desirable if the developed way of life in which it results is desirable. But, argue post development theorists, it most assuredly is not.

Much development literature implies that suffering, deprivation, and misery are the preserve of the underdeveloped. Citizens of the developed world apparently live basically good, meaningful, happy lives. From the perspective of a Third World citizen, familiar only with images of the developed society and not with the reality of day-to-day life in the developed world, this developed way of life seems very desirable. But, as a character in the play Mon Oncle d'Amerique commented, "America doesn't exist. I've been there" (quoted in Banuri, 1990a, p. 59). Much the same can be said of the "developed" world. If the developed world is the world in which poverty, injustice, conflict, want, and misery have been eradicated, then indeed, the developed world does not exist. Nevertheless, certain parts of the world are continually labeled

developed, and development literature continually assumes the desirability of life in these parts.

Post development theorists acknowledge that there are many benefits to life in the developed world, but point out that "the attractions of the Western model need no elaboration" (Marglin, 1990, p. 3) —we are well aware of the high levels of physical comfort enjoyed by those in the West and of the other benefits of the Western way of life. Despite these benefits, post development theorists argue that "the Western model remains less than compelling" (Marglin 1990, p. 3). There are several problems with the developed way of life, and post development theorists feel that these problems ought to be highlighted. As Verhelst (1990, p. 66) pointed out, many in the Third World are attracted by the well-advertised benefits of the Western way of life, and surely honesty requires that the problems of the West be publicly described and analyzed as well, to prevent the "persistent, servile admiration" of the West reflected in the attitude of some Third World citizens.

One of the problems of the West highlighted by post development theory relates to the environmental destruction that the developed way of life has brought with it. This problem is well known, and many in the developed world are actively trying to pursue ways in which to continue the developed way of life while mitigating its effects on the environment. The environmental crisis casts doubt on the viability and desirability of the development project.

Another problem experienced by the developed world has to do with the sociocultural characteristics of the developed regions. The developed world has certainly not found a way to eradicate misery. Marglin listed "spiritual desolation, meaningless work, [and] neglect of the aged" as some of the characteristics of the developed society that make it a "dubious example" for the rest of the world (1990, p. 3). Latouche spoke of the West as "an impersonal machine, devoid of spirit" and stressed that Western civilization has its "dark side," which includes desolation, numbness, and insecurity (1993, pp. 11–13). Verhelst dedicated a chapter

(titled "Alienation amidst Plenty") in his book on culture and development to the cultural desolation of the West. He began the chapter by noting that "There is something insulting and narrow-minded in speaking only of the 'problems of the Third World' as if humanity's evils were confined to the tropics and to people of color; as if the West, in contrast, was sheltered from all the misery and depravity that thrives overseas" (1990, p. 65).

A further problem that post development theorists identify in developed society is that it is parasitical upon the existence of underdevelopment. Here, they echo and build upon the ideas of dependency theorists, who argued that the underdevelopment of some regions is a result of the same process that brought development to other regions. It seems to post development theorists that developed society is only made possible by the deprivation of others. Alvares (1992, p. 145) argued that the levels of resource use and wastage of the developed world require the "permanent victimhood" of the many excluded from this way of life.

Disillusionment with the benefits of the modern Western way of life is thus a key feature of several post development writings. From the perspective of post development theorists, development appears to be premised on exploitation and oppression and to result in a way of life that, while having many benefits, is by no means unambiguously far superior to other ways of life.

The critique of the West enables post development theorists to question both the possibility and the desirability of development. If development is premised upon environmental destruction and the exploitation of others, then it may not be possible for the Third World to develop, because it lacks a periphery to exploit and because it seems that the development of the Third World would escalate already terrifying levels of environmental destruction, until such a point that all further development becomes impossible. Furthermore, if the goal of development—becoming "developed"—is not as desirable as it has been

presented, then there seems to be no reason to justify the exploitation of people and nature in pursuit of development.

Several post development theorists, particularly Sachs (1992, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2013) and Shiva (1989, 1991, 2016; Mies & Shiva 1993), drew attention to the ecological limits that suggest that the developed way of life cannot possibly be generalized. Sachs, for example, wrote of the "five or six planets [that] would be needed to serve as mines and waste dumps" if the industrialized model were to be generalized (1992, p. 2). Shiva and other Eco feminists argued that something more radical than the "greening" of development or "sustainable" development is required. Drawing on statistics about current and projected future resource usage, post development theorists argue that proposing development as the solution to the problems of the Third World is at best unwise and at worst suicidal. They do not see new "green" technology and "sustainable" development as solutions to such problems. It seems clear that even with attempts at "green" development, it is not possible for the whole of humanity to consume or waste in a manner similar to that of citizens of the developed world. For post development theorists, then, ecological limits make development impossible, and suggest the need for a new approach to the problems of the Third World.

Development is also impossible because it seems, as mentioned earlier, that the development of some parts of the world was at least to some extent predicated on the exploitation of other parts of the world. We can only speculate about what our contemporary world would look like had there been no imperialism, no slave trade, and no colonial and neocolonial trade practices; however, it seems reasonable to assume that the developed parts of the world could not have achieved their current levels of material comfort if these practices had never taken place, and indeed did not continue to take place today. To use Sachs's (1992, p. 2) image, the underdeveloped would need five or six planets not only to serve as mines and waste dumps, but also to serve as areas to be exploited and to provide cheap labor. Thus, the exploitative nature of the

development of the developed world suggests that the underdeveloped will not be able to achieve development.

For post development theorists, development is not only undesirable because it seems to be at least partially predicated upon exploitation, but also because the outcome of development—the developed society—does not make development seem a worthwhile process. If, as discussed earlier, the affluence of the developed world has not led to the eradication of misery, hopelessness, loneliness, fear, and deprivation among its citizens, then it seems necessary to question both the possibility and the desirability of becoming developed.

As pointed out earlier, post development theorists believe that to group together large sections of the world under the label underdeveloped are to ignore the differences among these groups. The underdeveloped regions of the world are home to diverse cultural groups with diverse ways of seeing and being in the world. Post development theory gives much attention to this diversity and presents it as a valuable asset that is being undermined by development.

Shanin (1997) suggested that the idea of progress, a core element of the idea of development, emerged partly in response to the West's need to explain the diversity of humanity. As European travelers became more and more aware that the world consisted of a vast variety of different people who lived in numerous very different ways, it became necessary to try to explain this diversity. The old dichotomy of civilization/barbarity no longer seemed adequate, given the myriad of societies that came to light during the period of European conquest. The idea of progress or development proved a useful tool to explain this diversity. Different societies were portrayed as being at different levels of development, with Western society presented as a more evolved version of earlier societies (Shanin, 1997, p. 67). This way of explaining diversity strengthened the West's belief in its superiority and helped legitimize colonialism. The post-colonial era may have seen the delegitimization of the idea that the "advanced" countries should rule

over the "backward" regions, but it has not seen an end to the belief that differences in societal arrangement reflect varying levels of some kind of evolutionary progress.

By explaining social difference in a way that ranks different groups of people, non-Western ways of life are denigrated. Moreover, this way of understanding difference denies non-Western societies any future other than gradual assimilation by the West. As Marx put it, "The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future" (1958, p. 74, cited in Rist, 1997, p. 42). According to this understanding of difference, a developed world would be one in which differences in socioeconomic arrangements and general lifestyle would be significantly reduced. Post development theorists believe that current development initiatives have thus far served to reduce diversity and that the reduction of diversity is to be lamented and opposed.

Diversity, to post development theorists, is an asset. As long as there is diversity, alternative ways of living are evident. The persistence of diversity means the existence of "other ways of building economies, or dealing with basic needs, of coming together into social groups" (Escobar, 1995, p. 225), and thereby provides us with lived alternatives to the way we do things. Marglin (1990, pp. 15–17) compared cultural diversity with biological diversity. Just as biologists speak in favor of maintaining the diversity of the genetic pool, so we should defend cultural diversity because the existence of a variety of cultures maintains "the diversity of forms of understanding, creating, and coping that the human species has managed to generate" (1990, pp. 16–17).

9.9 POSTDEVELOPMENT THEORY'S DEFENSE OF THE LOCAL AND THE NON-WESTERN

Post development theorists can be described as defenders of the "local." In line with their defense of diversity discussed above, many are opposed to "global solutions" because such solutions tend to ignore the

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specificities that may make a solution appropriate in one place but less appropriate elsewhere. Thus, for some post development theorists, to resist development is not to propose in its place another solution to the world's problems, but to stress that different societies need to find different ways to cope with the problems they face —and that the problems, too, will differ from place to place.

Some, like Esteva and Prakash (1997, 1998), opposed both thinking and acting "big." They argued that the slogan "Think globally, act locally" epitomizes a common approach among "alternative development" activists, but that it is preferable to both act and think locally, because they believed global thinking to be impossible and unwise. It should be noted that Esteva and Prakash were not opposed to "effective coalitions for specific purposes," nor to the articulation of a "shared No" to common enemies (1997, p. 24, p. 28), but they were cautious about more general and restrictive affirmative coalitions that try to define a broader common project. Similarly, Escobar believed that "There are no grand alternatives that can be applied to all places or all situations. . . . One must resist the desire to formulate alternatives at an abstract, macro level" (1995, p. 222). The argument is not one in favor of a radical localism that seeks no contact outside the immediate locality, but it is a position that both favors the local and is rather suspicious of big, far-ranging approaches.

Other post development theorists were less cautious about presenting general solutions or identifying general problems. Mies and Shiva warned against a position that is so sensitive to difference, and so opposed to universalism, that it advocates a form of cultural relativism. They argued that what "grassroots women activists" want is a new form of universalism and that we should focus not only on differences between people but also on "interconnectedness among women, among men and women, among human beings and other life forms, worldwide" (1993, pp. 12–13).

Post development theorists' suspicion of big, grand-scale projects leads them to support local social movements. Rather than placing their faith in government agencies, international institutions, and large nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), post development writers place their faith in smaller, "grassroots" organizations, many of which are referred to as "new social movements" (NSMs). It is hoped that these locally based, locally inspired groups will be better able to play a role that is sensitive to difference and that is based on the particular needs of particular groups of people.

In line with their critique of the West, their emphasis on the value of diversity, and their focus on the local, post development theorists stress that many non-Western, "non-developed" ways of life are valid and worth defending. Thus, they challenge the desirability of development both by challenging the desirability of becoming developed and by challenging the undesirability of being underdeveloped.

Post development theorists are more likely than other development theorists to draw on non-Western thinkers and philosophies in defense of their arguments. One of the non-Western thinkers much respected and referred to by post development theorists is Gandhi (see, for example, Alvares, 1992, pp. 131–135; Mies & Shiva 1993, p. 322; Shiva, 1993, p. 264). Alvares (1992, pp. 131–141) also drew on other non-Western thinkers, including Indian thinkers, such as Manu Kothari and Lopa Mehta, and a Japanese agricultural scientist, Fukuoka. Rahnema referred to the Chinese thinkers Confucius and Lao Tzu in the closing chapter of The Post-development Reader (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997, pp. 387–389). This reliance on non-Western thinkers is by no means unique to post development theory, but it contributes to their general stance in favor of the non-Western.

Post development theorists clearly do not think that development should be rejected only because being developed is not all it has been made out to be; they believe, too, that the underdeveloped ways of life, and the philosophies of those coming from underdeveloped areas, have much to

contribute to discussions about how to live good lives. In order to make this point, they implicitly and explicitly stress the value of underdeveloped worldviews and practices.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of this unit.

1. What do you know Post-development Theory's Critique of "Development"?
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2. Discuss the Post development Theory's Concerns About Westernization.

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3. Describe Post development Theory's Defense of the Local and the Non-Western.

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9.10 POSTDEVELOPMENT THEORY'S PROPOSED "ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT"

What ultimately characterizes post development theory, and sets it apart from other critical development theory, is its rejection of development. While many critical development theorists would agree with many of the arguments outlined above, they draw the line at calling for an "end to development." At this point they caution against "throwing the baby out

with the bathwater" (see, for example, Parpart, 1995, p. 264; Sharp & Briggs, 2006, p. 8; Sutcliffe, 1999, p. 151). Rejecting the whole contemporary notion of development seems too many to be a little extreme.

Extreme it may be, but this appears to be the position of post development theorists. In Sachs's introduction to his Development Dictionary, he described the intention of the contributors to the book as being "to clear out of the way this self-defeating development discourse" (1992, p. 4). Alvares talked about a need for "a frontal attack on the ideology of development," and said, "There is no such thing as a developed or an undeveloped person" (1992, p. 108). Rahnema stated that, while he does not believe that all development projects are bad, he and most other contributors to The Post-development Reader "have come to the conclusion that development was indeed a poisonous gift to the populations it set out to help" (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997, p. 381).

It seems clear that post development theorists differ from other critical development theorists in that they choose to oppose development rather than to reform and rehabilitate it. However, the difference between the two positions is not all that clear: is it a squabble about words—about whether or not the word development should still be used in descriptions of initiatives aiming to improve people's lives—or is there some deeper difference? Perhaps part of the reason why post development theorists choose to reject even the vocabulary related to development is that they believe that words do not just indicate and describe "things out there," but conjure up a whole number of images and feelings. Esteva argued:

Development cannot delink itself from the words with which it was formed—growth, evolution, maturation. Just the same, those who now use the word cannot free themselves from a web of meanings that impart a specific blindness to their language, thought and action. No matter the context in which it is used, or the precise connotation the person using it wants to give it, the expression becomes qualified and colored by meanings perhaps unwanted. (1992, p. 10)

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In a later work, Esteva (1996) described the words common in development discourse as buoys in a net, such that when one uses them, one finds oneself trapped in the net. In a similar vein, Latouche argued that "Words are rooted in history; they are linked to ways of seeing and entire cosmologies which very often escape the speaker's consciousness, but which have a hold over our feelings" (1993, p. 160). Latouche therefore did not believe that the debate about the word development is simply a silly squabble over words. For him, development is a "toxic word" that cannot escape the connotations that attach themselves to it. To argue that development must be completely different from what it has always been seems dangerous to him—it is to "don the opposition's colors, hoping perhaps to seduce rather than combat it—but more likely to fall into the abyss itself" (1993, p. 160). For Esteva, Latouche, and others, it seemed safer to avoid the terminology generally used in development discourse altogether. In this, post development theorists clearly differ from many other critical development theorists who prefer to redefine development, arguing like Tucker (1999, p. 15) and Rahman (1993, pp. 213–214) that the term development is a powerful word and that to reject it "would amount to handing over a powerful tool to those who exploit it for their own purposes" (Tucker, 1999, p. 15).

Along with rejecting the word development, post development theorists distance themselves from the advocates of various forms of "alternative development," arguing instead for "alternatives to development." Their distaste for alternative development stems partly from the realization that many so-called alternatives have been co-opted into standard development discourse, and that what is needed is a more radical position—one that opposes standard development discourse, rather than trying to coax it in a new direction. Banuri's distinction between "internal" and "external" critiques is useful here (1990a, pp. 35–38; 1990b, pp. 75–76). Internal critiques of development accept the underlying moral arguments and assumptions made in the development theories they criticize, while external critiques of development "reject the basic notions of welfare and behavior implicit in such theories" and are

opposed to the "presumed superiority of Western values" implicit in much development theory (Banuri, 1990a, pp. 35–36). External critiques resist being assimilated into development theory, while internal critiques do not. Post development theorists, unlike the advocates of "alternative development," are clearly external critics, standing outside the value system from which development initiatives emerge, and opposing the assumptions upon which the idea of development is premised. In this way, they resist being co-opted into standard development discourse. The recent history of development discourse demonstrates the very real risk of co-option: when development's impact on the environment was criticized, the idea of sustainable development came to the fore; when development was criticized for the way it approached culture, attempts were made to see culture as a "tool" for development, and so on. Thus the post development theorist's position of standing outside standard development theory and vehemently opposing it can be understood as an attempt to resist co-option within standard development discourse.

Of course, it should be pointed out here that the internal critic/external critique distinction is not very clear. Many advocates of alternative development share some but not all the values and assumptions implicit in standard development theory, and post development theorists cannot be said not to have a single value or assumption in common with mainstream development theorists. Nevertheless, the post development theorists' position is at greater variance with the standard development position than is the position of most advocates of various "alternative" forms of development.

Indeed, some post development theorists not only distance themselves from alternative development but also show themselves to be completely opposed to it. Latouche called alternative development a "siren song" and described it as more dangerous than "true blue" development (1993, p. 149). By presenting a "friendly exterior," alternative development is harder to resist than standard development; nevertheless, it shares many of the pitfalls of standard development. For Latouche, "The opposition between 'alternative development' and alternative to development is

radical, irreconcilable and one of essence, both in the abstract and in theoretical analysis" (1993, p. 159, emphasis in the original).

The rejection of the idea of alternative development and of the very vocabulary associated with development is part of post development theorists' preoccupation with culture, discourse, and mindsets. Many critics of past development initiatives point to the material failures of past development practice, but few give as much attention to the nonmaterial aspects of development, and of its failure, as do post development theorists. As mentioned earlier, post development theorists emphasize that development is a way of seeing the world, an ideology or a mindset. This emphasis on the nonmaterial also extends to the approach that post development theorists take when suggesting how to address the failure of development. Rather than proposing new strategies and approaches that could bring about "real" benefits, such as GDP growth, increases in literacy levels, and so on, they suggest that the most important requirement for addressing the failure of development is a change in the way we understand the world.

Post development theorists point out that the way we act and the way we see the world are intimately connected—"The act of belief is performative, and if people must be made to believe, it is so that they can be made to act in a certain way" (Rist, 1997, p. 22). Development has become the preoccupation of so many in the Third World because their imaginations have been conquered by the contemporary idea of development. In order for this idea of development to be popularized, people had to begin to see the world in terms of development—they had to perceive certain situations as being situations of underdevelopment and to see the solution to certain problems as development. As Esteva pointed out, "In order for people to seek to escape underdevelopment, they first have to believe that they are underdeveloped" (1992, p. 7). Likewise, if contemporary development initiatives are to be discarded and new ways of approaching problems like poverty and injustice are to be initiated, then new ways of seeing and understanding the world need to emerge. Verhelst stressed this, saying, "There can be no solution to the

crisis if we merely change structures without effecting the sort of personal conversion that allows collective changes of mentality and behavior" (1990, p. 71). So often, talk of the discourse and imagery of development is seen as neglecting the "real" effect of development or the lack thereof, but, as Ferguson underlined, "Thinking is as 'real' an activity as any other . . . ideas and discourses have important and very real social consequences" (1990, p. xv).

Post development theory's emphasis on the nonmaterial is one way in which it breaks with dependency theory. Post development theory echoes dependency theory in its belief that the development of the West was premised upon the exploitation of the Third World, but it does not see this exploitation as being only or even primarily neither material, nor does its way of addressing the problem stress the material. Verhelst discussed the importance of paying attention to nonmaterial aspects, and he quoted Ziegler (in Verhelst 1990, p. 20) who argued that many radical approaches are so fascinated by the "practical aspects of class struggle" and by material conflicts that they neglect another "battlefield"—"the one where wars are fought for the control of the imaginary." Post development theory seeks to enter into combat on this battlefield.

9.11 CRITICISMS DIRECTED AGAINST POSTDEVELOPMENT THEORY

Given the radical nature of post development theory, it is not surprising that it has attracted significant criticism. This criticism has come from a variety of sources, but it appears that most critics are advocates either of a Marxist, neo-Marxist, or post-Marxist understanding of development, or otherwise of some alternative conception of development. While it could thus be said that criticism of post development comes mainly from "the left" within development studies, it should be stressed that critics of post development theory are by no means a homogeneous group and that there is no single "anti-post development" position—rather, there are a number of different thinkers coming from a number of different academic disciplines and with different subject positions with regard to development who have found aspects of post development theory, the

work of particular theorists, or in some cases the whole body of literature, problematic.

One of the most common criticisms of post development theory is that the methodologies used and arguments made by post development theorists are unsound and that post development theorists provide inadequate support for their conclusions. Some critics feel that post development theory's conclusions are based on sentiment rather than sound argumentation. Sidaway noted that some see post development theory as nothing more than an "intellectual fad" (2002, p. 18), while Nanda (1999, p. 9) argued that post development theory's rejection of development stems from a particular predisposition or "mood" rather than from careful analysis of development practice. Post development theory's use—or misuse—of post-modern writings, especially of Foucault, is highlighted by several critics. Some critics (see, for example, Brigg, 2002; Lehmann, 1997; Ziai, 2004) feel that Foucault is not always well used by post development theorists, while others (such as Kiely, 1999) feel that the use of Foucault, and of post-modern thinking in general, is in itself a flaw that compromises post development theory. A final problem with regard to methodology and argumentation relates to certain gaps in the arguments presented by post development theorists. Berger (1995), for example, criticized Escobar for paying insufficient attention to the Cold War; and Lehmann (1997) and Nederveen Pieterse (1998) accused post development theorists of not adequately examining the experiences of the Asian countries, especially the Newly Industrialized Economies, in their analyses of the way in which development operates.

A second, and related, criticism levied against post development theory relates to its homogenization of development. Critics argue that the rejection of development by post development theorists is a consequence of their failure to recognize that development has changed over the decades and that not all development is the same (see, for example, Grillo, 1997; Kiely, 1999; Simon, 1997; Storey, 2000; Van Ausdal, 2001). As Simon put it, post development theory "set[s] up a straw elephant in seeking to portray postwar engagements with poverty in the

South as a single or singular 'development project' in order to be able to knock it down more easily," and post development theory ignores "the very tangible achievements" of many development programs (1997, p. 185; see also Simon, 2006, pp. 12–13). Kiely said that post development is a kind of reverse Orientalism that "turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized 'subaltern' that is then used to flog an equally generalized 'West'" (Chow, 1993, p. 13, cited in Kiely, 1999, p. 47). Likewise, Corbridge accused post development theory of presenting the West as "inauthentic, urban, consumerist, monstrous, [and] utilitarian" and Westerners as "lonely, anxious, greedy, and shallow" (1998a, p. 144). A related criticism of post development theory is that it romanticizes the non-West, the peasant, the traditional way of life, and, in the case of ecofeminist writers, women and nature (Corbridge, 1998a, p. 145; Gidwani, 2002; Molyneux & Steinberg, 1995, pp. 91–92; Storey, 2000, p. 42). Indeed, Kiely (1999) went so far as to ask if post development theory is "the last refuge of the noble savage." Post development theorists are thus criticized for exaggerating the benefits of the non-Western way of life and underestimating the appeal of the Western way of life to non-Westerners.

Perhaps the most common criticism of post development theory relates to critics' sense that post development theory does not provide an adequate alternative to development. Blaikie held that the deconstruction of development offered by post development theorists "leaves only fragmented remains . . . an agenda-less program, a full stop, a silence, after the act of deconstruction" (2000, pp. 1038–1039), while Nederveen Pieterse accused post development theory of being all "critique but no construction" (2000, p. 188). Some critics avoid accusing post development theory of completely lacking a future program, but criticize the alternatives on offer of having "a high New Age-like content clad in Third World clothes" (Schuurman, 2001a, p. 6) and of seeming "romantic and utopian" (Berger, 1995, p. 725). There is a feeling among critics that the alternatives presented by post development theorists lack detail, are unlikely to be realized, and are ultimately less constructive than the alternatives offered by alternative development approaches.

Notes

A final criticism of post development theory centers on the ethics and politics of post development theory. For many critics of post development theory, development is ultimately about addressing the terrible inequities evident in our world by emancipating the underdeveloped from their condition. The failure of past development initiatives only makes this task more urgent, and makes the post development theorists' contemplation of the ultimate desirability of becoming developed seem like immoral navel-gazing. While a position that is critical of past development theory but supportive of the idea of development enables further action to bring about development—and is, therefore, a politically feasible position—post development theorists' focus on discourse, ideas, and images, as well as their questioning of mindsets and philosophies, seems to some to pause, if not to halt, action in favor of improving the lives of the underdeveloped (see Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Schuurman, 2000, 2002). For many critics of post development theory, the post development position seems nothing less than indifference to the suffering of distant others, a shirking of duty, or an unwillingness to assist those less well off. It does not seem to many critics that this position is of any use to those in the Third World—to those who Simon said "can still only aspire to safe drinking water, a roof which does not leak and the like" (1997, p. 184). Post development theorists are thus not only politically, but also morally, irresponsible. Corbridge argued along these lines when he suggested that post development theory is "ethically deficient" because insufficient attention is paid to the "costs and disbenefits" that the "alternatives to development" suggested and that the "end of development" would entail (1998b, p. 35). Similarly, Fagan (1999, p. 180), Mkandawire (2005, p. 37), and Simon (1999, p. 18; 2003, p. 7) have a sense of moral discomfort about the idea of rejecting development from the position of a person who has access to all the benefits of a modern, developed life.

One of the apparent problems with the politics of post development theory is its stance in favor of the "local" and the "grassroots" and its concomitant suspicion of the state. Post development theorists see the

improvement of the lives of those in the Third World as more likely to result from the activities of local groups and from local strategies than from the initiatives of the state or suprastate organizations, but critics question whether the "local" can really offer a solution (see, for example, Schuurman, 2001b). A further problem with post development theory's focus on local and grassroots movements is that some post development theorists seem naively to believe that local and grassroots movements will necessarily act in the interests of the poor and marginalized, yet, as Nanda (1999) and Storey (2000) showed, such groups may not necessarily be pro-poor and may even have sexist, ethnocentric, or racist aims. Kiely called this faith in local social movements "Pontius Pilate politics" (1999, p. 45): because post development theorists do not provide clear criteria for the identification of the kinds of groups that can help improve the lives of the poor in the Third World, they are actually washing their hands of the fate of the poor.

These, then, are some of the criticisms that have been directed against post development theory. That post development theory has been the target of so much criticism indicates that there are some serious shortcomings in some aspects of post development theory. However, it also indicates the post development theory has touched a nerve and has triggered much lively debate.

9.12 FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Post development theory received a great deal of attention around the turn of the century, but the debate has since abated somewhat, although there is certainly ongoing interest in post development theory. However, it seems fair to say that debate about post development theory was most robust in the 1990s and early 2000s. Along with the abatement in interest in post development theory has come a slight change in emphasis on the part of some of the key post development thinkers. Escobar, perhaps the best known of the post development theorists, has more recently been writing about social movements, (anti)globalization, and coloniality (see Escobar, 2004a, 2004b; Mignolo & Escobar, 2013). While his key post development writings focus predominantly on critique, his new work is

more concerned with building alternatives to current economic and political practices. Two other prominent post development thinkers, Sachs and Latouche, have also shifted focus a little. Sachs's recent publications focus on the environment and sustainability, and he was involved in a large critical discussion forum related to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (see Sachs, 2000, 2002; Helfrich, Kuhlen, Sachs, & Siefkes, 2009). For his part, Latouche has been writing about and campaigning for something called la décroissance ("low growth" or "degrowth" economics; see Latouche, 2004, 2009, 2010, 2011). He and other proponents of décroissance oppose infinite economic growth and believe that we should work toward the creation of "integrated, self-sufficient, materially responsible societies" (see Latouche, 2004). These shifts in focus on the part of Escobar, Sachs, and Latouche are slight, with their recent research building on their earlier work. Their more recent work is more moderate and forward-looking and all three authors now collaborate with a variety of alternative development thinkers who do not necessarily embrace post development.

The new focus on the part of such thinkers, their willingness to work alongside other critical development theorists, and their shift away from a focus on critique help resolve some of the key criticisms directed against post development theory. Some of the recent writings of Escobar, Sachs, and others are less open to accusations that they are "all critique and no construction" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 188) than their earlier work. Furthermore, there is now a growing body of literature that responds to, and builds upon, post development theory, with the aim of making more particular and often more practical and detailed suggestions on how to improve upon past development practice—see, for example, the recent volume edited by Ziai (2007) and articles by Dinerstein and Deneulin (2012), Gibson-Graham (2010), and McGregor (2009). These more recent works move away from a focus on critique and suggest more concrete ways in which alternatives to development can be worked out.

While this more constructive work is to be welcome, some key challenges remain that advocates of post development theory need to

address. First, the relationship between those who advocate post development and those who advocate some kind of alternative development needs to be thrashed out more thoroughly. In an early post development text, Latouche (1993, p. 149) described alternative development as being even more dangerous than "true blue" development, but recently several post development thinkers, including Latouche, seem more willing to cooperate with those who do not share their antidevelopment stance, and writers like Gibson-Graham (2010, p. 227) suggested that post development is actually all about imagining and practicing development differently. If this is so, does post development theory not really belong beside and on a continuum with alternative approaches to development?

A second challenge to post development theory is the continued desire for development evident in the global South. The death of the idea of development predicted by some post development theorists has not happened, and it is precisely those in the Third World—imagined by some post development theorists as becoming disillusioned with development—who have been keeping the idea of development alive. In a new introduction to The Development Dictionary, Sachs (2010, p. viii) acknowledged that "the South has emerged as the staunchest defender of development." If development is indeed such a "poisonous gift to the populations it set out to help" (Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997, p. 381), then why is it these populations themselves who remain keen to acquire it?

Third, given that the idea of development itself is arguably being eclipsed by discussions about globalization, it is important for those who have adopted a post development stance toward development to turn their critical eye on discourses around globalization. Ziai (2015, p. 106) argued that it is globalization, rather than development, that is now the "buzzword" in the social sciences: What can be said about globalization from the perspective of post development theory? Some of Escobar's recent work (see, for example, Escobar, 2004a; Mignolo & Escobar, 2013) might be helpful in this regard, but there is certainly room for

further reflection on what post development theory's critique of development means in an increasingly globalized world.

In closing, post development theory provides a useful and thought-provoking critique of past development theory and practice. It has been very helpful in stimulating an invigorating and important debate within development studies. This ability to spark debate is perhaps the greatest strength of post development theory, with its weakness being the lack of careful argumentation and the vagueness of the positive program outlined by post development theorists. Post development theory is relevant not only to those interested in development theory, but also to all those interested in thinking of alternatives to the capitalist, industrialized way of life that has for so long been held up as an ideal toward which all should strive.

Check Your Progress 4

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.
ii) Check your answer with the model answer given at the end of this unit.

1. What do know Post development Theory's Proposed "Alternatives to Development"?

    …………………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………

2. Discuss the Criticisms Directed Against Post development Theory.

    …………………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………

3. How to find out the Future Directions to the world view?

    …………………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………………

9.13 LET US SUM UP

Post development theory is a compelling and controversial field of thought in contemporary development studies. It gained prominence during the 1990s, when it sparked fierce debate, but its influence has since waned somewhat. This chapter summarizes the contribution of post development theory to development studies and, more generally, to international studies. Post development theory's key contribution was a stringent and multifaceted critique of the idea of development. The critique offered by post development thinkers went beyond other critical engagements with development theory, in that it sought to reject, rather than reform, development. The critique was strongly informed by concerns about Westernization and by an associated desire to validate, protect, and revive non-Western ways of life. Furthermore, post development theorists adopt a critical stance toward globalization, seeking to defend the local against the global. After reviewing post development theory's radical critique of development, the article provides an overview of critical engagements with post development theory. Critics have been particularly concerned about post development theorists' reluctance or inability to move beyond critique in order to clearly outline possible alternatives to development. While this critique is well founded, the article does describe the ways in which some of the recent work by post development writers has begun to take on a more constructive character. The chapter concludes that post-development theory is relevant not only to those interested in development theory, but also to all those interested in thinking of alternatives to the capitalist, industrialized way of life that has for so long been held up as an ideal toward which all should strive.

9.14 KEY WORDS

Post Development: Post development theory (also post-development or anti-development or development criticism) holds that the whole concept and practice of development is a reflection of Western-Northern hegemony over the rest of the world. Post development thought arose in

the 1980s out of criticisms voiced against development projects and development theory, which justified them.

Reluctant: unwilling and hesitant; disinclined.

9.15 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you know World Systems Theory?
2. Discuss the Characteristics.
3. Discuss the Criticisms of World System.
4. Discuss Post-development theory.
5. What do you know about Historical Survey?
6. What do you know Post-development Theory's Critique of "Development"?
7. Discuss the Post development Theory's Concerns About Westernization.
8. Describe Post development Theory's Defense of the Local and the Non-Western.
9. What do know Post development Theory's Proposed "Alternatives to Development"?
10. Discuss the Criticisms Directed Against Post development Theory.
11. How to find out the Future Directions to the world view?

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9.17 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. The world systems theory, developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, is an approach to world history and social change that suggests there is a world economic system in which some countries benefit while others are exploited. Just like we cannot understand an individual's behavior without reference to their surroundings, experiences, and culture, a nation's economic system cannot be understood without reference to the world system of which they are a part. See Section 9.2

2. See Section 9.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 9.4
2. See Section 9.5
3. Post development theory is a relatively new area in development studies. The idea that there was something that could be described as post development theory arose in the 1990s. That said, precursors to post development theory can be identified. See Section 9.6

Check Your Progress 3

1. See Section 9.7
2. See Section 9.8
3. Post development theorists can be described as defenders of the "local." In line with their defense of diversity discussed above, many are opposed to "global solutions" because such solutions

tend to ignore the specificities that may make a solution appropriate in one place but less appropriate elsewhere. See Section 9.9

Check Your Progress 4

1. See Section 9.10
2. One of the most common criticisms of post development theory is that the methodologies used and arguments made by post development theorists are unsound and that post development theorists provide inadequate support for their conclusions. Some critics feel that post development theory's conclusions are based on sentiment rather than sound argumentation. See Section 9.11
3. Post development theory received a great deal of attention around the turn of the century, but the debate has since abated somewhat, although there is certainly ongoing interest in post development theory. However, it seems fair to say that debate about post development theory was most robust in the 1990s and early 2000s. Along with the abatement in interest in post development theory has come a slight change in emphasis on the part of some of the key post development thinkers. See Section 9.12

UNIT 10: STATE FORMS: FEDERALISMS

STRUCTURE

10.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to understand:

- To know about the Characterizing Indian Federalism: The Essence of a Federal Union.
- To discuss the Salient Features of Indian Federalism
- To find out the Meaning and Implication of the Word 'Union'
- To know the Inter-state Coordination
- To discuss the Distribution of Competence
- To know Working of Federal System
- To discuss the Deconcentration Initiative Taken by the Union.

10.1 INTRODUCTION

Federalism is a dynamic theory of nation and state building. It is primarily a theory about institutionalized political cooperation and collective co-existence. In other works, federalism is a grand design of 'living together' in the matrix arrangement of, what Daniel Elazar conceptually terms as 'self-rule plus shared rule'. Its hallmark is, to tide Rasheeduddin Khan, 'unity of polity and plurality of society'. As a theory of nation building, federalism seeks to define state-society relationships in such a manner as to allow autonomy of identity of social groups to flourish in the constitutionally secured and mandated institutional and political space. The federal constitution recognizes the special cultural rights of the people, especially the minorities. In this sense, it is very close to the theory of multiculturalism, yet different because the niceties of federalism lie in its fundamental stress on institutionalization of diversities and facilitating sociopolitical cooperation between two sets of identities through various structural mechanisms of 'shared rule'. , As a state-building theory, federalism has three essential components: (i) formation of I states and territorialisation of federal-local administration in such a manner as to promote closer contact between people and government; (ii) distribution of federal powers on a non-centralized basis; and (iii) creation of the institutions of shared rule. The first, component essentially means creation of the institutions of 'self-rule'. The institutions of self-rule at the macro level means creation of states, and at micro level, it refers to the institutional of local self-governance. States or regional units of administration are usually formed on the basis of relative continuity or discontinuity of spatial interaction pattern between people, culture and territory. This, in other words, means formation of states on the principle of "homogeneity with viability". The state system may include several sub state arrangements like regional councils or district councils to cater to the specific cultural and administrative requirements of the people living in geo-ethnic enclaves. The second component refers to the division of federal powers and functions on a relatively autonomous basis, where each unit has sufficient legislative competence, executive authority and financial resources to perform its function in the allotted domain efficiently and effectively. In recent years, the notion of competence division and

distribution has come into being. Competence refers to the functionally elaborated and constitutionally protected capacity of the various units of federal-regional administration. Fernandez Segado, following the Spanish example, has classified different kinds of competences into the following five categories: (a) Integral Competences: those in which a single authority-usually the state-has attributed all kinds of public functions regarding a particular matter; (b) Exclusive but limited Competences: those in which one authority enjoys full competence, but only to a certain extent in a particular matter. Hence, it is not the function, but the matter that is fragmented; (c) Shared Competences: those in which both the state and autonomous community [council] are entitled to exercise complementary parts of the same function over the same matter. This would be the case - rather frequently in matters in which the state has reserved for itself basic legislation, and the autonomous community has taken up legislative development; (d) Concurring Competences: those in which the competences of the state and those of the autonomous community are distinct, but converge on the same physical object; (e) Indistinct Competences: those awarded both to the state and to the autonomous community without any sort of distinction, and which enable them to deal with a matter in different ways. What follows from above is the fact that competence distribution is a manifold exercise of identification and distribution of subjects on the basis of territorial import and community significance of the subject either for exclusive or shared control of policy making and its execution. In the arena of shared competence, contents of the policy over a subject are divided and distributed. This, in other words, means jurisdictional partitioning of the subject. In the realm of allotted capacity each unit enjoys almost complete autonomy of decision and execution. One may here like to mention the fact that federalism has, over the years, evolved as policy science, where basic objectives of the discipline seem to be efficiency and achievement of targeted goals and policies. This is a step further growth of federal theory where it draws its critical resources from the disciplines of Public Administration and Management. - As a devolutionary theory of administration and governance, federalism and federal system may follow either one or combination of the following

arrangements like non-centralization, decentralization and deconcentration. Non-centralization refers to a non-hierarchical allocation of competence. Decentralization means conditional-hierarchical distribution of competence from one federal structure to other subordinate authority and- - structures. And deconcentration means a partial 'off-loading' of, usually executive authority and functions, from one authority to subordinate authority. An essential attribute of federalism is the creation of a federal political culture in which differences are sorted out through mutual negotiation, and consensus is built on matters of common concern and national importance.

The third component relates to the institutions of shared rule. This takes out federalism from being only a system of self-governance to collective governance on matters of Trans local importance and mutual concern. Sharedmle institutions may take variety of institutional shapes like zonal council, ministerial council, inter-state council, independent constitutional authorities like boards, commissions, planning and other regulatory bodies. The institutions of shared rule has important objective of laying down the policy norms, I and developing uniformity of outlook on matters of interregional and national significance and resolving inter-state disputes. Interestingly, there is not as exclusive and universal model of federalism. Two federal - polities share some characteristics in common, but differ widely in the structure of process of governance. Federal profile, builds its exclusive 'federal union' and 'federal nation' according to its own distinct social composition, cultural differentiation among the social groups, regional or sub regional variation of identity and development, and desired objectives and specifications of its constitutionalism and nationalism. It is precisely the reason that each federal polity constitutes a distinct class of federalism, so is the case with Indian federalism.

10.2 CHARACTERIZING INDIAN FEDERALISM: THE ESSENCE OF A FEDERAL UNION

Traditional-legal scholarship has characterized Indian federalism as 'quasi-federal'-"unitary state with subsidiary federal principles rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary principles" (K.C. Where). Such characterization probably fails to take into account a totalistic perspective of Indian federalism, its formation, growth and evolution. It is true that Indian federalism has an in-built tendency to centralize under certain circumstances, this nonetheless makes it quasi-federal. Within the allotted domain, the state is as sovereign as the union. In this regard, B.R. Ambedkar's speeches in the Constituent Assembly are worth recalling. During a discussion on the Emergency Provisions on 3 August 1949, he said: I think it is agreed that our constitution, notwithstanding the many provisions which are captained in it whereby the centre has been given powers to overdo the provinces, nonetheless is a federal constitution and when we say that the constitution is a federal constitution it means this, that the provinces are as sovereign in their field which is left to them by the constitution as the centre is in the field which is assigned to it. In other words, barring the provisions, which permit the centre to override any legislation that may be passed by the provinces, the provinces have a plenary authority to make any law for the - - peace, order and good government of that province. Now, when once the Constitution makes the provinces sovereign and gives them plenary powers.. . the intervention of the centre or any other authority must be deemed to be barred, because that would be an invasion of the sovereign authority of the province. That is a fundamental proposition, which . . . we must accept that we have a federal constitution. (emphasis added) Refuting the charge of centralism as essential and only feature of Indian Constitution, Ambedkar in the Assembly on 25 November 1949 said: The basic principle of federalism is that the legislative and executive authority is partitioned between the centre and states not by any law to be made by the centre, but by the constitution itself. This is what constitution does. The states under our constitution are in no way dependent upon the centre for their legislative or executive authority. The centre and the states are co-equal in this matter. It is difficult to see how such a constitution can be called centralism. It may be that the constitution assigns to the centre too large field for the operation of its legislative and

executive authority than is to be found in any other federal constitution. It may be that the residuary powers are given to the centre and not to the states. But these features do not form the essence of federalism. The chief mark of federalism lies.. .. in the partition of the legislative and executive authority between the centre and the units by the constitution. This is the principle embodied in our constitution. There can be no mistake about it. It is therefore; wrong to say that the states have been placed under the centre. Centre cannot by its own will alter the boundary of that position. . Nor can the Judiciary. The principle on which the founding fathers divided powers between the centre and the states was that the division of powers must be in consonance with the distribution of responsibilities.

The centre has been assigned the important roles of:

(i)   nation-building and nation preserving;

(ii)   maintaining and protecting national unity and integrity; and

(iii)   maintaining constitutional political order throughout the union of India.

The states have been assigned only those subjects which are purely local in nature. Besides, having autonomy of legislation, regulation and execution of the subjects assigned to it, the states are expected to coordinate, cooperate and execute the policies of union especially with regard to those belonging to the nation-building aspect. Federal union as envisaged by the framers of the constitution would essentially have following three components: (i) At the societal level, it seeks to build a social union, permitting pluralism (of group life) to flourish within the broader framework of secularism. A social union has to function through the instrumentality of local self-government. (ii) At the national-political level, it seeks to establish a political union, functioning through a synthesized construct of parliamentary democracy and federalism. The emerging model is that of the parliamentary federalism seeking to achieve the three basic objectives of federal nation building namely, accountability, autonomy and integration. (iii) The federal union also

seeks to establish an economic union through planned national economic development. The national economy is expected to remove graded inequality among the regions and the classes through various measures of capacity building and prevention of polar accumulation of wealth, resources, industry and technology. The economic union is expected to provide a minimum level playing field to each unit of the federation. In this context, it may be mentioned that the founding fathers had specifically perceived federalism as instrument of nation-building, therefore made the political system adequately resilient.

It is accordance the imperatives of national development and the maintenance of national unity and -integrity that the degree of federalism may vary from time to time. Indian federalism is complex enough to defer any singular generalization and characterization. At best, one can characterize it as Union type federal polity. Such a polity usually combines the features of a dual federalism (i.e., divided sovereignty); cooperative-collaborative 8 federalism (a model of collectivism, where union and states collectively resolve and take decision on the issues of common concern); and the interdependent federalism (a model of reciprocal dependence, if states depend heavily on union government for fiscal help, so the union government on the states for execution of its policies and programmes).

10.3 SALIENT FEATURES OF INDIAN FEDERALISM

The union type federal polity presupposes the essential balancing* of two inherent tendencies namely, unionization and regionalization. The unionization process allows Indian federalism to assume Unitarian features (popularly referred to as centralized federalism) when there is a perceived threat (internal or external) to the maintenance of national unity, integrity and territorial sovereignty of India on the one hand, and the maintenance of constitutional-political order in the states on the other. However, union's prerogative of perception and definition of 'threat' is not absolute. This is subject to review by the Apex Court. This

has become evidently clear from the Supreme Court's ruling in the S.R. Bommai case. It is only in the abnormal times (as the spirit of the t Emergency Provision suggests) that the Indian federalism assumes the characteristics of I a Unitarian polity. However, more than this, the unionization process constitutionally bestows upon the union government with added responsibility of securing balanced economic growth and social change across the regions &d social segments through means and measures of mixed economy and state regulated welfare planning. In this endeavor, the constitution envisages the role of the states as coordinating partners to the union government. Beyond this, the unionization process has no more political meaning and relevance. Along with the unionization principles, the constitution of India also. recognizes 'regionalism and regionalization' as valid principles of nation-building and state formation. A close scrutiny of the constitutional provisions reveals that the constitution of India acknowledges and recommends the formation of a multilevel or multilayered federation with multiple modes of power distribution. The multilayered federation may consist of a union, the states, the sub state institutional arrangements like regional development autonomous councils, and the units of local self-government at the lower levels. While the union and the state constitute the federal superstructure, the remaining two constitutes the federal substructure. Each level has constitutionally specified federal functions, which they perform almost independently of each other. However, the superstructure exercises certain fiscal and political control over the substructures. Developmental fields to the substructure are released by the two superstructures. Many of the decisions of the regional councils are subjected to the approval by the concerned states. As a matter of fact, the constitution of India promotes both the symmetrical and asymmetrical distribution of competence. This variegated system first lays down the general principle of power distribution, having symmetrical application to all states of the union. Then, there is provision for special distribution of competence and power sharing arrangements between the union and the select states. There are many provisions like Article 370, 371, 371A-H, fifth and sixth schedules which allow for a special type of union-state relations. To put succinctly, these

provisions restrict the application of many union laws; delimit the territorial extent of the application of the parliamentary acts having bearing upon the law making power of parliament and the concerned state legislatures; and, bestows upon the office of Governor with special powers and responsibility in some states like Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra and Gujarat. If we closely examine the above mentioned constitutional provisions, it appears that the federalism in India has been fine tuned to accommodate ethnic diversity and ethnic demands like application of customary law in the administration of civil and criminal justice etc. It is for reasons of accommodating ethnic features in the formation of polities that the constitution permits for the ethnic self-governance through specially created institutions like autonomous regional or district councils.

A few dozen such councils exist in the northeast regions and other parts of India. These councils seek to protect and promote the indigenous identity and development. At the fourth level exist the units of local self-govefiance. With the passage of 73rd and 74th Constitution Amendment Acts, the constitution of India further federalizes its powers and authority at the village and municipal levels. The Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) are mainly developmental in htioning. Constituted through direct election, the Pancl~ayats and Municipal bodies are expected to:

(i)   build infrastructure of development like road, transport etc.;

(ii)   build and maintain community assets;

(iii)   promote agricultural development through management and control of minor irrigation and water management; soil conservation and land improvement;

(iv)   promote social forestry and animal husbandry, dairy and poultry;

(v)   promote the development of village industry; and

(vi)   manage and control of education and health at the local level.

In nutshell, the PRIs are institutions of empowering people for self-government. From the federal point of view, the relationship between PRIs, the state and the centre exist on the one-to-one basis. While many of the developmental schemes of the centre are implemented by the Panchayet without any interference by the state, the state government allocates a certain percentage of its development plans and budget to the Panchayats. What has been shown above is the fact that Union type federalism of India essentially functions on the basis of territorial decentralization, which combines both the centre-periphery and non-centralisation models of federalism. If federalism in India deviates from the classical reference to American federalism, it is only for the purpose of accommodating diversity and to serve its national interests. But in no way it alters the participatory features of federal governance. It is because of its being multilayered that one finds both the symmetrical and asymmetrical systems of power distribution.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

ii) Check your answer with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1) How do you know about the Characterizing Indian Federalism: The Essence of a Federal Union?

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2) Discuss the Salient Features of Indian Federalism.

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10.4 MEANING AND IMPLICATION OF THE WORD 'UNION'

The Article 1 of the Indian Constitution declares India as the Union of States, thereby implying the indestructibleness of the union and the unity of India. By implication, no unit possesses the right to secede. It is the sole prerogative of the union to form the states by way of division, merger and alteration of the existing internal boundaries of India. The union also possesses the right to admit any new territory in the union of 1 India. Today India consists of 28 states and seven union territories. By and large, the union of India has reorganized its units on the four structural principles of state formation. These principles, as laid down by the States Reorganization Commission (1955) include: (i) preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India; (ii) linguistic and cultural homogeneity; (iii) financial, economic and administrative considerations; and (iv) success working of the national plan. As far as possible, the Union of India has attempted to reorganize its units on the relative congruence of 'identity boundary' and 'administrative boundary'. Language, culture and ecology have decisive impact on the ongoing process of reorganization. Though union has sole prerogative of state formation, it does so only on the basis of resolution passed by the Legislative Assembly of the affected states. Another implication of the word 'Union' is that Indian federalism is not a compacted federalism between two preexisting sovereign entities. The union has come out in existence only through the unified will of the people of India, nourished during the national movement. This is probably the reason that the Upper Chamber (Rajya Sabha), expected to represent the interests of the units of federation, does not have symmetrical (equal) representation. It is composed on the basis of proportionality of population size. According to the population size each state has been allocated respective number of seats in the Rajya Sabha. Thus, while Uttar Pradesh has got 3 1 seats, the smaller states like Manipur, Goa, etc., have been allocated only one seat. As a logical consequence of the word 'Union', the union and its

constituent units are governed by single constitution. Each unit draws its authority from the same constitution. Interestingly, the union and the states do not have the constitutive authority to amend the essential or basic features of the constitution. The legislative authority of the union and states are expected to mend the ways for the achievement of constitutional goals and to facilitate the harmonious administrative functioning of the union and the state. Though Union has power to amend the Constitution, the same cannot be exercised unilaterally. There are many provisions like revision of the entries in the three lists of the seventh schedule; representation of states in Parliament; the amendment provision and procedure as laid down in the Article 368; the provision related to Union Judiciary and the High Courts in the states, legislative relations between the union and states; election to the President and Vice President; extent of the executive power of the union and the states; provisions related to the High Courts for union territories, which cannot be amended by the union Parliament without ratification and approval by not less than half of the states of the federation. This places the states on equal federal footing with the union. An integral federal union creates a federal nation based on the principle of equality of status and opportunity. Therefore, one does not find double citizenship in the Indian constitution. Culturally people of India may be plural and diverse, but politically they constitute one nation-a civic-political nation. Such a nation has one common all India frameworks of administration and Justice. This does not mean that constituent units cannot have its own administrative setup. The all India services are common to the union and state. Their basic function is to secure the interests of the union as a whole across the regions of India. Article 3 12 of the constitution provides "if the Council of states has declared by resolution supported by not less than two thirds of the members I present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest to do so, Parliament may by law provide for the creation of one or more all India services I summon to the Union and the states". These are some of the general features of union type federalism. In Indian federalism, we find two broad types of centralization of federal powers circumstantial and consensual.

As mentioned above, the constitution entrusts centre with important powers of protecting the Union from 'internal disturbances' and 'external threat' suck as war and aggression. The internal disturbances include physical breakdown in case of natural calamities, political and constitutional breakdown, and financial- economic crisis. The articles from 352 to 360 deal with certain emergency situations and its impact on the working of the federal system. The constitution, here subscribes to the theory of 'safety valve', whose objectives include: i) To protect the units of the jidekarion from external aggression, internal aggression, subversive terrorist activities and armed rebellion against the state. ii) To maintain the Constitution: By virtue of this, the constitutional political order is restored, which otherwise gets disturbed because of the mal-administration, ministerial crisis (emerging in the event of unclear electoral verdict or hung assembly or governmental instability caused by the frequent defection and breakdown of party system) natural calamities and other such physical and political disorder. iii) 70 protect the unity and integrity of the federal nation: The union can assume to itself the power of the state government when a particular state government itself goes against the territorial integrity of India or subverts the constitutional process in the state. iv) 70 take out the union and the provinces financial crises and economic disorder: The essence of the financial emergency lies in the "realization of one supreme fact that the economic structure of the country is one and indivisible. If a province breaks financially, it will affect the finances of the centre; if the centre suffers, all the provinces will break. Therefore, the interdependence of the provinces and the centre is so great that the whole financial integrity of the country is one and a time \ night arise when unitary control may be absolutely necessary", said K.M. Munshi in the Constituent Assembly on 16 October 1949. Circumstantial centralization has another dimension too. On a resolution of the Council of States (Rajya Sabha), the union Parliament can make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the state list and as specified in the resolution for the whole or any part of the territory of India (Art. 249). Another feature of Indian federalism is the centralization by consent or consensual centralization which Article 252

provides. "If it appears to the Legislatures of two or more states to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no powers to make laws for the states except as provided in articles 245' and 250 should be regulated in such states by Parliament by law, and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those states, it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly ..." This provision has intended objective of regulating issues of common concern between two t states, which otherwise is not possible due to diversity of law and diverse perception of the issues. Consensual centralization allows centre to arbitrate and frame common policy approach to those subjects in the state list, which have assumed national or trans-local importance. This enabling provision provides for the better coordination of inter-state issues.

10.5 INTER-STATE COORDINATION

For coordinating inter-state and union-state relations and for consensual working of federal system, the constitution expressly provides for the constitution of inter-state council or other such subject and territory specific councils. The first ever inter-state council was constituted on 28 May 1990. Principally being a recommendatory body, the council is expected to perform the following duties. a) investigating and discussing such subjects, in which some or all of the state, or the state, or the union and one or more of the states have a common interest, as be brought up before it; b) making recommendations upon any subject and in particular recommendations for the better coordination of policy and action with respect to that subject; and c) deliberating upon such other matters of general interest to the states as may be referred by the chairman to council. In this context one may like to reiterate the fact that constitutional provisions relating to federalism avoid exclusionary characteristics of dual federalism. The basic ethos of Indian federalism is coordinated and cooperative functioning of the union, where centre and states are equal partners in making the union a success. Even the over whelmingness of centre to centralize federal powers and curtail states' autonomy is mostly circumstsuitia, the centre cannot exercise these

powers arbitrarily. It has been sufficiently subjected to the principles of parliamentary accountability, scrutiny and approval and due process of law.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

ii) Check your answer with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1. Discuss the Meaning and Implication of the Word 'Union'.

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2. Describe the Inter-state Coordination.

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10.6 DISTRIBUTION OF COMPETENCE

Distribution of federal powers is essentially based on the notion of territoriality and specification of subjects accordingly. Thus, matters of local interests or those subjects which do not have trans-boundary implications have been put together under the state lists. The list comprises 62 items or entries over which the state legislature has exclusive competence of legislation and execution. The list includes such subjects like public order and police, local government, public health and sanitation, agriculture, forests, fisheries, sales tax and other duties. The union list enumerating 96 items empowers union Parliament to legislate

on matters of foreign affairs, defense, currency, citizenship, communication, banking, union duties, taxes, etc.

However, there are subjects like industry, mines and minerals, which find place in both the lists. To find an explainable answer to this, one has to look into the types of competence available in the federal scheme of India. Broadly, there are three types of competence: one, on which the respective sets of government has exclusive and distinct competence It is rarely that on item like defense, foreign affair etc., delegation of authority is made by the union government. Two, on items like industry, mines and minerals, the state government has exclusive but limited competence. On these subjects, its competence is subjected to the regulation by the union government in order to serve the larger public and national interests. Lastly, there are items of concurrent jurisdiction (List three) on which each unit of the federation enjoys exclusive but concurring competence. In the event of conflict, it is usually the union law that prevails over states' laws. On matters of none-numerated item, the union government has been vested with residuary powers of legislation. i So far as the distribution of executive authority is concerned, it generally follows the scheme of distribution of the legislative powers. In other words, executive powers of the union and state governments are co-extensive with their respective legislative competence. In the case of state government, its executive authority over a legislative field has been subjected to the qualification restriction of 'doctrine of territorial nexus'. However, as D.D. Basu observes, it is in the concurrent sphere where some novelty has been introduced. "As regards matters included in the concurrent Legislative List (i.e. List 111), the executive function shall ordinarily remain with the states, but subject to the provisions of the constitution or of any law of Parliament conferring such function expressly upon the union". Thus, under the Land Acquisition Act 1894; and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Provision to Article 731, the centre has assigned to itself all the executive functions pertaining to these two acts. However, of importance are some of the exclusive executive powers of the union, defiance or non-cognisance of the same by the states may attract plenary action as it amounts to the

violation of the constitution. This includes union's powers to give directions to the state governments; ensuring due compliance with union laws; ensuring exercise of executive power of the state in such a manner as not to interfere with the union's executive power; "to ensure the construction and maintenance of the means of communication of national or military importance by the state; to ensure protection of railways within the state, to ensure drawing and execution of schemes specified in the directions to be essential for the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the states, securing adequate provision by the state for instruction in mother tongue at the primary stage; ensuring development of Hindi language in the state, and above all, "to ensure that the government of a state is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution". Also, during emergency of any type, the union government may regulate through its power of issuing directions the manner in which the executive power of the state has to be exercised. In other words, the state has been assigned certain obligatory duties under the federal constitution of India. The centre-state administrative relationship is based on the principle of division [Jurisdictional partitioning of control and execution of decisions over a subject matter], coordination and cooperation in policy and planning. In many areas, while centre retains its exclusive legislative competence, it, however, delegates powers of ancillary legislation and exclusive executive competence to take decisions independently to the states. The centre administers directly only on the matters pertaining to defense, foreign affairs including passports, communications (post and telegraphs, telephones), the union list taxes, and industrial regulation. On rest of the enumeration in the union lists, the administrative function is exercised by the states 'under statutory or executive delegation'. It has been rightly pointed out in one of the commentaries on Indian constitution that "there seems to be no element of subordination, although cooperation is occasionally made compulsory. The constitutional details the essential features of the union-stale administrative relations, and raises no walls of separation between them. There is no rigid pattern of allocation of responsibilities. The union Parliament may confer power, and may impose duties under laws pertaining to the union list matters. The President may entrust functions

to the state governments "in relation to any matter, to which the executive power of the Union extends ... The state executive functions can, notwithstanding anything, be entrusted either conditionally or unconditionally" to the central government. In actual practice the states exercises a large measure of executive authority even within the administrative field of the union government" (Kagzi's The (Constitution of India, Vol. I, 2001). The financial relation between the union and state is based on the principle of sharing and equitable distribution of resources. The constitution also makes "distinction between the legislative power to levy a tax and the power to appropriate the proceeds of a tax so levied". The centre and the states have been assigned certain items to impose and levy taxes. There is no concurrent power to either of the units of the federalism to impose and levy taxes. Provisions have also been made to extend financial help in the form of grants and loans to the states. The amount of grant-in-aid has to be decided by Parliament. Also, any development project initiated by the state with the prior approval of the centre for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in that state or raising the level of administration of the scheduled areas has to be funded by the centre as grants-in-aid charged on the Consolidated fund of India. In the distribution of financial competence, each unit has been granted exclusive taxes.

The list of exclusive taxes to the union include custom, corporation tax, taxes on capital value of assets of individuals and companies, surcharge on income tax etc. Similarly exclusive taxes to the states include land revenue, stamp duty, succession and estate duty, income tax on agricultural land, sales tax [This is now being supplemented by a new system of Value Added Tax] etc. Given the fact that the volume of revenue raised from different tax sources by the state may not be adequate enough to meet its budgetary and plan proposals, the constitution provides for the sharing of proceeds of taxes earned by the union. The modalities of collection, appropriation and sharing vary from case to case. Thus while some duties such as stamp duties and duties of excise on medicinal l and toilet preparations as are in the union list are

levied by the union but collected and appropriated by the states (Article 268).

Taxes on the sales or purchase of goods and taxes on the consignment of goods are levied and collected by the union, but the i proceeds are then assigned by the union to those states within which they have been levied. Also certain taxes, such as taxes on non-agricultural income, duties of excise as i are included in the union list, except the medicinal and toilet preparations are levied and collected by the union and they are then divided between union and states in certain proportion.

The principal sources of non-tax revenues of the union are the receipts from Railways, Post and Telegraph, Industrial and Commercial undertakings at union such as Air India, Indian Airlines etc. Similarly the non-tax revenue of states include receipts from forests, irrigation and commercial enterprises like electricity, road transport and industrial undertakings such as soap, sandalwood, Iron and steel in Karnataka, Paper in Madhya Pradesh, Milk supply in Mumbai, Deep-sea fishing and Silk in West Bengal. It is true that the tax base of the state is not adequate enough to meet all the expenses and developmental requirements of the state. This is so because of the overall nature of Indian economy. As stated above, federal union seeks to establish a closely integrated economic union, where union has been assigned the important responsibility of socioeconomic reconstruction of the nation. Economy is national, where regional development is taken care of by the union. Federal finance is directed to achieve this objective. Usually, federal grant to state follows certain objective parameters laid down from time to tinie by an autonomous body known as Finance Commission of the India. However, adequate care is always being taken to remove economic imbalances across community, class and regions. Special care is also being taken up for the development of backward segments of the society through different special assistance programmes of the Union.

10.7 WORKING OF FEDERAL SYSTEM

During the first four decades of the working of the constitution, the federalism in India exhibited a strong centralizing tendency wherein the union government accumulated powers beyond its constitutional competence. It is true that the constitution permits for the circumstantial concentration of federal powers in the union, but it nowhere means suspension of federal autonomy and powers of the states even during normal times. How the centre has encroached upon the autonomy of states? The union government adopted several methods of encroachment: the foremost being its exclusive power of defining what is national and public interest. This prerogative has been used frequently to enlarge its legislative competence and to encroach upon legislative authority of the state on the matters of state lists. The seventh schedule makes entries of main subjects only. Over the years, the centre has evolved the practice of legislating upon the subsidiary matters/subjects either to give effect to main subjects, or to seek national uniformity on a particular item in the larger public interest. As a consequence, the centre has encroached even upon the subjects, originally assigned to the states. To illustrate, "Acts passed by Parliament by virtue of entries 52 [Industries] and 54 [Regulation of mines and mineral development] of the union List are typical examples. Under entry 52, Parliament has passed the (Industries Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. As a result, the union now controls a very large number of industries mentioned in schedule 1 of the Act. The constitutional effect is that to the extent of the control taken over by the union by virtue of this act, the power of the state Legislatures with respect to the subject of 'Industries' under entry 24 of the state list has been curtailed. This Act also brings under central regulation agricultural products such as tea, coffee, etc. Similarly, Parliament has, by making the requisite declaration of public interest under entry 54 of the union list.

The legal effect is that to the extent covered by this Act, "the legislative powers of the set, tee legislatures under 23 [Regulation old' Mines and Mineral Development] of the state list have been ousted," observes Surkaria ('commission on Centre State Relations. As a consequence, approximately %bout 93 percent of the organized industries fall directly

under the control of the union. By way of omission, addition and transfer, the union government through different amendment acts has brought changes in the distribution of competences as under seventh schedule of the constitution, between centre and states. Thus forty-second amendment act omitted entries (education). I9(test), 20 (protection of wild life). 29 (weights and measures) and seventh amendment act omitted entry 36 (acquisition or requisitioning of property) from the state list. As a result, the state list now contains only 61 subject, instead of 66 subjects as originally provided. On the other hand, forty-second amendment acts by way of transfer added four ilcw entries in the concurrent list. They include 11A (administration of justice), 17A (forest), 17R (Protection of wild animals and bird), 20A (population control and family planning), and 33A (weights and measures), besides important substitution made in the entries 25 (education) and 33 (trade and commerce). As a result, we have 51 entries in the concurrent list. In the union list we find three important inclusions: 2A (deployment of armed forces), 92A (taxes on sale or purchase of goods in the course of interstate trade or commerce), and 92B (taxes on the consignment of goods). Besides through substitution method the centre has enhanced the ambit of its 'eminent domain'. Along with it, "centralized planning through the Planning Commission is a coilspicuous example of how, through an executive process, the role of the union has extended into areas, such as agriculture, Fisheries, soil and water conservation, minor irrigation area development, rural construction and housing etc. which lie within the exclusive state field." It has been rightly pointed out by D. D. Basu that the activities of the Planning Commission "have gradually been extended over the entire sphere of the administration excluding only defense and foreign affairs, so much so, that a critic has described it as "the economic cabinet of the country as a whole ...." In spite of being an advisory body, its political and bureaucratic clout has gone to the extent of verticali-sing the nature of federal grants to the states. It now appears more as a regulatory body attenuating the politicisation of transfer of resources at the command of the union to the states. Conti-ary to the wisdom of founding fathers, Article 356 has been used, abused, misused and overused for more than

100 times. On an objective estimation it has been used for aboui 30 times to 'maintain the constitution' and rest of the times abused to settle political score, usually dictated by the ruling party at the centre. The most detrimental aspect of its abuse is that in most of the cases it has negated the basic premises parliamentary denlocracy and federalism. This article requires a thorough lying down of norms as to prevent its misuse. Besides Sarkaria Commission's recommendation in this regard, judicial pronouncements (of Supreme Court) in the famous case, S, R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994) are here that mentioning. The Court held that the Presidents' satisfaction though subjective in nature, is the essence of this article.

power is conditional, and not absolute in nature. If Court strikes down the Presidential proclamation, 'it has fiower to restore the dismissed government to office and to revive and reactivate the Legislative Assembly. Till the proclamation is approved by both the Houses of Parliament, the Legislative Assembly should not be dissolved. but be kept under suspended animation. On parliamentary disapproval of the proclamation, the dismissed government should be revived in the state. However, of far reaching significance is the Court's observation about the secularity of the state. The Court held: "secularism is one of the basic features of the constitution. While freedom of religion is guaranteed to all persons in India, from the point of view of state the religion, faith or belief of a person is immaterial. To the state, all are equal and are entitled to be treated equally. In matters of states, religion cannot be mixed. Any state government which pursues unsecular policies or unsecular course of action acts contrary to the constitutional mandate and renders itself amenable to action under Article 356." What is required in order to prevent its abuse is a two-fold exercise of:

(i) ensuring by rule and convention, the maximum objectivity and transparency in the exercise of this power by the President and Governor and; (ii) to codify the stipulated grounds on which this article can be invoked. While ensuring its restrictive use, the basic object under this article should be to restore the constitutional order in the state. There are

many other critical areas, such as reservation of state bills by the Governor, financial allocation of resources between union and state, growing politicisation and subjectivity of the institution of Governor, directives from union, deployment of para military forces etc., which have affected the smooth working of union-state relations. The net affect has been the excessive concentration of power in the union. Thus, what is now required is the 'off-loading' and 'deconcentration or devolution' of powers from centre to states; and from states to the panchayats and municipal bodies. In fact, what is required is the redistribution of competences among three schedules-7, 11 and 12 of the constitution. The federal restructuring, without disturbing the basic scheme of the constitution, is required to make the principle of autonomy a reality. In the changing context of state-society relationship, redistribution of competences would, in all probability, facilitate the attainment of three basic objectives of the constitution: unity, social revolution and democracy. Being mutually dependent, 'inattention to or over attenlion to as Granville Austin warns, any one of them will disturb the stability of the Indian Nation. And exercise for stability should not be the sole prerogative of the centre. It is a collective exercise of union, state and the people.

10.8 DECONCENTRATION INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE UNION

As of today, the Report of the Sarkaria Commission is considered as piecemeal effort to provide resilience to the successful working of federal system. The Commission, by and large, has found the union type federal polity, not only suitable but essential to build the federal nation of India. However, it recommended for the 'off-loading' of the some of the union's function to the states, and it further underlined the need for evolving transparent procedural norms in implementing some of the controversial federal provisions such as Article 356 etc. It also stressed the need for evolving the cooperative-collaborative federal culture in which both the union and tne states would work as equal partner in building an integral federal union. Altogether, the commission made 230 specific recommendations. In a further development, the Government of

India constituted InterState Council in 1990. The Council has been entrusted with the task of examining the reports of the Sarkaria Commission in the first instance, and to evolve consensus on the possible change in the structure and process of inter state relationship. Out of the 230 recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission on which Council took decision, altogether 108 recommendations have so far been implemented, 35 have been rejected and 87 are under implementation. The remaining 17 recommendations of the Sarkaria Commissic~n pertaining to Article 356, deployment of paramilitary forces in the states, comp1ianc:e with union's directions and laws made by Parliament (Article 256 and 257), and effect of the failure to comply with, or to give effect to, directions given by the union government etc. have been considered by the subcommittee of the Council. The Council has rejected six recommendations pertaining to the role of Governor and 18 on All India Services. Out of 44 recommendations on financial relations the Council has accepted 40 arid rejected the remaining 4. So is the case with 'Reservation of Bills'. There seems to be no disagreement between the centre and states on 33 recommendations belonging to the head 'Economic and Social Planning'. Divergence of views still prevails on issues like role of Governor, industries, mines and minerals etc. Some of the consensus decisions of the Council include:

(i)　　residuary powers of legislation should be transferred from union list (entry 97) to concurrent list;

(ii)　　as a matter of convention, states must be actively consulted by the centre while legislating on concurrent list. "This is because laws enacted by the Union, particularly those relating to matters in the concurrent list, are enforced through the machinery of the states and consultation is essential to secure uniformity",

(iii)　　consultation with states by the centre should be made obligatory in the matters of appointment and selection of the Governor. To give effect to, the constitution may be suitably amended. To ensure impartiality and neutrality of the office of Governor, the person so appointed should not be intimately

connecled with the active politics. "Persons belonging to the minority communities should also be considered for gubernatorial posts". Also, the Governor, as a matter of convention, should not "return to active partisan politics after relinquishing office, even though he or she would be eligible for a second term or for election to the office of Vice President or President of India. This was [is] necessary to ensure the functioning of a ovenbird in an independent and impartial manner". Further, the special powers given to the Governor in some states have to be exercised by him in his discretion. When a noconfidence motion is pending against a Chief Minister, the Governor may not concede his request for proroguing the House, rather the Governor may summon the Assem'bly on his own. Instead of head rolling at the Governor's place (Raj Bhawan), the majority must be tested on the floor of the House;

(iv) time bound clearance of state bills referred to the President by the Governor. The state bills should not generally be reserved for presidential consideration, except for the constitutional specification and for the purposes referred to by the Sarkaria Commission in its report:

(v)   approved the alternative scheme of devolution of share in central taxes to the states and the transfer of taxation from the union list to the concurrent list;

(vi) amending Article 356 [proclamation of emergency in a state on the grounds of breakdown of constitutional machinery] as to provide the material ground.

(vii) Delegations of powers to the state governments for divers oil of forest land for developmental use;

(viii) revision of royalty rates under Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act every two years, instead of four years; (ix) formulation of a uniform policy on the creation or abolition of the Legislative Council in the states;

(ix) formulation of a comprehensive central legislation on taxes imposed by the local bodies of the states on the coinmercial

operation of central undertakings, etc. Much of these decisions of the Council are in the form of laying down the political-executive norms of federal practice. This does not require a major revision of the constitution.

10.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Over the years, the Indian federalism has shown enough resilience to adapt and to accommodate structurally and politically the various pressures of federal state formation. It has accommodated the various identity-linked demands for statehood. It has also, as mentioned above, attended to the institutionalization of societal autonomy as it gets if reflected in the northeastern regions of India. The federal democracy has decentralised itself to the level of village self-governance. As a matter of fact, federalism in India is: publicly perceived, as an instrument of people's empowerment, and to that extent federal, democracy seems to be working successfully. Similarly, in the arena of union-state relationships one finds almost total unanimity among political parties and the units of federation to follow the recommendations of Sarkaria Commission in building a cooperative-collaborative model of Indian federalism. It is precisely the reason that today one does not find such demands of yesteryears like scrapping of Art 356 etc. The growing salience of regional parties in the national decision making process in the present era of coalition governance show the participatory strength of Indian federalism. Another interesting development that one witnesses is the growth of competitive federalism among the states. In the present liberalised market economy of India, the centre is withdrawing itself from many crucial sectors of socio-economic development. The state is allowed [of course, under the rules and regulations framed by the centre] to negotiate for foreign direct investment. This does not mean that states have treaty making power. The competitive federalism has another dimension too. The developed, or developing and performing states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, etc., are demanding greater shares in the financial allocation made by the centre. They argue that central allocations should be linked to the performance level of the state. Thus rule for minimum level playing field should be relaxed. This nonetheless

may have adverse impact of the undeveloped states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, etc. We should never forget that the basic objective of an economic union is to maintain minimum regional balance in term of growth and development. Here the role of centre assumes critical federal significance. As a means of nation-building, federalism in India has largely succeeded in building a federal union and a federal nation.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.
ii) Check your answer with the model answers given at the end of the unit.

1. Discuss the Distribution of Competence.

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2. Discuss Working of Federal System.

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3. Discuss the Deconcentration Initiative Taken by the Union.

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10.10   LET US SUM UP

This unit introduces the concept of federalism-its meaning and essence focussing on the characteristics and salient features of Indian federalism. Federalism implies collective governance through:

(i)   formation of states and territorialisation of federal-local administration in such a manner as to promote closer contact between people and government;

(ii)   distribution of federal powers on a noncentralised basis; and

(iii) creatilm of the institutions of shared rule. Indian federalism is characterized as 'quasi-federal' with an in-built tendency to centralise under certain circumstances.

The legislative and executive authority is partitioned between the states and the centre by the Indian institution, Though India is a union of states, no unit possesses the right to secede and is governed by a single constitution. It is only under unusual circumstances (like an emergency) that Indian federalism assumes the characteristics of a Unitarian polity. There are two broad types of centralisation of federal powers circumstances and consensual in order to protect the units of the federation from external aggression, maintain the Constitution, protect the integrity of the nation and take the union out of financial crises. Federal powers are distributed between the states and the union on the basis of territoriality and specification of subjects with matters of local interest like public disorder, police, agriculture, sanitation, fisheries, and sales tax being put under the state list. Subjects like foreign affairs, defense, currency etc. are put in the union list. Over the years, federalism in India did exhibit a strong centralising tendency, encroaching upon the subjects originally assigned to the states enhancing its domain through various means. The Report of the Sarkaria Commission is considered an effort to provide resilience to the successful working of the federal system. The union type federal polity is coincides essential for India but the Commission recommended transferring some of the union's functions to the state and evolving transparent norms to implement some of the controversial federal provisions. Federalism in India is perceived as an instrument of peoples' empowerment and to that extent and as a means of

nation building it has been functioning successfully in building a federal union.

10.11   KEY WORDS

Sales Tax: A sales tax is a tax paid to a governing body for the sales of certain goods and services. Usually laws allow the seller to collect funds for the tax from the consumer at the point of purchase. When a tax on goods or services is paid to a governing body directly by a consumer, it is usually called a use tax.

Concurrent list: The Concurrent List or List-III is a list of 52 items given in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It includes the power to be considered by both the central and state government. The legislative section is divided into three lists: Union List, State List and Concurrent List.

Federalism: Federalism is the mixed or compound mode of government, combining a general government with regional governments in a single political system.

10.12   QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

4. Do you agree with the view that India is "a unitary state with subsidiary federal Principles rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary principles"?

5. Discuss the circumstantial and consensual centralisation of federal powers in India.

6. Discuss the working of the federal system in India.

7. How do you know about the Characterizing Indian Federalism: The Essence of a Federal Union?

8. Discuss the Salient Features of Indian Federalism.

9. Discuss the Meaning and Implication of the Word 'Union'

10. Describe the Inter-state Coordination

11. Discuss the Distribution of Competence

12. Discuss Working of Federal System

13. Discuss the Deconcentration Initiative Taken by the Union.

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10.14 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. i.   nation-building and nation preserving;
    ii.   maintaining and protecting national unity and integrity; and
    iii.   maintaining constitutional political order throughout the union of India. See Section 10.2
2. See Section 10.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. Though Union has power to amend the Constitution, the same cannot be exercised unilaterally. There are many provisions like revision of the entries in the three lists of the seventh schedule; representation of states in Parliament; the amendment provision and procedure as laid down in the Article 368; the provision related to Union Judiciary and the High Courts in the states, legislative relations between the union and states; election to the President and Vice President; extent of the executive power of the union and the states; provisions related to the High Courts for union territories, which cannot be amended by the union Parliament without ratification and approval by not less than half of the states of the federation. See Section 10.4

2. Principally being a recommendatory body, the council is expected to perform the following duties. a) investigating and discussing such subjects, in which some or all of the state, or the state, or the union and one or more of the states have a common interest, as be brought up before it; b) making recommendations upon any subject and in particular recommendations for the better coordination of policy and action with respect to that subject; and c) deliberating upon such other matters of general interest to the states as may be referred by the chairman to council. See Section 10.5

3. See Section 10.6

Check Your Progress 3

1. See Section 10.7

2. The Council has been entrusted with the task of examining the reports of the Sarkaria Commission in the first instance, and to evolve consensus on the possible change in the structure and process of inter state relationship. For more details kindly see section 10.8

3. The state is allowed [of course, under the rules and regulations framed by the centre] to negotiate for foreign direct investment. This does not mean that states have treaty making power. The competitive federalism has another dimension too. The developed, or developing and performing states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, etc., are demanding greater shares in the financial allocation made by the centre. They argue that central allocations should be linked to the performance level of the state. See Section 10.9

UNIT 11: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIAN AND THE SECURITY STATE

STRUCTURE

11.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit examines contemporary democratic and authoritarian forms of government, a broad classification of political systems regimes that has been adopted since the inter-War period. After going through this unit, you should be able to:

- To distinguish the terms government, political system and political regime;
- To explain the evolution of democratic regimes;
- To analyse the nature, forms and characteristics of modern democratic regimes;
- To identify the features of authoritarian regimes; and

- To analyse the forms of authoritarian regimes established in the post-Second World War period.

11.1 INTRODUCTION

A democracy is a political system, or a system of decision-making within an institution or organization or a country, in which all members have an equal share of power. Modern democracies are characterized by two capabilities that differentiate them fundamentally from earlier forms of government: the capacity to intervene in their own societies and the recognition of their sovereignty by an international legalistic framework of similarly sovereign states. Democratic government is commonly juxtaposed with oligarchic and monarchic systems, which are ruled by a minority and a sole monarch respectively.

Democracy is generally associated with the efforts of the ancient Greeks and Romans, who were themselves considered the founders of Western civilization by the 18th century intellectuals who attempted to leverage these early democratic experiments into a new template for post-monarchical political organization. The extent to which these 18th century democratic revivalists succeeded in turning the democratic ideals of the ancient Greeks and Romans into the dominant political institution of the next 300 years is hardly debatable, even if the moral justifications they often employed might be. Nevertheless, the critical historical juncture catalyzed by the resurrection of democratic ideals and institutions fundamentally transformed the ensuing centuries and has dominated the international landscape since the dismantling of the final vestige of empire following the end of the Second World War.

Modern representative democracies attempt to bridge the gulf between the Hobbesian 'state of nature' and the grip of authoritarianism through 'social contracts' that enshrine the rights of the citizens, curtail the power of the state, and grant agency through the right to vote. While they engage populations with some level of decision-making, they are defined by the premise of distrust in the ability of human populations to make a direct judgement about candidates or decisions on issues.

Anthropologists have identified forms of proto-democracy that date back to small bands of hunter-gatherers that predate the establishment of agrarian, sedentary societies and still exist virtually unchanged in isolated indigenous groups today. In these groups of generally 50-100 individuals, often tied closely by familial bonds, decisions are reached by consensus or majority and many times without the designation of any specific chief. Given that these dynamics are still alive and well today, it is plausible to assume that democracy in one form or another arises naturally in any well-bonded group or tribe.

These types of democracy are commonly identified as tribalism, or primitive democracy. In this sense, a primitive democracy usually takes shape in small communities or villages when there are face-to-face discussions in a village council or with a leader who has the backing of village elders or other cooperative forms of government. This becomes more complex on a larger scale, such as when the village and city are examined more broadly as political communities. All other forms of rule – including monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, and oligarchy – have flourished in more urban centers, often those with concentrated populations.

The concepts (and name) of democracy and constitution as a form of government originated in ancient Athens circa 508 B.C. In ancient Greece, where there were many city-states with different forms of government, democracy was contrasted with governance by elites (aristocracy), by one person (monarchy), by tyrants (tyranny), etc.

Under the influence of the theory of deliberative democracy, there have been several experiments since the start of the new millennium with what are called deliberative fora, places (in real life or in cyber space) where citizens and their representatives assemble to exchange reasons. One type of deliberative forum is called a nonpublic: a body of randomly chosen or actively selected citizens that represents the whole population. The use of random selection to form a representative deliberative body is known as sortation. Examples of this are citizens' assemblies and citizens' juries.

Citizens' assemblies have been used in Canada (2004, 2006) and the Netherlands (2006) to debate electoral reform and in Iceland (2009 and 2010) for broader constitutional change.

The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq led to a toppling of Saddam Hussein and a new constitution with free and open elections.[neutrality is disputed]. Later around 2011, the Arab Spring led to much upheavel, as well as the establishment of a democracy in Tunisia and some increased democratic rights in Morocco. Egypt saw a temporary democracy before the re-establishment of military rule. The Palestinian Authority also took action to address democratic rights.

In Africa, out of 55 countries, the process of continental democratization seems almost stalled since 2005 because of the resistance of some 20 non-democratic regimes, most of which originated in the 1980s. In exception to this, in 2016, after losing an election, the president of The Gambia attempted to cling to power but was forced to leave by a threatened regional military intervention.

In Asia, Burma (also known as Myanmar) the ruling military junta; in 2011, changed to allow certain voting rights and released democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. However, Burma still will not allow Suu Kyi to run for election and still has major human rights problems and not full democratic rights. However, this was later partially abrogated with the election of Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party and her appointment as the de facto leader of Burma (Myanmar) with the title "state councellor", as she is still not allowed to be president and therefore leads through a figurehead, Htin Kyaw. Human rights, however, have not improved. In Bhutan, in December 2005, the 4th King Jigme Singye Wangchuck announced that the first general elections would be held in 2008, and that he would abdicate the throne in favor of his eldest son. Bhutan is currently undergoing further changes to allow for a constitutional monarchy. In the Maldives, protests and political pressure led to a government reform which allowed democratic rights

and presidential elections in 2008. These were however undone by a coup in 2018.

The Ukraine saw several protest movements leading to a switch from oligarchy to democracy, as of 2019, the post-Maiden Revolution Ukraine has seen two presidential elections and the peaceful transfer of power.

Not all movement has been pro-democratic however. In Poland and Hungary, so-called 'illiberal democracies' have taken hold, with the ruling parties in both countries considered by the EU and civil society to be working to undermine democratic governance. Also in Europe, the Constitutional Court of Spain declared illegal a referendum on the independence of Catalonia, a decision causing months of instability in the region. Meanwhile, in Thailand a military junta twice overthrew democratically elected governments and has changed the constitution in order to increase its own power. The authoritarian regime of Han Sen in Cambodia also dissolved the main opposition party and effectively implemented a one-man dictatorship. There are also large parts of the world such as China, Russia, Central and South East Asia, the Middle East and much of Africa which have consolidated authoritarian rule rather seeing it weaken.

In 2018 the dictatorships in Sudan and Algeria were toppled though as of 2019, it is unclear what regime will emerge in these two countries.

11.2 GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL REGIME

As we saw in the last unit, classification as well as characterisation of the various forms of political regimes began with Aristotle, the Greek philosopher of 4th century BC. In his attempts to describe the political regimes then in / existence, he coined the therms 'democracy', 'oligarchy' and 'tyranny'. Comparative political theorists working in the context of modern nation states continue to use these terms to describe modern political regimes. Contemporary political systenis/regimes are broadly categorised as democratic or authoritarian. As we shall see, this

categorisation was a response to the events of historical significance in the 20th century-the emergence of Stalinist Russia, Fascist Italy and Spain and Nazi Germany. Before we proceed to examine the nature and evolution of modern democratic and authoritarian forms of government, it is necessary to address to a theoretical issue of critical significance. This relates to the different connotations of the terms government, political system and political regime.

In all modern states, governmental functions have greatly expanded with the emergence of government as an active force in guiding social and economic development. In countries with a command economy, government has a vast range of responsibilities for many types of economic behaviour. In those countries favouring social democracy, the government owns or regulates business and industry. Even in the free-market economy of the United States—where there remains a much greater attachment than in most societies to the idea that government should be only an umpire adjudicating the rules by which other forces in society compete—some level of government regulation, such as the use of credit controls to prevent economic fluctuations, is now accepted with relatively little question. Government has thus become the major or even the dominant organizing power in all contemporary societies.

The historical stages by which governments have come to exercise their contemporary functions make an interesting study in themselves. The scope of government in the ancient polis involved the comprehensive regulation of the ends of human existence. As Aristotle expressed it, what was not commanded by government was forbidden. The extent of the functions of government in the ancient world was challenged by Christianity and its insistence on a division of those things that belong separately to Caesar and to God. When the feudal world succeeded the Roman Empire, however, the enforcement of the sanctions of religion became one of the first objects of political authority. The tendencies that began in the 18th century separated church from state and state from society, and the modern concept of government came into being. The American colonies' Declaration of Independence expresses the classic

modern understanding of those ends that governmental functions exist to secure. The first aim of government is to secure the right to life; this comprehends the safety of fellow citizens as regards one another and the self-preservation of the country as regards foreign powers. Life exists for the exercise of liberty, in terms of both natural and civil rights, and these, along with other specific functions of government, provide those conditions upon which men may pursue happiness, an end that is finally entirely private and beyond the competence of government.

With the advent of the Marxist conception of the state, the ends of human existence once again became the objects of comprehensive government regulation. Marxism sees the state as a product of class warfare that will pass out of existence in the future age of perfect freedom. Aristotle believed human perfection to be possible only within political society; Marx believed that the perfection of man would follow upon the abolition of political society. Before the final disposal of the state, however, many Marxists believe that forceful use of governmental power is justified in order to hasten mankind's progress toward the last stage of history.

In ancient Greece, democracy firstly meant the direct reign of the people. Since at that time, only a selected group of citizens had the right to political participation, the idea of the people was very limited and the Greek Polis popular meetings were reserved only for men. Today, democracy is used mostly to denote the political systems, where the base of the reign comes from a broad and pluralistic understanding of the people and includes participation rights for all citizens. For a decision to meet the democratic standards, in addition to the majority principle, other criteria must be satisfied. The actual realisation of these specific criteria depends on the respective electoral system.

Countries with better education in the past are more likely to be democracies today
A long-standing theory in political science argues that education is a key determinant of the emergence and sustainability of democracy, because it

promotes political participation at the individual level and fosters a collective sense of civic duty.

And so, under this theory, we should expect that education correlates positively with measures of democratization in subsequent years. This is precisely what we see in the data and chart below. Those countries that had higher average education levels in 1970 are also those countries that are more likely to be democratic today (you can read more about measures of education level in our entry on Global Rise of Education).

Again, these data should be interpreted carefully. They merely show a correlation and do not imply a causal link. That is, these data do not imply that education leads to democracy.

Nonetheless, academic work does suggest that there is such a causal link. Even after controlling for many other country characteristics, the positive relationship between education and democracy holds (see, for example, Lutz, Crespo-Cuaresma, and Abbasi- Shavazi 20102).

11.3 THE PURPOSE OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL REGIMES

Though the terms government, political system and political regime are used interchangeably yet there are differences. Government refers to institutional process through which collective and usually binding decisions are made and implemented. The core functions of government are law making (legislation), law implementation (execution) and law interpretation (adjudication) which are performed by its three organs namely legislature, executive and judiciary. A political regime or political system, however, is to be analysed in a much broader perspective in the sense that they encompass not only the organs of the government and the political institutions of the state, but also the structures, processes and values through which these interact with the civil society. It follows that different political regimes have tended to prioritize different sets of criteria. Among the parameters, most

commonly used to classify the nature of political regimes, are the following:

Who rules? Does the process of political participation involve only elite, or does it involve the people as a whole? How is compliance achieved? Is the political regime obeyed as a result of the use of coercion, or through consensus, bargaining and compromise? Is the political power of the regime centralised or fragmented? What kind of mechanisms are needed to ensure separation of powers and checks and balances exist within the political regime'? How is government power acquired and transferred? Is regime open and competitive? What is the relationship between the state and the individual?

What is the nature of distribution of rights and responsibilities between government and the citizens? What is the nature of political economy? Is the political economy geared to the market or to State's regulation and 'planning? Within what limits and scope the political regime operates? Whether it is a limited or unlimited Government and what is the proper extent of democratic rule? Under which conditions and constraints? What are the socio-economic and cultural problems coming in the way of the functioning of the political regime? How stable is a political regime? Has a particular regime survived over a considerable period of time, and that it shown the capacity to respond to new demands and challenges?

Government is the means by which state policy is enforced, as well as the mechanism for determining the policy of the state. A form of government, or form of state governance, refers to the set of political institutions by which a government of a state is organized (synonyms include "regime type" and "system of government"). Governments consist of two broad interplaying elements that generally determine how a government is coded: the power source and the power structure. Power source refers to the individuals and institutions that exercise governing authority over a state and the means by which they obtain their power, while power structure refers to the system by which they are organized.

In the case of its broad definition, government normally consists of legislators, administrators, and arbitrators. Government is the means by which state policy is enforced, as well as the mechanism for determining the policy of the state. States are served by a continuous succession of different governments. Each successive government is composed of a body of individuals who control and exercise control over political decision-making. Their function is to make and enforce laws and arbitrate conflicts. In some societies, this group is often a self-perpetuating or hereditary class. In other societies, such as democracies, the political roles remain, but there is frequent turnover of the people actually filling the positions.

Forms of Government

Governments with Aristarchy attributes are traditionally ruled by the "best" people. Aristocracy refers to the rule by elite citizens; a system of governance in which a person who rules in an aristocracy is an aristocrat. It has come to mean rule by "the aristocracy" who are people of noble birth. A meritocracy refers to rule by the meritorious; a system of governance where groups are selected on the basis of people's ability, knowledge in a given area, and contributions to society. Finally, a technocracy refers to rule by the educated; a system of governance where people who are skilled or proficient govern in their respective areas of expertise in technology would be in control of all decision making. Doctors, engineers, scientists, professionals and technologists who have knowledge, expertise, or skills, would compose the governing body, instead of politicians, businessmen, and economists.

Governments with autocratic attributes are ruled by one person who has all the power over the people in a country. The Roman Republic made Dictators to lead during times of war. In modern times, an Autocrat's rule is not stopped by any rules of law, constitutions, or other social and political institutions. After World War II, many governments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa were ruled by autocratic governments.

Governments with democratic attributes are most common in the Western world and in some countries of the east. In democracies, all of the people in a country can vote during elections for representatives or political parties that they prefer. The people in democracies can elect representatives who will sit on legislatures such as the Parliament or Congress. Political parties are organizations of people with similar ideas about how a country or region should be governed. Different political parties have different ideas about how the government should handle different problems. Democracy is the government of the people, by the people, for the people.

Governments with monarchic attributes are ruled by a king or a queen who inherits their position from their family, which is often called the "royal family. " There are at two opposing types of monarchies: absolute monarchies and constitutional monarchies. In an absolute monarchy, the ruler has no limits on their wishes or powers. In a constitutional monarchy a ruler's powers are limited by a document called a constitution.

Governments with oligarchic attributes are ruled by a small group of powerful and/or influential people. These people may spread power equally or not equally. An oligarchy is different from a true democracy because very few people are given the chance to change things. An oligarchy does not have to be hereditary or monarchic. An oligarchy does not have one clear ruler, but several powerful people. Some historical examples of oligarchy are the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Apartheid in South Africa. Fictional oligarchic examples include the dystopian society of Oceania displayed in the book Nineteen Eighty-Four, the stratocracy government of Starship Troopers, and the kritarchic "Street Judges" of Judge Dredd.

Democratic Government

Democracy is a form of government in which all eligible citizens have an equal say in the decisions that affect their lives. Democracy allows

people to participate equally—either directly or through elected representatives—in the proposal, development, and creation of laws. It encompasses social, economic, and cultural conditions that enable the free and equal practice of political self-determination. The term originates from the Greek word: δημοκρατία (*dēmokratía),* which translates to "rule of the people". This term was used around 400 BCE to denote the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Athens.

A democratic government contrasts two forms of government where power is either held by one, as in a monarchy, or where power is held by a small number of individuals, as in an oligarchy or aristocracy. Nevertheless, these oppositions, inherited from Greek philosophy, are now ambiguous because contemporary governments have mixed democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic elements. Several variants of democracy exist, but there are two basic forms, both of which concern how the whole body of citizens executes its will: direct democracy and representative democracy.

1. Direct Democracy

Direct democracy is a form of democracy in which people vote on policy initiatives directly. This is different from a representative democracy, in which people vote for representatives who then vote on policy initiatives. Depending on the particular system in use, it might entail passing executive decisions, making laws, directly electing or dismissing officials, and conducting trials. Two leading forms of direct democracy are participatory democracy and deliberative democracy.

The earliest known direct democracy is said to be the Athenian Democracy in the 5th century BCE, although it was not an inclusive democracy; women, foreigners, and slaves were excluded from it. In the direct democracy of Athens, the electorate did not nominate representatives to vote on legislation and executive bills on their behalf (as in the United States Congress), but instead voted on these items in their own right. Participation was by no means open, but the in-group of

participants was constituted with no reference to economic class and they participated on a large scale. The public opinion of voters was remarkably influenced by the political satire performed by the comic poets at the theaters.

Also relevant is the history of Roman republic, beginning circa 449 BCE. The ancient Roman Republic's "citizen lawmaking"—citizen formulation and passage of law, as well as citizen veto of legislature-made law—began about 449 BCE and lasted the approximately 400 years to the death of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE. Modern-era citizen lawmaking began in the towns of Switzerland in the 13th century CE. In 1847, the Swiss added the "statute referendum" to their national constitution. Currently in Switzerland, single majorities are sufficient at the town, city, and canton level, but at the national level, double majorities are required on constitutional matters. The intent of the double majorities is simply to ensure any citizen-made law's legitimacy.

2. Representative Democracy

Direct democracy was very much opposed by the framers of the United States Constitution and some signatories of the Declaration of Independence. They saw a danger in majorities forcing their will on minorities. As a result, they advocated a representative democracy in the form of a constitutional republic over a direct democracy. For example, James Madison, in Federalist No. 10, advocates a constitutional republic over direct democracy precisely to protect the individual from the will of the majority. Representative democracy is a variety of democracy founded on the principle of elected people representing a group of people. For example, three countries which use representative democracy are the United States of America (a representative democracy), the United Kingdom (a constitutional monarchy) and Poland (a republic). It is an element of both the parliamentary system and presidential system of government and is typically used in a lower chamber such as the House of Commons (UK) or Bundestag (Germany).

Democracy in the Contemporary World

According to Freedom House, in 2007 there were 123 electoral democracies – up from 40 in 1972. According to World Forum on Democracy, electoral democracies now represent 120 of the 192 existing countries and constitute 58.2 percent of the world's population. At the same time, liberal democracies—countries Freedom House regards as free and respectful of basic human rights and the rule of law—are 85 in number and represent 38 percent of the global population. In 2010 the United Nations declared September 15 the International Day of Democracy.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answer with the answer at the end of the unit.

1) How would you differentiate between government and the political regimes?

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11.4 EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

The process of classification of political regimes serves three purposes: First, classification of a political regime is an enabling exercise as far as the understanding of politics and government is concerned as it involves the issues related to them mentioned in the second section. Second, the process of classification facilitates a meaningful evaluation of a particular political regime which Idads to better governance; third, apart from involving the normative issues, the process helps in tackling the questions at the concrete level like 'should the transition to liberal democratic regime in the former communist countries from people's

democratic regime be welcomed? Should developing countries favor a 'guided' democratic regime on the pattern of South East Asian countries?' etc.

11.5 DEMOCRATIC REGIMES IN THE DEVELOPED STATES

The tern1 democracy is an article political term whose meaning is derived from the Greek words denlos (people) and Kratia (rule or authority). Hence it means 'rule by the people'. The Word democratic was first used by the Greeks towards the middle of the 5th century to denote the political regimes of their City States. The usage was part of the 'classical' classification of regimes that distinguished rule by one (monarchy), several (aristocracy or oligarchy) and the many (democracy). The advocates of democracy have always debated the question as to who should compose the demos. Both the classical Greece as well as in modern times the citizen body has always excluded some individuals as unqualified. When Athenian democracy was at its height in the 5th century BC, only a small minority of the adult population of Athens comprised the 'demos', or those able to participate in the political process. It is only in the 20th century that universal suffrage and other citizenship rights were extended to all, or almost all, permanent residents of a country. For instance, universal adult franchise was introduced in Germany in 1919. A year later it was introduced in Sweden. France introduced individual franchise only in 1945, just a couple of years ahead of India. Along with the changing notion of what properly constitute the people, the conceptions as to what it means for'the people to rule have also changed. The political institutions and the systems have evolved in the contemporary democratic regimes primarily to facilitate 'rule by the people'. The ideas about political life that lend legitimacy to these institutions and systems enshrined in them are radically different from the democratic regimes of classical Greece, the Roman Republic, or the Italian republics of the middle ages and early Renaissance. Thus with the winning of universal suffrage, the democratic theory and practice turned to issues of democratic building as there was shift of the locus of democracy from the small scale of the city-state to the large scale of the

modern nation state. The assertion of national independence got reformulated in democratic terms as democratic regimes came to be identified with the right of collective self-determination. Consequently even where the 'new' post-colonial regimes could not ensure self-government, they nevertheless called themselves democratic on the strength of their experiences of anti-colonial struggle. In the similar vein, one Fan refer to the people's democratic regimes of the second and third worlds which asserted their democratic legitimacy in the language of economics, pointing to their collective ownership of capital production and distribution, work for all under planned economy, while neglecting the political and legal rights, multi-party electoral system and parliamentary politics. The democratic regimes in the western countries relied on traditional political and legal language, emphasised electoral and civic rights, democratic constitution and institutions and the formal liberty and equality of the political system. The above brief historical sketch of the evolution of democratic regimes shows that democracy has been subjected to marked available and intense philosophical and ideological debates. It acquires distinct characteristics depending on the nature of the countries they are based: East or West, developed or developing ones.

The liberal democratic regimes in the developed states have been categorized as polyarchical regimes by Robert Dalil in his work 'Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition'. The term 'Polyarchy' has been preferred to 'liberal democracy' by the western comparative political theorists primarily because of two reasons. First, liberal democracy as a concept has been treated mostly as a political ideal than a form of regime, and is thus invested with neither broader nor ~ native implications. Second, the usage of the concept of 'polyarchy' tends to acknowledge that the democratic regimes in the developed countries, mostly western, still fall short in significant ways, of the goal of democracy as theorised in political theory. 'The liberal democratic or polyarchical regimes are to be found in the states of North America, Western Europe and Australia. However, there are states like Japan and

South Africa who also exhibit the same characteristics. Some of these characteristics may be identified in a brief manner as given below:

- These democratic regimes represent political institutions and practices which include universal suffrage. Elections of representatives for a specified period makes them directly responsible to people. These regimes also provide equal opportunities to the citizens to compete for public office. The political parties and the political leaders enjoy the rights to compete publicly for support. Free and fair elections are the basis of the formation of governments. A competitive party system is supplemented by the pressure groups and the lobbying organisations. These pressure groups influence the conduct of the government by mobilizing the people.

- The democratic regimes reflect a high level of tolerance of opposition that is sufficient to check the arbitrary inclination of the government. The existence of alternative sources of information independent of the control of the government and of one another is helpful in this regard. Institutionally guaranteed and protected civil and political rights are further strengthened by the presence of the new social movements. It all results into a vigorous and democratically conscious civil society.

- The democratic regimes accept the presence of political cleavages due to diversity in the civil society. As such political conflicts are seen as an inevitable aspect of political life. Political thought and practice, enshrined in these democratic regimes accept conflict as a normal and not aberrant feature

- Modern democratic regimes are distinguished by existence, legality and legitimacy of a variety of autonomous organisations and associations which are relatively independent in relation to government and to another.

- These democratic regimes derive their underpinnillgs from the western liberal individualistic tradition of political thought thus besides guaranteeing the individual rights they also support free competitive market society. The cultural and ideological

orientation of these regimes likewise is also derived from western liberal ism.

- The democratic regimes in the developed World are not considered all alike. Some of them tend to favour centralization and majority rule whereas others favour fragrneltatiol and pluralism. 'Thus the comparative political theorists like Lijphart distinguishes these regimes between 'majority' democratic regimes and the 'pluralist' democratic regimes.

The 'majority' democratic regimes are organised along parliamentary lines in accordance with the Westminster model. Such democratic regimes are to be found in United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and Israel. Sallie of the significant features these regimes share are single party government, a lack of sepal-ation of powers between the executive and the legislature, a simple plurality or first past the post electoral system, unitary or quasi-federal government, legislative supremacy, etc. The pluralist democratic regimes based on the US model represent the separation of power and checks and balance. The provisions of the Constitution allow institutional fragmentation. The states like Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland which are divided by deep religious, ideological, regional, linguistic and cultural diversities have adopted such regimes which are also called the consociatiollal democratic regimes. These regimes promote the value of bargaining and power sharing which call ensure consensus. The common features these regimes share are coincide Government. a separation of power between the legislature and executive, an effective bicameral system, a multiparty system, Proportional representation federalism or devolution of political power, a Bill of rights, etc.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answer with the answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What are the features of the 'pluralist' democratic regimes?

11.6 DEMOCRATIC REGIMES AND THE DEVELOPING STATES

A number of newly independent states of Africa and Asia emerged from colonial rule after the Second World War. Decolonization brought forth the hope that the modernising political elite of the 'new' states might successfully transform the nationalist, anti-colonial movements into democratic Government and thereby advance the gigantic task of nation building and State building. Most of these States, however, suffered from severe handicaps, some in the shape of objective conditions like lack of literacy and industrial development and others because of their traditional cultures like lack of democratic experience. Thus even when most of these Asian and African post-colonial states adopted democratic form of regimes, many of these regimes developed authoritarian tendencies. Many states in the developing world alternate between democratic and authoritarian forms of, regime. Pakistan is such an example. 'Then, while some regimes maintain the democratic form, they are authoritarian in actual working. A major obstacle to the success of the democratic regimes in the developing states has been the deep ethnic divisions along the linguistic, tribal and religious lines - affecting their civil societies. These ethnic groups remain at different stages of socio-economic and political development. The ethnic diversities are naturally reflected in political organisations and form the basis of political mobilisation on the part of the ethnic groups for the fulfilment of their demands in a resource-scarce economy. The political regimes in the face of the increased level of political participation by the wider groups with their increased expectations find it necessary to introduce measures that would co-ordinate and control these groups and their demands. Often such measures are the beginnings of the authoritarian measures. Participation explosion has forced most of the democratic regimes into authorities' military or bureaucratic regimes in the States of Latin America. Another major proclivity before the democratic regimes in the developing States has been that of under development as the dependency theorists have put

it. This calls for strong initiatives on the part of the regime. Thus the democratic regimes in the East and South East Asian states are oriented more around economic goals than the political ones. Their overriding economic priority has been to boost growth and deliver prosperity, rather than to enlarge individual freedom in the western sense of civil liberty. This essentially practical concern is evident in political economies of these countries i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. Second, in these countries of East and South East Asia, there has been broad support for strong regimes. Powerful ruling parties tend to be tolerated, and there is general respect and faith in the ability of the regime to guide and regulate the decisions of private as well as public bodies and draw up strategies for national development. Third, these Asian democratic regimes command legitimacy based on Confucian values which stress on loyalty, discipline and duty. All the above three factors qualify the democratic reginies of East and South East Asian States as they reflect implicit and sometimes explicit authorities tendencies. People's democratic regimes in the Asian states like China have not been in terms of conform democratic petition, accountability and political liberties. However, unlike the erstwhile communist party regimes in Eastern Europe, these regimes have been noted for the extensive participation as citizens have got used to voting periodically in local elections. Islam, as Samuel P. Huntington has argued in his work 'Clash of Civilizations' has had a profound effect on politics in the States of North Africa, the Middle East and parts of South and South East Asia. As a consequence of the challenge to the existing regimes in the last two decades by the pro-urban poor militant Islamic groups, 'new' democratic regimes have been constructed or reconstructed on Islamic lines. Iran, Sudan and Pakistan along others are the pertinent examples. It Such Islamic democratic regimes have been considered 'by the western comparatists as illiberal on two counts. First, these regimes violate the distinction between private and public realms, in that they take religious rules and precepts to be the guiding principles of both personal life and political conduct. Second, these regimes invest political authority with potentially unlimited power, because temporal power is derived from spiritual wisdom. As Regimes such these regimes cannot claim to be

based surely on the popular consent or follow the constitutional framework. It would be apt to note, in this context, that Islam has been found compatible with the political pluralism followed by the 'guided' democratic regime in such countries like Pakistan and Malaysia. In essence, however, authoritarian tendericies have remained in the Islamic regimes even if it may not be correct to call them 'fundamentalist' in character.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answer with the answer given at the end of the unit.

1) List out, the major obstacles to the success of the democratic regimes in the developing states.

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11.7 THE NATURE OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

De~iiocratic and autlioritaria~i regimes may be distinguished both in terms of their objectives as well as liieans to achieve them. Authoritarian regimes decide what is good for individuals. The ruling elite impose their values on society irrespective of its members' wishes. Authoritarian refers to a forni of gover~i~nent which insists on unqualified obedience, conformity and coercion. It is in essence negation of democracy. When power is based on consent, respected willingly, and recognised by wider masses, it is legitimate and binding. This is called autliority. Authority is power raised in a moral or ethical level. Authority involves legitimate exercise of power, and in that sense it arises 'from below'. Democratic reginies i~pliold this type of authority and are authoritative. However, when a regime exercises authority regardless of popular consent and witli the help of force, it can be called autlioritarian. As sucli authoritarianism is a belief in, or practice'of, governnient 'from above thus practice of

governnient 'from above' is also associated witli ~iionarcliical absolutism, traditional dictators11 ips, most single party regimes, and most forms of military regimes. They all are autlioritarian in the sense that they are concerned witli the repression of opposition and political liberty. Autlioritarian regimes are distinguished from the totalitarian regimes. Totalitarian regimes depict modern dictatorship in terms of a model govern~iient by coniplete centralisatiori and uniform regimentation of all aspects of political, social and intellectual life and in these respects transcending by far the earlier manifestations of absolute or autocratic or despotic or tyrannical regimes and their capacity to control and mobilize the masses. In this sense totalitarianism is truly a phenomenori of twentieth century. The term has been applied to the three radical dictatorial regimes of the inter-war period: Italian Fascism, German National Socialism and Stalinism in Russia.

It follows that through totalitarian regimes are authoritarian - all authoritarian regimes are not necessarily totalitarian. No doubt the authoritarian regimes are concealed with the repression of opposition and political liberty. However, unlike the totalitarian regimes, these regimes do not aim to achieve far more radical goal of obliterating the distinction between the state and civil society. Authoritarian regimes tend to tolerate a significant range of economic, religious and other freedoms.

11.7.1 Characteristics of Authoritarian Regimes

- In the authoritarian regimes the techniques of decision by public discussion and voting are largely or wholly supplanted by the decision of those in authority. b The authoritarian regimes exercise sufficient power to dispense with any constitutional limitations.

- Those in power in an authoritarian regime claim to derive their authority not necessarily and always from the consent of the governed but from some special quality that they claim to possess. Based on force, authoritarian regimes are likely to use violence against the citizens who do not receive any importance in the

governance. Power is controlled, changes of government or even of leaders, is not smooth and peaceful under authoritarian regimes. Such changes take place either by means of coup dealt or as a result of revolutions. Coup has been a normal feature as far as the authoritarian regimes in Africa are concerned. Authoritarian regimes are likely to employ force also in their relations with other countries.

- Since institutions of such regales are not based on the participation of the people, and are not accountable to people, the moderating influence of public opinion is not effective.

- As such the authoritarian regimes do not help the cause of international peace. The authoritarian regimes are characterized by low and limited political mobilization. De-politicisation of the Inass of the citizen's falls into the intent of the ruling elite, fits with their mentality, and reflects the character of the comparative of the limited pluralism supporting them.

- Contrary to the democratic regimes which represent almost unlimited pluralism in institutionalized form, the authoritarian regimes represent limited pluralism. The limitation of pluralism may be legal or de facto, implemented more or less effectively, confined to strictly political groups or extended to interest groups.

- Moreover, political power is not legally accountable through such groups to the citizens, even when, it might be quite responsive to them. This is in . contrast to democratic regimes, where the political forces are formally dependent on the support of constituencies.

11.7.2 Authoritarian Regimes in the post-Second World War Period

Authoritarian regimes have been mostly established in the developing states of Latin America, the Middle East Africa and South East Asia. Developed states of the West like Spain, Portugal and Greece, however, have also experienced it in the post-World War period. These regimes-

more than political, economic, cultural or ideological factors-have been dependent on the use .of military power and systematic repression. Democratic institutions-both formal and informal-have been either weakened or abolished and the political and legal rights have been non existent.

These military regimes have been mostly under the control of a junta comprising Regimes of the officers of the three wings of armed forces like in Argentina during 1978- 1983 or in present day Myanmar. However, there are other forms of regimes where a military backed personalized dictatorship is established. In such cases a single individual acquires pre-eminence within the junta or regime, often being bolstered by a cult of personality drawing on charismatic authority. The military regimes headed by Colonel Papadopoulas in Greece, General Pinocliet in Chile, General Abacha in Nigeria, General Zia-UI-Haq in Pakistan, Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, Sergeant Samuel Doe in Liberia are among the pertinent examples. Still other forms of such regime are one where the civil regime survives primarily due to the backing of armed forces. In such cases military often prefers to rule behind the scenes and exercise power covertly through a civilianized leadership. Zaire under Mobutu, who came to power in a military coup in 1965, but later allowed the army to withdraw progressively from active politics by ruling through the popular movement of the revolution in the sixties can be cited as an example and so is the case of Egypt which experienced transition from military regimes to authoritarian civil rule under Garlie1 Nasser arid Anwar Sadat, both military figures, in the 1960's and 1970's.

Check Your Progress 4

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answers.

ii) Check your answers with the answer given at the end of the unit.

1) What is the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes?

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2) State three main characteristics of the authoritarian regimes.

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11.8 LET US SUM UP

The notion of absolutism defines a political system of the early modern period which, from a traditional perspective, was defined as the reign of a king whose power was attached to his person and he reigned without the participation of state institutions. The term "absolutism" is also used for the period of the European history between the religious wars of the 16th to early 17th century and the revolutions of the late 18th century, where we could find elements of this political regime. The sovereign relies on five pillars of power: its standing army, the judiciary and the police, the administration of which the king is the head, the nobility at the royal court, the Church of the State (the clergy) and mercantilism, a political and economic theory related to absolutism, whose objective is the health of the state budget. In order to achieve these goals, all means could be implemented.

Government in its broadest sense represents any mechanism through which ordered rule is maintained, its central feature being its ability to make collective decisions and implement them. A political regime, or system, however, involve not only the mechanisms of government and institutions and instructions of the state, but also the structures and processes through which these interact with the society. Classification of political regimes enable us in the understanding and evaluation of politics and government. It also helps us in analysing the problems of a particular regime. The inter-war period saw the alteration in the nature of classifying the regimes. Broadly speaking, two kinds of regimes, democratic and authoritarian can be universally accepted.

Democratic regimes have undergone a process of evolution beginning with the Greek city States to the modern nation-states. Post Second

World War period saw the emergence of 'three worlds' classification of political regimes. The first world liberal capitalist, 'Second World' communist and 'Third World' 'new' democratic regimes were found to have material and ideological differences the developed states, the democratic regimes are polyarchal in the sense that they operate through instiutional and political processes of modern representative democracy which force the rulers to take into account the interests, aspirations and rights of the citizens. In the developing states of Asia. Africa and Latin America, the democratic regimes have been under considerable constraints due to ethnic diversities and socio-economic backwardness. Role of religion like Confucianism and lslam has provided uniqueness to the political regimes of some developing states. Authoritarian regimes are anti-democratic in the sense that such regimes limit democracy, liberty and law. Such regimes insist on unqualified obedience, conformity and coercion. Authoritarianism can be distinguished from totalitarian in the sense that the former does not seek to obliterate the distinction between the state and civil society. Authoritarian regimes during the post-second World War period, whether in the developing or developed countries, have been primarily established with either the covert or overt role of military.

11.9 KEY WORDS

Democracy: Democracy is a form of government in which the people have the authority to choose their governing legislation. Who people are and how authority is shared among them are core issues for democratic development and constitution

Authoritarian: Authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Political scientists have created many typologies describing variations of authoritarian forms of government.

11.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1) How would you differentiate between government and the political regimes?

2) What are the features of the 'pluralist' democratic regimes?

3) List out, the major obstacles to the success of the democratic regimes in the developing states.

4) What is the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes?

5) State three main characteristics of the authoritarian regimes.

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11.12   ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) While the former refers to the institutional process through which collective' and binding decisions are made, the latter is a much broader term involving structures, processes and values through which the political institutions interact with civil society.

Check Your Progress 2

1) These promote values of bargaining and power sharing through institutional arrangements like checks and balances among different organs of the government, multiparty system, and division or devolution of power.

Check Your Progress 3

1) High levels of political participation in the context of deep ethnic divisions, the problems of underdevelopment and the need for strong initiatives of the regimes.

Check Your Progress 4

1) Totalitarian regimes are characterized by complete centralization and uniform Regimentation of political, social, economic and intellectual life. The distinction between state and civil society are obliterated. Authoritarian regimes tolerate some amount of pluralism and do not seek to control all aspects of an individual's life.

2) Based on force, law and limited political mobilization, absence of constitutional accountability etc.

UNIT 12: COMPARATIVE PARTY SYSTEMS

STRUCTURE

12.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- The Origin of Party Systems
- To know the Human Nature Theory
- To discuss the Environmental Explanation
- To know Interest Theory
- To describe Meaning and Nature
- To discuss Functions of Political Parties

- To describe Principal Types of Party Systems

12.1 INTRODUCTION

The role of party system in the operation of democratic polity is now generally well recognized by Political Scientists and politicians alike. Democracy, as Finer observes, "rests, in its hopes and doubts, upon the party system." In fact, as democracy postulates free organization of opposing opinions or 'hospitality to a plurality of ideas' and political parties act as a major political vehicle of opinions and ideas, party system is the sine qua non of democracy. Without party, the electorate would be highly diffused and atomized, and opinions too variant and dispersed. The existence of party-system is, therefore, necessary to bring public opinion to focus and frame issues for the popular verdict. It is, therefore, very useful and interesting for students of Comparative Politics to understand the origin, meaning, various kinds and merits and demerits of the party system.

12.2 ORIGIN OF PARTY SYSTEMS

Political Scientists have offered several explanations for the origin of the party system. These exploitations can be broadly clubbed under three categories as discussed below:

12.2.1 The Human Nature Theory

Under this category, three kinds of explanations have been put forward for explaining the origin of the party system. Firstly scholars like Sir Henry Main argue that what causes parties to rise is the characteristic tendency of human nature towards combativeness. In other words, human beings form parties to give organized expression to their combative instinct. The second category of explanation under the human nature theory identifies the human temperament as the cause of the emergence of political parties. To put it differently, the diverse temperaments of individuals lead them to form different parties. For

instance, while persons having liking for the established order join right of the political divide, others opposing the existing order join left of the political spectrum. In other words, those who do not support change in existing system form one party, and those who want reforms and changes get together in another party. Third explanation concerning the human nature of origin of parties runs in terms of the charismatic traits of political leaders. Since the dormant masses need leadership to articulate their latent feelings, formation of a political party depends upto the availability of dynamic political leadership who can inspire masses to work towards achieving the goals of a particular party.

12.2.2 Environmental Explanation

In addition to the above-mentioned explanations, considerable data is available to show the role of the socio-economic environment in the evolution of the party system. The unorderly democratic party system, for instance, is the result of at least two significant political developments: the limitation of the authority of the absolute monarchy and the extension of the suffrage to virtually all the adult population. It is thus not surprising to find the historic roots of the party system both in the struggle of the legislature to limit the king's prerogative and in the development of groups within the expanded electorate taking sides in the battle or demanding recognition of their interests. By 1680 the public policy of Britain had become the joint concern of both King and Parliament, and the terms 'Whig' and 'Tory' were commonly applied to those who, respectively, attacked and supported royal policy.

12.2.3 Interest Theory

As usual, while the above-mentioned explanations are partly correct, no single explanation is adequate or completely true. Combativeness, for instance, is only one of the various motivations of human behavior. Similarly, age is an uncertain element as an indicator of political attitude and dynamic of political leader is not permanent. In view of the inadequacies of the aforesaid explanations regarding the origin of the

party system, the "interest theory" is advanced as a widely recognized hypothesis. This theory is based on the basic assumption that various parties are formed on the basis of various interests. In other words, part' rat: serve as convenient agencies for the expression of individual and group interests. The nature, extent and degree of an individual's political activities are motivated by the range of interests he develops. These interests grow out of interaction of his/her personality with his/her cultural environment. Birth, education is an experience may, thus, determine an individual's interest which, in turn, party affiliations. While the 'interest theory' recognizes the significance of economic interests in influencing an individual or group's decision to join a particular party or combination of parties, this theory does not agree with the Marxist 3ssumption of economic determinism and its concomitant dichotomy of social classes. In fact, to reduce social tensions to two embattled groups of "haves" and have-cots" all along the economic line is to oversimplify a complex One may, therefore, argue that the human beings tend to support and vote for the political party that hold the prospect of achieving their desired economic as well as sociocultural objectives.

12.3 MEANING AND NATURE

Political party is a group of people that seeks to get its candidates elected to public offices by supplying them with a label-a "party ide11tification"- by which they know to the electorate. This definition is purposefully broad so that it will include both familiar parties (Democratic and Republican in the US for instance) and unfamiliar ones (Whig, Libertarian, Socialist Worker) and will cover periods in which a party is very strong (having an elaborate and well-disciplined organization that provides money and workers to its candidates) as well periods in which it is quite weak (supplying nothing but only the labels to its candidates. This definition suggests three political arenas in which parties may be found. A party exists as label in the mind of voters, as an organization that recruits and campaigns for candidates, and as a set of leaders who try to organize and count the legislative and executive branches of government. A careful look at the above-mentioned meaning of political party shows its certain marks that distinguishing it from similar groups

such as temporary organizations, interest groups or factions, etc. For instance temporary political organizations like Food Price Committee or Fan line Resistance Committee, etc., are formed for the single purpose of supporting or opposing a particular temporary issue. Political parties, on the other hand, have some degree of permanence. Secondly, political parties are the only association groups that are bolt open to all (at least in theory) and have very wide interests. This is because of the fact that they concern themselves with problem of government and cannot concentrate on specific matters. They are open to all, because they try to enlist the support of as many members of the polity as possible. It is in this context that a political party is different from interest and pressure groups which work only for the advancement of the cause of those groups. Thirdly, parties must have definite aims and objectives. The objectives are often a mixture of ultimate and immediate purposes. Party programs contain ideas about law and government, ideas about the shape of political things to come and each party seeks to focus its own brand of political ideas. Fourthly, recognition, of material advantages that go with the securing of the power of government, forms a part of party programme. In fact, as we see in India today Inore often than not political parties give priority to capturing power though they do this of ideology like opposing. In this sense as well, political parties are different from interest or pressure groups as the latter do not nurse the constituencies for competing at the polls to form the government. A political party is thus a coalition of group interests pursuing general political policies. Pressure groups, on the other hand, are the living 'public' behind the parties. Like interest and pressure groups, and unlike political parties, factions are also not organized for political purposes. But at the same time they do not possess ally continuous stable organizations. Factions may thus be characterized as a group of persons serving sectional interests within a political party rather than aggregate interests which parties usually champion for whirling elections. As the idea of a common interest and national unity sustains the constitutional appeal to the polls, the logic of party system rejects the Marxian doctrine of class struggle. This implies that parties transcend class-barriers and sectional interests by mutual recognitions in the sense that in spite of their differences, political parties do not disagree

on everything. On the basic features of the system to which they belong, there must be a consensus. Political parties may thus be defined as a group consisting of cross-sections of human beings, more or less stable and organized, with the objective, in accordance with the constitution, of securing or maintaining for its leaders the control of a government, and of giving to members of the party, through such control, ideal and material benefits and advantages.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer.

ii) Check your answer with that given at the end of the unit.

1) Discuss briefly the human nature theory of the origin of party system.

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2) Define political parties and distinguish between political parties and pressure groups.

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12.4 FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Parties contribute to democratic government through the functions they perform for the political system. These functions call broadly be divided under six categories: Firstly, political parties unite sectional interests, bridge the geographical differences, and induce cohesion. In other words, various interests are aggregated through the instrumentality of parties. This ensures both order and system maintenance.

Secondly, political parties contribute to democratic government by iodinating candidates for election to public office. In the absence of

parties, voters would be confronted with a, bewildering array of self-nominated candidates, each seeking a narrow victory over others on the basis of personal friendships, celebrity status or name. Parties minimize this danger by setting up their candidates in different constituencies. They carry out campaigns to win elections. They also defray the cost of contesting elections where the candidate is a poor person. Again, political parties help democratic government by structuring voting choice reducing the number of candidates on the ballot to those who have realistic chance of winning. Parties that have won sizeable portions of the vote in past elections are likely to win comparable portions of the vote in future ones also. This discourages non-party or non-serious candidates for running for the office. This in turn focuses the election on the contest between parties and on candidates with established records, which reduces the amount of new information that voters need in order to make a rational decision.

In addition, parties also help voters choose candidates by proposing alternative programmes of government action in the form of party manifestos. 'The specific policies advocated in an election campaign may vary from candidate to candidate and from election to election, the types of policies advocated by candidates of one party nonetheless usually tend to differ from those proposed by candidates of other parties. In the case of the US, for example, even though the neutrality of the names of major political parties, namely, Democratic and Republican suggests that they are undifferentiated in their policies, in reality; however, these parties regularly adopt very different policies in their platforms. Besides, parties help co-ordinate the actions of public officials. A government based on the separation of powers like that of the Unites States, divides responsibilities for making public policy. The President and leaders of the House and Senate are not required to cooperate with one another. Political parties are the major means for bridging the separation of powers, of producing co-ordinated policies that call government the country effectively. Individual of the same party in the presidency, the House, and the Senate are likely to share political principles and thus to cooperate in taking policy. In a parliamentary political system, where the

formation and continuance of the real executive, i. e., the Council of Ministers, depends on the support of the majority in legislature, political parties perform the task of disciplining the plans of the majority to keep them united for providing the life line support to the government. This role of political parties has, in fact, made them informal governments in democracies as the powers of the legislature has now been usurped, to a great extent, by political parties. Though victory is certainly the first commandment of a political party, in a democracy defeat of party also does not mean its demise. In that case, a party functions as a critic and watchdog of the government's policy. Political parties thus play an extremely significant role in democracies. While, on the one hand, they have to maintain and strengthen the structure of democratic norms and values; on the other, they have to secure maximal community mobilization for social and economic development. Political parties have thus to induce both political and socio economic development.

12.5 PRINCIPAL TYPES OF PARTY SYSTEMS

Functions of a Political Party

Every political party has a number of functions to perform. Here we have listed some of them.

A political party contests elections by putting up candidates.

In countries like the USA, the candidates are selected by members and supporters of a party.

On the other hand, in countries like India, the candidates are chosen by top party leaders.

Every party has different policies and programmes. Voters make a choice in accordance with the policies and programmes liked by them.

In a democratic country, a large group of people that has certain similar opinions group together and form a party. Then then, give a direction to the policies adopted by the government.

Those parties which lose elections form the opposition. They voice different views and criticise the government for their failures and mobilize opposition to the government.

Political parties shape public opinion. With the help of the pressure groups, the parties launch movements for solving problems faced by the people.

Parties even offer access to government machinery and welfare schemes. The local party leader serves as a link between the citizen and the government officer.

Importance of Political Parties

A democracy cannot exist without the presence of a political party. This is clear from the function performed by the political parties. In case, there are no political parties then:

Every candidate in the election would be an independent candidate. Any individual candidate does not have the efficiency to promise any major policy change to the people. In such a scenario, no one will be responsible for how the country is run.

In the long run, only a representative democracy can survive. Political parties are the agencies that gather different views on various issues and present them to the government.

12.5.1   One Party Systems

In a one-party system, there is no competition in this system. Here, the lone party nominates the candidates and the voters have only two choices i.e.

Not to vote at all or

write 'yes' or 'no' against the name of the candidates nominated by the party

Such a political system has been prominent in authoritarian regimes and communist countries such as China, North Korea, and Cuba. Before the collapse of communism, this system was also prevalent in USSR.

The one party or single party system is found upon the assumption that the sovereign will of the state reposes in the leader and the political elite. This authoritarian principle found expression first in monarchies, later in dictatorships and more recently in some democracies. As the dictatorship needs a monopoly of power for its survival, it abolishes all political parties. Though elections are conducted even in such a regime if only to show the facade of popular support, the voter's choice is limited to only, one candidate. There may be some variations in the single party system prevailing in different countries, but some of the common features of dictatorial parties in these countries make them unique. These features are:

(1) Such party is an official party in the sense that it lays a monopoly and is led by the same persons who rule;

(2) membership of such a party is usually made an essential requirement for acquiring at least important government jobs;

(3) this kind of party supervises the governmental efforts to ideologically doctrine peoples; and

(4) it is characterize by its elite personality. The essential function of one-party system thus is not to elicit decisions from the Inass electorate on the big issue of politics, but to ensure discipline and obedience among

the people. In its organization, it is more like an army than a political party.

Obviously, therefore, a one-party system becomes necessarily totalitarian. As the sole operator of a political system, the party extends its authority everywhere. The general policy is decided by the dictates of the party. Every word the party declares is, like the Delphic oracle, taken to be true. The source of all laws is the party, and no aspect of individual and social life is immune from its potential control. Not surprisingly, a single-party system involves the abolition of freedom of speech and expression, press and association. Accordingly, the line of distinction between society and the state is blurred and the latter completely swallows up the former. This type of party system was found in Fascist Italy under Mussolini who as sullied power in 1922 and systematically destroyed all parties except his own Fascist Party. In Germany, Hitler came to power in 1933 and destroyed all opposition. In 1934, the party purged itself of scores of prominent liberties of the party by shooting the down under the presence that they were resisting arrest. Similarly, there was only Communist Party rule in former USSR and there were several purges between 1936 and 1938 by the Communalist Party. Single mass parties have, of course, come to power in some of the Afro-Asian states in the post-colonial era these countries include Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Turkey and Mexico, etc. In Turkey, for instance, the People's Republican Party, operated from 1923 to 1946 without killing democracy. Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, who founded African National Union, is another example of single-party democracy. In that country, through TANU was the only recognized party, yet voters did have a choice of candidates from within that party as in each constitution more than one TANU candidate was allowed to contest. In Kenya, the government the only opposition party, Kenya African People's Union in 1969, but allowed the members of that party to compete in elections.

12.5.2 Two Party Systems

In a two-party system, the power shifts between two major, dominant parties. So, for winning the elections, the winner will have to get the maximum number of votes. However, please know that maximum number of votes is not equivalent to a majority of votes.

So, the smaller parties tend to merge with the bigger parties or they drop out of elections. Such a parliamentary system prevails in Canada and Great Britain, in which there are two parties holding the maximum numbers of seats.

A two-party system is one where only two parties, despite the presence of other parties, have substantial support of the electorate and expectation of forming the government. Under this system, the majority of the elected candidates at a given time belong to any only of the two major parties which form the government, while the other party remains in the opposition. In such a system, there may exist more than two parties, but actual or likely transfer of power takes place between two giant parties only. The United States and the United Kingdom provide good examples of two-party system. In the former, the Democratic and Republican parties are two giant parties. In the UK, the transfer of power takes place between the two major parties, the Labour and the Conservative. There are, of course, certain differences between the American and British party systems. While the American parties are not ideologically very much different from each other-they are broker-bargaining parties to the point that each party achieves a basically similar political consensus-the British parties, though also pragmatic, are, generally speaking, ideologically distinct from each other. Recognizing these differences the two party systems may be divided into (a) indistinct two-party system in the US, and (b) distinct two-party system in Britain.

12.5.3 Multi-Party Systems

The third and the most common form of government is the multi-party system. In such a system, there are three or more parties which have the capacity to gain control of the government separately or in a coalition.

In case, no party achieves a clear majority of the legislative seats, then several parties join forces and form a coalition government. Countries like India follow a multi-party system. Some people are of the view that a multi-party system often leads to political instability in a country.

A multi-party system is one in which more than two major parties exist, who struggle with each other for power but no party can alone secure absolute majority to rule. In countries like India and several countries on the Continental Europe, such a system exists, though in a variety of forms. One can discern two kinds of multi-party systems from the point of view of stability of government: (a) unstable multi-party-systems; and (b) working multiparty systems. As its name indicates, the former does but provide stability. India today provides one of the best examples of this, where recurring 'hung' Parliaments due to plethora of parties has caused political instability at the union level since 1996. France under the Third and Fourth Republics provides another example of this kind of party system, where government formed by coalition of parties rose and fell with dismaying regularity. Italy provides yet another example, where hardly any party since the Second World War has been able to win a majority of the seats in the Italian Parliament. The working multi-party systems, on the other hand, behave like two-party system and thereby tend to provide stability to government, even though they have more than two major political parties. Former West Germany, before the rise of the Social Democratic Party as the government party, had characteristics of a two-party system as two of the three major parties, working together, provided the government and the Social Democrats remained in the opposition. In Norway, Sweden, Belgium and Israel also the existence of various parties have not caused instability.

12.5.4 Two Party vs. Multi-Party Systems

Democracy has functioned as successfully in multi-party systems as in two-party systems. There are, however, certain relative advantages and

disadvantages of a particular system. To begin with, the supporters of multi-party system argue that:

(a) it more effectively corresponds to the division of public opinion especially in a plural society like India;

(b) it represents and satisfies the aspirations of diverse interest groups;

(c) under this system, a voter can choose among more parties and candidates than available under the two-party system;

(d) it reduces the fear of absolutism of the majority; and filially

(e) it is more flexible because under this system groups can be freely organized, can unite and separate in accordance with the exigencies of the circumstances. In theory the multi-party system, has much in its favour, in practice not so much. As we see in India today, inability of any single party to command absolute majority and consequent inevitability of forming coalition government led to the crisis of stable government in India.

The members of the Council of Ministers instead of working under the leadership of the Prime Minister seek guidance from their party bosses and even a single under of Parliamentarian to blackmail the government by threatening to withdraw its support. Not surprisingly, the government does not find enough time to devote attention to the task of governance as it remains busy with keeping its partners in good humor even at the cost of -.strong interest. The major party is also forced to abandon its electoral pledge cobble a majority in the lower house of legislature. The Cabinet in consequence comes to represent, not a general body of opinions, but a patchwork of doctrines leading to a gap between the electorate arid the government.

·   The recent election in the US has once again brought the focus on the debate whether a two-party system of democracy is better than multi-party system (more than two parties).

·   The US, the world's oldest democracy, has traditionally followed a two-party system. India, on the other hand, has taken the latter route. Both systems have their pros and cons.

Key Points

·   In the US, elections have been traditionally contested between the Republicans and the Democrats.

·   Both parties have their own policies and views on various issues, such as health care, foreign affairs, internal security, employment, outsourcing and the war on terror.

·   Every four years, both parties nominate candidates to contest the post of the President of the US.

·   The President is elected by the Electoral College, which is a body of popularly elected representatives from each state.

·   In a multi-party system, various national and regional parties field candidates to contest elections to represent constituencies. Each state has a different number of constituencies depending on the size and population.

·   The party which has a majority of elected representatives has the right to form the government and choose the Prime Minister.

Why a multi-party system is better

·   Restricting choice to two parties limits the number of ideas on every issue and reduces each voter's choice. Each of the two parties has fixed views on various topics. A voter who supports the view of one party on a topic but supports the view of the other party on another topic is forced to compromise one of his views.

·   A multi-party system, on the other hand, allows each citizen to vote for the party that best fits their beliefs and represents their ideology.

·   Countries like the US and India are known for the diversity of their population. Two parties are not enough to represent this diversity.

·   A multi-party system is more responsive to a change or shift in public opinion. Two-party systems are not as flexible because they have a more or less rigid set of opinions on every issue.

·	To win an election, each party in a two-party system is forced to moderate its views. Thus, each party represents the radically moderate, and not the conservative and liberal wings. As is evident in India, the multi-party system also caters to people with extreme views.

·	If the voter turnout is very low, the votes that the winning party gets would actually only represent a minority of the population.

·	Some voters tend to have one issue that determines which party they will vote for. In a two-party system, opposing parties tend to take opposite sides on many issues. These "one issue voters" will automatically vote for the party that represents their view on the one issue, even though they may disagree with most of their other positions.

·	Since the two parties have completely opposing views on issues, they tend to reverse the policies of the previous government when voted into power. This does not benefit the state in the long run.

·	A multi-party system prevents the leadership of a single party from setting policy without challenge.

·	If any one party in a two-party system becomes weak, a dominant-party system may develop.

·	In a two-party system, candidates are motivated to run negative campaigns, pointing out the flaws in the "other person" (usually the leader of the other party).

Why a two-party system is better

·	The two-party system presents voters a simple choice.

·	Since the parties in a two party system have to moderate radical views, they follow public opinion better than a multi-party system would.

·	If the majority opinion is split among a large number of parties, it is possible that a party representing a minority view may prevail over the majority in a multi-party system. In this sense, the two-party system protects the majority from the minority.

·	In a multi-party system, even parties with extremely radical views have a chance to be elected to power. This could result in chaotic and disastrous reforms. The moderate approach of a two-party system negates this possibility.

· There is no real control or limit over the number of parties. Sometimes, no single party is able to get a clear majority. This leads to hung parliaments and coalition politics, as has been the case in India for some time now.

· Coalition partners often tend to use their clout to get their way on key issues. This can be very detrimental to progress.

· There is very little chance of a coalition government in a two-party system. This provides for stable governance.

1. Will a two-party system work best for India?

For

· It will put an end to coalition politics. The declared agenda of the contesting parties won't change as a result of any coalition formed after the election.

· The elected government will be able to function without any undue pressure. It will be able to take crucial decisions without having to succumb to the demands of coalition partners. For example, India could have signed the Civilian Nuclear Deal with the US far earlier had it not been for coalition politics.

· It is far easier to choose between two candidates, rather than studying the policies of different parties before making a choice.

· Both parties in a two-party system tend to be moderate in their views on all issues. This automatically rules out any radical ideas being implemented by the government.

· For all practical purposes, there are only two real major players on the political scene anyway. The smaller parties do play significant roles, but can never hope to form the government on their own.

· Leaders of the UPA could seriously consider making the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) a national party. The coalition already has a Common Minimum Program. It can be broadened into a party manifesto. The BJP-led NDA (National Democratic Alliance) can follow suit, resulting in a two-party system at the national level.

Against

·   A two-party system will not be able to fully represent a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, large country like India, where people speak different languages and have different takes on various issues.

·   A multi-party coalition ensures that a proper check is kept on the government. For example, the UPA government had a tough time going ahead with the Civilian Nuclear Deal because some parties that supported it were against it.

·   Stability is undesirable in a democracy. It results in complacency, which could lead to poor governance.

·   For a developing country like India it is necessary to have a pool of ideas and thoughts on every issue. In a two-party system, the number of ideas is always restricted.

·   In a two-party system of governance, newly elected governments tend to reverse the policies of the previous government. This could lead to instability, especially in the transition phase.

·   A two-party system forces people to compromise on some of their values and choose the party that represents their view the best, rather than entirely.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer

ii) Check your answer with that giver] at the end of the unit.

1) Discuss the role of political parties in a democracy.

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Critically evaluate the merits and demerits of various types of party systems.

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12.6 A CRITIQUE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM

This unit reflects on the current performance of political parties in the UK, using Alan Ware's conceptual distinction between democracy as a means of interest optimalisation, democracy as a way of fostering civic orientation among citizens, and democracy as a mechanism of popular choice and control of government. Seen from either of the first two perspectives, parties appear to be largely failing democracy, but they remain important mechanisms by which a significant degree of popular choice and control can be achieved. Even here, however, they are more challenged and less appreciated than was once the case, though this may reflect changes in popular perception more than a shift in the actual performance of parties. That being the case, it is not clear that institutional reforms which aim to improve party performance will necessarily achieve their goal. In recent years the party system has become the object of much criticism almost everywhere. Firstly, under this system the perpetual struggle for political power turns the legislature into a battle field and in the process national interests are ignored. Secondly, it encourages increasingly as specious issues are often raised to divert public attention. Thirdly, parties tend to become autonomous in the sense that principles and national interests are subordinated for the sake of winning elections. Fourthly, parties unnecessarily extend national political issues to local elections. Fifthly, the practice of rewarding party members, known as the spoils system in the US, constitutes a dereliction from principles. Sixthly, "party spirit is accused of debasing the moral standards", as scruples are sacrificed at the altar of party interest. Seventhly, as parties have to mobilize funds for contesting elections, they have to reward the donoryaker winning the elections leading to corruption. Finally, parties are often run by leaders and their small cliques in the name of masses thereby frustrating the will of the people for better government.

Political parties in the UK today – as in so many other countries - are widely seen as disappointing in their democratic performance. 1 Those who purport to care about democracy are anxious. There is widespread evidence of disconnect, alienation and apathy among citizens – and the

search is on for explanations and for ways to put things right. The blame for this state of affairs is heaped on various targets: the parties and the politicians tend to lead the way but, somewhat less tangibly, 'the political system' is apt to come in for criticism from some quarters. Others prefer to level their sights on the role of the mass media, and occasionally even on the public itself. In this paper, I shall examine the nature and causes of the present discontent by addressing the failings of political parties, real and perceived.

How far one views parties as 'failing' depends largely on one's normative take on democracy. Taking a cue from Alan Ware (1987) it is useful, I believe, to identify three core elements to democracy. These receive differing emphases in the various treatments of the subject and such emphases affect perceptions of party performance. Ware refers to the first democratic element as interest optimalisation, the second as civic orientation and the third as popular choice and control. I will use these three perspectives on democratic theory as a way of organising my discussion of the current performance of parties in the UK.

It is common for critics to argue that the solution to the perceived problems of contemporary democratic systems lies in an injection of more participatory forms of democracy. Since citizens are said to be frustrated at the lack of participatory opportunities, these observers propose that reforms must provide for greater direct engagement in politics. A striking recent example of the argument that participatory reforms can (in part) provide an answer is provided by the Power Report. It argued that the British political system had failed to keep pace with social change and was run by elites disconnected from those they are supposed to serve, many of whom are therefore turning away from conventional politics altogether. The report's solution to this problem is a set of recommendations (Power Inquiry 2006: 20–5), which it claims will contribute to 'the creation of a culture of political engagement in which policy and decision- making employs direct input from citizens'. The report is somewhat vague as to the precise forms by which direct participation might be enhanced, though it argues that 'citizens should be

given the right to initiate legislative processes, public inquiries and hearings into public bodies and their senior management' (Power Inquiry 2006: 24), and expresses its confidence that advances in communication technology will 'increasingly allow large numbers of citizens to become engaged in political decisions in a focussed way' (ibid.: 229). 4

The Power Report is contemporary and has caught the attention of observers in Britain, including some in government, but one could of course refer to the far more developed pro- participation arguments of well- known political theorists and theorists such as Carole Pateman (1970), Joseph Bessette (1980), Benjamin Barber (1984), Joshua Cohen (1989) or James Fishkin (1991). But what evidence is there that Britain (or for that matter, other Western democracies afflicted by similar trends in political disaffection and declining participation) is a nation of disappointed democrats who yearn for deeper and more extensive political engagement? Russell Dalton's comparative research (2004) suggests that the principal reason for growing political disaffection is the rising expectations of government that citizens of Western democracies have. These expectations are most pronounced among the young, the better educated, the more affluent and the post- materialist; while these are the very groups that have most directly benefited from the spread of affluence, their expectations have increased the most, as has their tendency to criticise political elites, institutions and processes. Yet as he sees it, they do not represent a threat to democracy per se; on the contrary, these 'dissatisfied democrats' are driven by a passion for the democratic creed that fosters disillusionment with the way current political processes operate. These empirical findings seem to be consistent with the arguments of participationist critics.

However, there are those who cast considerable doubt on the participationist critique of parties. With respect to Britain, for instance, Philip Norton 5 cites evidence from the Audit of Political Engagement survey which shows that, although people tend to claim that they want to have a say in the way the country is run and feel that they are presently denied the opportunity, when pushed on what type of activity they would

be prepared to engage in, a different picture emerges: '[B]eyond signing petitions, the vast majority of respondents were unwilling to undertake any further action.' Furthermore, Norton cites Declan McHugh's (2006) argument that more participatory democracy

may only succeed in engaging those already over- represented amongst voters and party members – that is, the educated, affluent and middle class. Mechanisms designed to provide greater opportunities for citizens to participate more directly in decision- making as a means of increasing legitimacy and reducing the perceived democratic deficit may therefore have the opposite effect.

A yet starker challenge comes from across the Atlantic:

The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision-making: They do not want to make political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know the details of the decision- making process. … This does not mean that people think no mechanism for government accountability is necessary; they just do not want the mechanism to come into play except in unusual circumstances. (Hibbing and Theiss- Morse 2002: 1–2)

Hibbing and Theiss- Morse summarise the orientations of American citizens as a preference for some kind of 'stealth' arrangement, whereby citizens know that democracy exists, but expect it to be barely visible on a routine basis – an attitude that they describe as naive and unfeasible. The upshot of their Stealth Democracy study is that the authors criticise both the naivety of popular attitudes towards politics and the insistence of some observers that participatory democracy provides the solution to it:

People need to understand that disagreements can occur among people of good heart and that some debating and compromising will be necessary to resolve these disagreements and come to a collective solution. As such, education designed to increase people's appreciation of democracy

needs to be a crucial element of efforts to improve the current situation. (ibid.: 10)

The alleged benefits of participatory democracy are derided as 'wishful thinking', and they point out that research tends to reveal that it only works under very limited conditions: 'Deliberation will not work in the real world of politics where people are different and where tough, zero-sum decisions must be made … real deliberation is quite likely to make them hopping mad or encourage them to suffer silently because of a reluctance to voice their own opinions in the discussion' (ibid.: 207). Indeed, they cite a variety of research evidence to debunk three of the major claims of the participationists: that deliberative and participatory democracy produces better decision- making; that it enhances the legitimacy of the political system; and that it leads to personal development ('improves people').

To summarise, those who regard democracy as a means to the realisation of civic and community consciousness are highly likely to see parties as failing to foster this spirit or engage the necessary level of political participation by citizens. The sceptics doubt that the public has the interest or capacity to fulfil such participatory visions. Who is right about this is essentially an empirical question, which clearly points to a need for research in to popular attitudes towards and understanding of politics. More prosaically, parties are rarely now the political expression of social group identities, and the erosion of affective loyalty leaves them open to consumerist expectations that they should 'deliver' as public service providers. This brings us to the role of parties in government, which in turn hinges on the capacity of parties to act as mechanisms of popular choice, accountability and control.

12.7 WHETHER PARTY-LESS DEMOCRACY IS POSSIBLE?

All political parties in India are rogue entities. The Constitution of India, adopted on 26 November 1949 not by "we the people" but by the Constituent Assembly set up by our colonial rulers on 16 May 1946,

accepted adult franchise, the most powerful instrument devised by man for breaking down social and economic injustice, but did not recognise political parties. The makers of the Constitution envisaged a partyless democracy. BR Ambedkar, chairman of the drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly, said on 4 November 1948 while introducing the draft Constitution for debate, "Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realise that our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only top-dressing on Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic."

The Indian National Congress was a movement engaged in freedom struggle. Ignoring Mahatma Gandhi&'s advice to dissolve it after independence, leaders of the Congress, made up of people holding views from the far right to the left, converted the movement into a political party with the sole purpose of grabbing power. The party lacked constitutional or legal validity. To make matters worse, over the years it introduced the principle of hereditary succession. Most of the political parties that came after the Congress followed suit. From the Abdullahs of Kashmir to Karunanidhi of Kanyakumari they have established minor political dynasties. Thomas Paine in his immortal book, Rights of Man, wrote: "When the mind of a nation is bowed down by hereditary succession, it loses a considerable portion of its powers…Hereditary succession requires the same obedience to ignorance as to wisdom; and when once the mind can bring itself to pay this indiscriminate reverence, it descends below the statue of mental manhood. It is fit to be great only in little things."

Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act allows for small groups of people to form political parties by making a simple declaration. The result is the proliferation of parties with no political ideology or programme. More than 1,200 political parties are registered with the Election Commission. When it comes to elections, less than one-third of them participate. Collecting government advertisements for their 'official' organ or publication is one of their major sources of income. During elections many of these parties get into the fray only to withdraw

in favour of one of the mainstream parties for a price. No political parties, including the Congress and the BJP, hold proper internal elections or publish their audited accounts. Two years ago the Central Information Commission decided that the Right to Information Act was applicable to all political parties, in keeping with the spirit of democracy. The Congress, which enacted the RTI Act, joined the rest in opposing it tooth and nail.

The National Committee to Review the Working of the Constitution headed by former Chief Justice MN Venkatachaliah, the Law Commission headed by Justice Jeevan Reddy, and the National Election Watch and the Association for Democratic Reform were unanimous that Parliament should enact a law to regulate the constitution, functioning, funding, accounts, audit and other affairs concerning political parties and participation in elections. The existence of political parties is now implicit though the Constitution did not provide for it. High cost of elections, corrupt electoral practices, abuse of money power to the extent of paying for votes and dynastic control of political parties have resulted in erosion of democracy and its essential values. The time has come to make political parties democratic, transparent, accountable and open to scrutiny by regulating their conduct and affairs like holding periodical election of their office-bearers and publishing their annual audited accounts as public limited companies are mandated to do. The need for comprehensive legislation to strengthen political parties has been felt for quite some time. Neither the BJP nor the Congress has shown any interest in such legislation. The NCRWC in its report to the NDA government headed by the BJP stressed the desirable objective of promoting "progressive polarisation of political ideologies" with a view to weeding out less serious political activity. While proliferation of smaller parties created confusion, any tightening of regulation must take into account "the need to reflect the aspirations of a plural society," the report said.

The committee recommended that the Election Commission should progressively increase the threshold criterion for eligibility for

recognition so that the proliferation of smaller parties was discouraged. It also wanted rules and by-laws of the parties seeking registration should include provisions for a declaration of adherence to democratic values and norms of the Constitution in their inner-party organisations and a declaration to shun violence for political gains. Another recommendation was that parties should not resort to castes and communalism for political mobilisation. However laudable these recommendations are, the government was not prepared to concede the demand of the Election Commission to amend Section 29A of the RP Act by adding a clause authorizing the commission to issue necessary orders regulating registration and de-registration of political parties. The Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Bill introduced in the Lok Sabha on 19 March 2002 sought to introduce Section 29D to the RP Act. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs recommended deletion of the entire Section 29D in Clause 2 of the Bill. It may be recalled that LK Advani was the Home Minister then. The Law Commission in its 1999 report recommended amending the RP Act to insert a new Section 78A requiring maintenance, audit and publication of accounts by political parties. To enforce compliance of Section 78A, certain penalties were suggested. It too was shot down by the Home Ministry.

Another important recommendation of the NCRWC was the setting up of special Election Benches in High Courts designated to hear only election petitions and dispose them within a time-frame not exceeding six months. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission, in its report "Ethics in Governance," also echoed the same sentiments. The report said: "Special Election Tribunals should be constituted at the regional level under Article 329B of the Constitution to ensure speedy disposal of election petitions and disputes within a stipulated period of six months." In practice, however, cases involving election petitions are rarely resolved in a timely manner. Such petitions remain pending for years and in the meanwhile even the full term of the House expires, thus rendering the petitions infructuous.

For instance, in the 2009 Lok Sabha election in Sivaganga the final round of counting showed Raja Kannapan of the AIADMK was leading by 7,034 votes against P Chidambaram of the Congress. After half an hour of heated exchanges in the counting hall, Chidambaram was declared elected. Aggrieved Kannappan filed an election petition in the Madras High Court on 25 June 2009. By seeking adjournment after adjournment, Chidambaram completed his full term of five years as Union Home and Finance Minister. Kannapan's election petition is still pending in the High Court, notwithstanding Sections 86(6) and 86(7) of the RP Act which state the High Court shall dispose of an election petition within six months. Since the political parties do not want to be brought under any law or discipline, the Association for Democratic Reforms in association with the National Election Watch prepared a draft legislation titled "The Political Parties (Registration and Regulation) Bill" and submitted it to the UPA government in 2011. It was ignored. The BJP too has no intention of bringing forward such legislation.

Rule of law is essential for the protection of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, is the Magna Carta of mankind. The Supreme Court in its landmark judgment in the Keshavanand Bharti case ruled that there are certain essential features of the Constitution which cannot be amended by Parliament even by the requisite majority. The law must have a certain core component which guarantees the basic human rights and dignity of every person. The First Republic of India has spent itself in the last 64 years without achieving that goal. The time has come for a new Constitution rectifying the shortcomings of the existing one to usher in the Second Republic.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space given below for your answer

ii) Check your answer with that given at the end of the unit.

1) Examine the drawbacks of the party-system.

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2) Explain why party-less democracy is not possible.

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12.8 LET US SUM UP

A political party is an organization through which individuals and groups work to secure political power and, if successful, to translate those policies and programmes into reality. They have come into existence due to several factors that include human instinct of combativeness, their temperamental differences, dynamic leadership, social and political challenge like limitations imposed on the monarchy and extension of adult suffrage as also divergent interests of the people. There are three principal kinds of party systems, namely, single party system, two-party system and multi-party system. While one-party system is generally regarded anti-democratic, bi-party and multi-party systems have their respective advantages and disadvantages. What is crucial therefore is the political culture of a country that determines the suitability of a particular kind of party system for that country. While the party system has certain drawbacks, it is essential for the working of a democracy as parties stand between the electorate and the government.

The alienation and disenchantment with the parliamentary or presidential forms of governments, both party based, is not confined to young democracies like ours. Its most vociferous expression has appeared in the oldest democracies of the UK and USA. What has triggered it off is the deceit and lying that party leaders could get away with to start the Iraq war and their parties made to accept the fait accompli. Individual acts of corruption of fund raisers for parties and lowering of the guard on the fund donors like the Lehman brothers or Anderson or the Union Carbide are all cases in point. In fact the size of the funds needed to do politics has weakened political control over big business whose political clout

has kept growing and often tilts the balance on such sensitive matters as peace and war.

With lesser men at the helm of affairs as Presidents and Prime Ministers, democratic governments have increasingly come under a cloud forcing millions of people on the streets in London or Washington or Denmark or Doha to press their views directly to bring governments in a tighter leash than is possible by a five-year term and periodic elections. No wonder the New York Times wrote that along with a single superpower had been born a new superpower of public opinion.

In India and much of South Asia there is grave concern with the delivery system. Hundreds of crores have gone down the drain by being pilfered by middlemen, colluding people's representatives and corrupt bureaucrats. Records are fudged and non-existent schemes reported to be complete in the MNREGA and wages grossly underpaid. The number of days of employment offered is grossly below the promised 100 days. The public distribution system is in a mess and more than 50 per cent is siphoned off. In the Border States it is smuggled out. We have complacent or overzealous Ministers, little cohesion between coalition partners, a disappearance of discipline and accountability most glaringly evident in the bungling of such a costly piece of showmanship as the Commonwealth Games.

The Central Government is weak and overly concerned with policy-making towards growth and little with equity, distribution and farm production and serious wage and income disparities. It took them several years to devise policies to tackle rural unemployment and farmers suicides.

All this cumulatively could jolt the people's faith in the relevance or benefits of democracy and turn them towards parties that deny democracy or preach and bring to power cattiest and communal politics and leadership which disrupt social cohesion and peace and delay addressing more serious life-sustaining issues.

12.9 KEY WORDS

Political Party: A group operating to secure the control of a government.

Party System: A political configuration that exists in a country as a result of legal requirements and long term influence on number and strength of parties.

Totalitarian System: Where a single party rules at the cost of individual freedom and democracy.

Political Culture: The sum-total of attitudes, beliefs, norms and values of the people towards the political system and political issues.

12.10   QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1) Discuss briefly the human nature theory of the origin of party system.

2) Define political parties and distinguish between political parties and pressure groups.

3) Discuss the role of political parties in a democracy.

4) Critically evaluate the merits and demerits of various types of party systems.

5) Examine the drawbacks of the party-system.

6) Explain why party-less democracy is not possible.

12.11   SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

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12.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1) Three kinds of explanations are given, (a) tendency of human nature towards combativeness - people from parties to give organized expression to their combative nature; (b) diverse temperaments of individuals lead them to form different parties - people with similar thinking get together; (c) charismatic nature of political leaders bring followers together.

2) A party is a group of people organised to seek political power through electoral process. Pressure groups are groups of people seeking protectionism of interest of their members. They do not coli test elections, and do not seek political power.

Check Your Progress 2

1) Political parties that is sectional interests; they contribute to democratic government by candidates for public offices; they impart political education; they rule, if in majority or offer constructive criticisms if in opposition.

2) Single party systems often is used in totalitarian systems and destroys freedom of people. Two-party system provides the alternatives to voters, gives stability to government. But, it pays a price for stability as it implies that there are only two schools of thought. Multiparty system creates political instability, but brings out different shades of opinion.

Check Your Progress 3

1) Thus legislature had a battle field; principles of parties and national interest are often subordinated to factional interests; moral values are often debased, big donations made by parties lead to use of corrupt practices.

2) Parties are guarantees of free democratic governance; bridge gaps between sectorial interests and ensure responsibility in administration.

UNIT 13: THEORIES OF REVOLUTIONS: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REVOLUTIONS

STRUCTURE

13.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know the Background to the' Chinese Revolution;

- To discuss Reform Movement;

- To know Counter Revolutionary Yuan Shikai;

- To understand some Major Figures' Views on the Morality of Revolution;

- To distinctive Features of Revolutionary Wars;

- To know Revolutionary Jus ad bellum, Revolutionary Jus in bello.

13.1 INTRODUCTION

The moral issues posed by revolutions are both practically important and theoretically complex. There are also interesting conceptual questions as to how to distinguish revolution from resistance, rebellion, and secession, all of which also involve opposition to existing political authority. Unfortunately, the recent renaissance in just war theorizing focuses implicitly on interstate wars and thus has largely ignored the morality of revolution, at least as a topic worthy of systematic theorizing in its own right. Recent work on the morality of asymmetrical warfare, on terrorism, and on humanitarian military intervention provides valuable resources for constructing a theory of the morality of revolution, but until the appearance of Christopher Finlay's book, Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory of Just Revolutionary War (2015), nothing approaching a systematic account of the morality of revolution has been available. In other words, moral theorizing relevant to revolution has been rather fragmentary and adventitious, because it has mainly occurred in the pursuit of other topics rather than as part of an inquiry directed squarely at the phenomenon of revolution. Furthermore, although prominent figures in the history of Philosophy have held views on revolution, they have primarily concentrated on the issue of just cause (and in some cases on rightful authority to wage revolutionary war), without addressing a number of other moral problems that revolutions raise, such as the question of whether revolutionaries can rightly use forms of violence that the armed forces of states are morally prohibited from using and whether they may conscript fighters, punish defectors and traitors, and expropriate property needed for the struggle. There are hopeful signs, however, that moral theorists will soon give revolution the attention it deserves.

The plan of this entry is as follows. Section 1 discusses conceptual issues, distinguishing between different understandings of revolution and between violent and nonviolent revolution; it also distinguishes revolution from resistance, rebellion and secession. Because violent revolution poses the most serious and difficult moral issues, it will be the focus of the remainder of the entry. The morality of nonviolent resistance

to political authority is itself sufficiently distinctive, significant and complex to warrant a separate entry.

Section 2 outlines in broad relief some of the major historical views on the morality of revolution and demonstrates how far short of a comprehensive account of just revolutionary war they fall. Section 3 lays out seven morally relevant differences between revolutionary wars and interstate wars that a theory of just revolutionary war should heed. Section 4 is structured by the traditional just war theory division between jus ad bellum (the just initiation of war) and jus in bello (the just conduct of war). With respect to the former, it is argued that it is necessary to distinguish different moral issues faced by different parties: the aspiring revolutionary leadership who take it upon themselves to initiate revolutionary war and ordinary individuals who are faced with the decision whether to join the revolutionary struggle or not. This section, drawing on the distinctive features of revolutionary wars set out in the preceding section, identifies the special moral issues faced by the aspiring revolutionary leadership, showing that the actions they must undertake to have a good prospect of succeeding in war against the most oppressive regimes are extremely morally problematic. It also shows that these particular moral problems are obscured by mainstream just war theory's focus on war between states—in other words, between entities that already have recognized leadership for war, are already able to mobilize effective armed forces, and that have legitimate political institutions or at least have access to resources for constructing legitimacy. The aspiring revolutionary leadership, in contrast, must struggle to achieve acknowledgment of its leadership in the face of rival claimants to leadership, must mobilize forces for war in spite of the regime's imposition of extreme costs for participation in revolution, must "punish" traitors and informants, and yet typically lacks opportunities for establishing its legitimacy with regard to the undertaking of any of these tasks. This section emphasizes the difficulty of satisfying the requirement of "rightful authority" for waging war in the case of revolutionary wars. Also included here are critical discussions of competing views on two issues central to just revolutionary war theory: whether revolutionary

warriors may use tactics and strategies prohibited to combatants in interstate wars and whether revolutionary war to overthrow "lesser tyrannies", regimes that violate civil and political rights but do not inflict killings, maimings, or enslavement on their peoples, is justifiable.

The Conclusion emphasizes some of the major results of the investigation and suggests two further topics that a comprehensive theory of just revolutionary war should address: the morality of intervention in revolution and how it is shaped by the morality of revolution; and the moral assessment of the international Law of Armed Conflict's asymmetric treatment of the rights of combatants fighting on behalf of states and revolutionary fighters.

At present, no set of competing theories of the morality of revolution is currently available for critical comparison. Consequently, the emphasis will be more on laying out the problems such theories should address, rather than on setting out all of the alternatives for addressing them.

13.2 BACKGROUND TO THE' CHINESE REVOLUTION

The Manchus, a small nation of Jurchid origin, inhabiting the northern part of Liaodong Peninsula, captured Beijing (Peking) and installed the Manchu dynasty on the Chinese throne in 1644. The Manchu rule lasted for about 268 years. The period witnessed great achievement in science and culture. Under Manchus China enjoyed a long period of peace and economic prosperity. However, trouble started brewing with the arrival of the foreign powers from the beginning of 19th century. Repeated foreign aggressions were coincided with prolonged economic crisis on account of stagnancy in the agriculture economy. The situation was further worsened due to ascensions of successive incapable rulers, palace intrigues and the hostilities of the conservative forces headed by Cixi, the dowager Empress towards the reform movements.

13.2.1 Reform Movement

Western intervention in China by the late 19th century contributed to the growth of modem industries in several parts of the country. This had led to the emergence of a small entrepreneurial class as well as the working class. From this section a large number of reformers arose, being imbibed with liberal ideas. The intellectuals of 19th century China got easily influenced by the liberal democratic ideologies and demanded reformation of the old moribund political and economic systems.

The reformers sought to transform China into an effective modern state. The Emperor acting under the influence of a group of intellectual leaders, issued a series of reform adicts which touched everything from the system of government to the development of science. The reform .movement, however, infuriated the conservative forces. The dowager Empress who headed these forces thereupon staged a coup in September 1889, imprisoned the Emperor, rescinded the reform edicts, and imprisoned the reformers. Since the duration of the reform was hundred days, the movement has came to be known in the history as the Hundred Days Reform.

13.2.2 Counter Revolutionary Yuan Shikai

The establishment of a provisional government dealt a severe blow to the Qing (Manchu) regime and its cohorts:Yuan Shikai, head of the Qing regime's army, schemed to grab power. He joined the League along with his supporters. Being blessed by the imperialists he forced the last Qing [Manchu] emperor to abdicate.

By this act he became popular. With the backing of the Northern warlords he made the Nanjing government to hand over power to him. He then managed to get himself elected as president of the central government and Sun Yet-Sen was forced to resign. Yuan by granting additional

benefits to the imperialist powers, purchased their support. Yuan soon lost popular support and died in despair in 1916. Duan Qiwi succeeded Yuan.

Duan became an autocrat from the beginning. He abolished both the constitution and the parliament. Sun Yet-Sen however did not remain idle. He organized anti-Duan movements but due to the machinations of the warlords and the foreign powers Sun could not achieve success immediately.

13.3 SOME MAJOR FIGURES' VIEWS ON THE MORALITY OF REVOLUTION

Several terms are used to denote extra-constitutional rejection of an existing government's authority, either tout court or in some particular domain: resistance, rebellion, secession, revolution. Resistance need not be total; it can instead involve disobeying some particular law or laws or efforts to thwart a government's policies or the government's attempt to perform particular actions; and resistance can take a number of forms, including acts of disobedience that are not only public but designed to achieve maximal publicity (as in the case of civil disobedience), as well as covert acts of noncompliance; and it may also be either peaceful or nonviolent and disruptive or not. Rebellion, usefully distinguished from resistance, involves a wholesale rejection of government's authority. But such a rejection of governmental authority could be undertaken for quite different reasons, whether to do away with government altogether (the anarchist's goal), to establish a new government with the same domain of territorial authority, to create a new territorial unit out of part of the territory of the existing government (secession), or to sever part of the territory of the government and join it to another existing state (irredentist secession). Revolution is commonly understood to have two components: rejection of the existing government's authority and an attempt to replace it with another government, where both involve the use of extra-constitutional means. On this reading, revolution and rebellion share a negative aim, the wholesale rejection of a government's

authority, but revolution includes in addition a positive aim, to institute a new government in place of the one it has destroyed.

Some important empirical work relevant to the morality of revolutionary war is to be found in studies of civil war. The latter is sometimes defined as a large scale armed conflict between state forces and one or more nonstate parties. This definition may be too restrictive, however, since it would exclude a large-scale armed conflict between two or more nonstate parties under conditions in which the government had disintegrated entirely or still existed but was not capable of fielding forces. A broader understanding of civil war that would encompass that kind of case would be simply that of a large-scale intrastate armed conflict.

The preceding terms are not always sorted out in this way in actual political discourse. For example, the government of the United States labeled the secession of the Southern states from the Union as a rebellion, while many Confederates called their enterprise the Second American Revolution; and the American colonists who strove to secede from the British Empire tended to call themselves revolutionaries, not secessionists or rebels. (It may be that the Americans avoided the term "rebel" because they thought it had negative connotations). Similarly, the Algerian secession from France is often referred to as the Algerian Revolution and wars of colonial liberation are rarely called secessionist conflicts, though their goal is secession from a political order centered on a metropolitan state. In what follows, the term "revolution" will be reserved for extra-constitutional attempts to destroy an existing national government and replace it, to the full extent of its territorial authority, with a new government. On this way of sorting out the various terms, secessionists and revolutionaries are necessarily rebels, while rebels need be neither secessionists nor revolutionaries (they may be anarchists), and secessionists, as such are not revolutionaries.

One more distinction is needed. Revolutions may be violent or nonviolent and may begin nonviolently and become violent. This

distinction, though obviously important, is not so crisp as one might think, because what counts as violence may be disputed. For example, attempts to overthrow a government by disruptive techniques (for example conducting general strikes, disabling power grids, or blocking main transportation routes) are not violent in the way in which discharging firearms or detonating explosives is, but they may nonetheless cause lethal harms. The chief topic of this entry is violent revolution where "violence" is understood in the most robust way and as occurring on a large scale; in other words, the topic is revolutionary war as "war" is usually understood (Singer & Small 1994: 5).

It is well worth noting, however, that there is a position on revolution that obviates the need for a theory of just revolutionary war, namely, the view that large-scale revolutionary violence is never morally justified because the risks of such an endeavor are so great and because nonviolent revolution is more efficacious. Some empirical political scientists have argued that there is good evidence that nonviolent revolution is more likely to achieve its ends than revolutionary war (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). Even if that is true as a generalization, the question remains as to whether there are exceptions—cases where nonviolence is not likely to achieve the aims of just revolution or would only achieve them with undue costs in terms of human well-being—and whether they can be identified ex ante. If there are any such cases, there is a need for a theory of just revolutionary war.

Check Your Progress 1

Note : a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of this unit.

    1.   What do you know the Background to the' Chinese Revolution?

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2.	Please discuss Reform Movement.

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3.	What do you know Counter Revolutionary Yuan Shikai?

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4.	What do you understand some Major Figures' Views on the Morality of Revolution?

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13.4 DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARS

No attempt can be made here to conduct a survey of views on revolution across the history of Western Philosophy, much less one that encompasses other traditions. Instead, it must suffice to say that the typical attitude toward revolution of major figures in the Western tradition prior to the modern period was to condemn it or to acknowledge its moral permissibility only in very narrow circumstances (Morkevicius 2014). Augustine (City of God) and Aquinas (Summa theologiae), for example, both condemn rebellion and hence revolution, unambiguously urging obedience to the powers that be. Suárez (1609) held that only "lesser magistrates" had the authority to try to overthrow an existing government, with the implication that revolution by those who do not already occupy official roles was never justified. Hobbes (1651), whom some consider the first truly modern political philosopher in the Western tradition, explicitly denied that revolution could ever be justified, holding instead that a subject could only rightly resist government authority as a matter of self-defense and then only when the perpetration of lethal harm against her was imminent.

Views that reject revolution outright or hold it to be permissible in only the most extreme of circumstances typically have either or both of two rationales. The first is an overriding aversion to the perceived risk of violent anarchy posed by attempts to overthrow a government (the Undue Risk Argument). The second is the conviction that the requirement of rightful authority cannot, as a matter of logical necessity, be met in the case of revolutionary war (The Conceptual Argument).

Consider first the Undue Risk Argument for the conclusion that revolution is never or only rarely justified. Put most simply, the idea here is that virtually any government is better than none and that while it is true that revolutions (as opposed to mere rebellions) aim not merely to destroy existing government but to replace it with something better, they may succeed only in the first, destructive task, or not succeed in the second, constructive task until an unacceptable decrement in physical security has occurred. Such views have often been grounded in a rather pessimistic view of human nature. While some Medieval thinkers may have attributed the risk of extreme violence when government authority is rejected to man's supposedly irrational and selfish nature, Hobbes (1651) in contrast can be interpreted as attributing it to human rationality, without any assumption that all or even most human beings are bloody-minded or subject to overweening desires for domination. On this interpretation of Hobbes, where there is no government—no power capable of enforcing rules conducive to physical security—it is rational for individuals to try to dominate others for purely defensive reasons, even if there is only a minority of individuals who seek domination for its own sake. It is not man's sinful nature, but his rationality, combined with the game-theoretic structure of the condition of anarchy, that makes lack of government so lethally dangerous.

At least in the classical liberal tradition, according to which individuals have rights prior to the institution of government and in which governments are viewed as trustees, agents of the people, the attitude toward revolution is generally more permissive. There is a right to revolt

when government violates those natural rights for the protection of which it was created. Locke (1689) apparently goes further: on one interpretation, he holds that the people at its own discretion may rightly revoke the trusteeship, that is, dissolve the government, even in the absence of the state's violation of natural rights or failure to protect them. They could, for example, dissolve the government in order to form a new one that they simply thought was more efficient. Locke apparently attempts to dull the edge of this rather radical conclusion by assuming, quite gratuitously, that revolution will not occur unless the people as a whole have already suffered greatly at the hands of the government. He might also have thought that in cases where the present government was not violating natural rights, dissolving it was only permissible if done through a constitutionally sanctioned process, not through revolution.

Locke does not explicitly consider two possibilities that have frequently been realized in actual revolutionary circumstances: first, that governmental oppression may not be universal but instead may target only certain groups within society, for example, religious or ethnic or national minorities or those who criticize government; second, that even if there is general oppression there may not be a sufficient spontaneous mobilization of forces to overthrow the government. Consequently, Locke conveniently sidesteps two questions that a theory of the morality of revolution ought to address: (1) whether revolution to end special as opposed to general oppression is justifiable; and (2) what means may those already committed to revolution employ to mobilize enough others to participate in revolution to make success possible. The first question is significant because of the possibility that the harm to innocent people—including a general decrease in physical security—that revolution may entail, has somehow to be weighed against the benefit in terms of relief from injustice that the oppressed minority will get if the revolution ultimately succeeds. Even if the injustices done to the minority ought to be given greater weight in the balancing exercise, there may come a point at which revolution fails a proportionality test if the harms to others that will result from remedying minority rights-violations are great enough. The second question arises because even where oppression is general

there may not be sufficiently widespread participation in revolution to achieve success, either because significant portions of the population, in the grip of an ideology that purports to justify the existing political order, do not see themselves as seriously oppressed, or because of the failure to solve collective action problems. If either of these two conditions obtain, mobilizing enough people to have a good chance of successful revolution may require coercion under conditions in which those who would wield it lack legitimacy and in which the institutional resources that could confer legitimacy are unavailable.

Locke took a more favorable stance toward revolution than Hobbes or his medieval predecessors, because he did not believe that the risks of physical insecurity attendant upon the destruction of an existing government were as high as those thinkers did. That more optimistic view as grounded, in turn, in his belief that the destruction of the political order need not entail the destruction of society—that is, of social practices and habits that effectively control the most serious forms of violence. It is a mistake, however, to conclude either that Hobbes was right and Locke was wrong or vice versa about the consequences for physical security of the destruction of government. A generalization either way would be unhelpful. A more reasonable view is that the risks of the destruction of government and hence of revolution vary, depending upon the circumstances. If that is so, and if the justifiability of revolution depends even in part on the severity of the risks of physical insecurity it involves, then it appears that the content of a theory of just revolutionary war must be shaped by empirical considerations. Yet it is fair to say that many philosophers who have had something to say about just revolutionary war, whether explicitly or by implication in their work on interstate wars, have not taken this point to heart. They have either not understood the importance of empirical assumptions about the risks of revolution or made the relevant empirical assumptions but without supplying sufficient evidence for their validity. Without a well-evidenced empirical account of the conditions under which attempts to overthrow the government are likely to cause violent anarchy, and an account of the conditions under which violent anarchy is likely to continue for some

significant period of time, both pessimism and optimism about revolution, and the calculations of proportionality on which the justification for revolution is supposed to depend, will be more a matter of faith than reason.

The second or conceptual argument or denying that revolution is justifiable is attributed to Kant on what might be called the Rousseauian interpretation of his view, as articulated perhaps most clearly by Christine Korsgaard (2008) and Katrin Flikschuh (2008). (1) to be justified, an attempt to overthrow the existing political authority would have to be an expression of, or authorized by, the general will; otherwise it would be the imposition of a private will or private wills and hence contrary to right; (2) but only the existing supreme political authority can express or be the authorized agent of the general will; therefore (3) revolution can never be justified. This argument against revolution, unlike Hobbesian-style undue risk arguments, does not rely upon unsupported empirical assumptions about the uniformly dire consequences for physical insecurity of attempts to destroy existing governments. It is vulnerable, however, to a different objection, namely, that when government is sufficiently tyrannical and destructive, the lesser of evils may be for someone to act without possessing authority—in other words, that the use of coercion, if it is necessary to achieve the conditions for basic justice and involves the minimal amount of coercion needed to accomplish that, can be morally justified even if it is not wielded by an agent that possesses legitimacy (Buchanan 2013, 2016). Framed in Kantian terms, this is the view that in extreme cases the imposition of the basic order needed for the realization of rights can be justified even if it is the imposition of a private will, so long as the object of that will is the common good of justice properly conceived, so long as the coercion employed is the least needed to do the job, and so long as the agent undertaking to create order is likely to be capable of succeeding in doing so.

The conceptual version of Kant's denial that revolution can be justified is distinct from a different Kantian argument that is more akin to the Undue

Risk Argument: (i) all human beings are indefeasibly obligated to contribute to getting out of and staying out of a condition in which universal right cannot be realized, (ii) universal right can only be realized where government exists and is recognized as authoritative, (iii) to revolt is both to try to destroy the existing government and to deny its authority, and therefore (iv) revolution can never be justified. This second interpretation of Kant's view holds that to engage in revolution is not just to create an unacceptably high risk of general insecurity but also to violate a fundamental obligation to contribute to the conditions for the realization of universal right. In more contemporary terms, it is an argument against revolution based on a strong interpretation of the Natural Duty of Justice, the obligation to help bring about and sustain the conditions for justice.

The Natural Duty Argument is vulnerable to an obvious objection: If the existing government is so awful as to thwart even a decent approximation of the realization of universal right, and if revolution presents a better prospect for doing so, then the moral obligation to create the conditions for the realization of universal right speaks in favor of revolution, not against it (Finlay 2015: 19–52).

Whereas liberal political philosophers have tended to frame the justification or revolution in terms of remedying government's violation of natural rights or its failure to acknowledge the people's revocation of its trusteeship (for example by rejecting the results of an election), revolution in the Marxist tradition is understood quite differently. There is one strain of Marx interpretation according to which he rejects rights-talks altogether, either in favor of the discourse of conflicting interests or in favor of the vocabulary of self-realization or mankind's overcoming of alienation from its "species being" (Buchanan 1982). On this interpretation, Marx held that the very concept of rights is an ideological construct that is fostered by and in turn reinforces the egoistic psychology of bourgeois society and will be discarded once the transition to developed communist society occurs. If the very concept of rights is thus both tainted and fated for obsolescence, then the question arises as

to how else the justification for proletarian revolution might be framed (Finlay 2006). One answer that is consistent at least with the early writings of Marx is that proletarian revolution is needed to destroy the conditions of alienation and create the conditions for the full realization of man's nature as a creative, communal being, the sort of being who will, through processes of scientifically informed collective decision-making, bring the natural and social world fully under deliberate human control for the good of all (Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in MER: 66–125).

Even if Marx thought that successful revolution could be correctly described as the overcoming of alienation or more positively as the realization of human "species being", it is doubtful that he thought that proletarian revolution needed to be justified in this or any other way. There is, after all, a Marx who derides "moralistic" socialists and who seems to hold that successful proletarian revolution is a matter of the historically inevitable realization of the common interests of the proletariat, and that the revolution will be effectively motivated by those interests, not by a commitment to any moral principle (On the Division of Labor in Production in MER: 683–717). Such an interpretation fits well with Marx's understanding of his theory of history as scientific and realistic. According to this account, the question of whether revolution is justified is idle; it will occur, because the revolution in the mode of production that marks the transition from capitalism to communism will produce a fundamental transformation of all social relationships that will carry human beings beyond the state and beyond politics (Critique of the Gotha Programme, Part IV, 1875 in MER: 525–541). Call this the Amoralist interpretation of Marx on revolution.

To the extent that the Amoralist interpretation includes an account of the motivation (as opposed to the justification) of proletarian revolution[7], it is simple and rationalistic: eventually the workers will realize that overthrow of the capitalist order is in their interests and will act accordingly. There are two apparently fatal problems with such a view. First, according to Marx's own thinking, the proletariat will mobilize

against the capitalist order only when the capitalism has reached such a pitch of alienation, exploitation, and immiseration that the workers have nothing to lose but their chains (Capital, Volume 1, 1894, in MER: 329–343; Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848, in MER: 500). Marx believes that this is bound to occur because the capitalist system gives every capitalist an overriding incentive to keep squeezing as much labor out of his workers as possible, even if every capitalist reads Capital and can foresee that that the aggregate effect of such behavior will result in the overthrow of the system. But this means that Marx assumed that the capitalists as a class were afflicted by a collective action problem they could not solve—that even though it is in their collective interests to avoid the immiseration of the proletariat, each will find it rational to act in a way that will contribute to immiseration. On the contrary, it can be argued that the capitalists solved their collective action problem by the creation of the modern welfare state—a device that sufficiently alleviates the plight of the workers to thwart mobilization for revolution, but without destroying the dominance of the bourgeoisie. Second, while Marx gives us no good reason to think that the capitalists will succumb to an insoluble collective action problem, he fails to take seriously the collective action problem faced by the proletariat (Cohen 1978, Elster 1985). As with revolutions generally, each individual may reason that either enough others will mobilize to enable a successful revolution or they will not, that her own participation in revolution is likely to come at a significant cost, that she will reap the benefits of the revolution if it succeeds, and that therefore the rational course of action is to abstain from participation. The key point here is that the workers lack the resource for solving their collective action problem that the capitalists can use to solve theirs: control over the state and hence access to enforcement of rules that can change incentives for refraining from contributing to a public good. Marx not only fails to take the proletariat's collective action problem seriously; his theory of alienation implies that it will be severe, because one of the effects of capitalism is to turn workers against each other in the competition for employment and produce among them the egoistic psychology typical of all people living under capitalism (Buchanan 1979). In brief, the Amoralist Marx's

attempt to side-step the question of whether or under what conditions revolution is morally justified fails, because his interest-based account of revolutionary motivation makes the revolution depend upon the immiseration of the proletariat, wrongly assumes that the capitalist class will not be able to act collectively to avoid immiseration, and wrongly assumes that if the proletariat come to see that their interests require the overthrow of the system they will in fact revolt.

A natural Marxian reply might be to abandon the claim that interest-based motivation is causally sufficient for successful proletarian revolution, holding instead that the proletariat can come to see that capitalism is incompatible with the dignity of human beings or with the full realization of their potential for harmonious, creative, collective control over the natural and social world and the abolition of all forms of exploitation and exploitation. On this view, the motivation for revolution is a kind of perfectionist ethics or, more modestly, a desire to end human degradation.

The idea would be that the proletarians only encounter an insoluble collective action problem if each worker (or enough of them) operates in the calculating mode, weighing the costs and benefits of participation, as they decide whether to revolt. One might think that it is a distinctive feature of some types of moral motivation that they can lead individuals to escape the calculating mode that produces collective action problems. Not all types of moral motivation would do the trick, of course. If the workers were overall utility-maximizers, each might still decide to refrain from revolution, reasoning that either enough others will participate to enable the revolution to succeed or they will not, regardless of whether she participates and that her participation would simply be an unnecessary subtraction from overall utility. Other kinds of moral motivation, including those that are expressions of commitment to deontological principles, might in contrast, preclude the individual from making the calculations that produce the proletariat's collective action problem. Such principles can serve as "exclusionary reasons" and what they exclude from consideration is cost-benefit calculations.

Abandoning the Amoralist Marxian account of revolution would mean ignoring the numerous "scientific realist" passages in Marx's writings and ignoring his scorn for moralistic socialists. But there would still remain two problems, one internal to the Marxist view and the other independent of it. The first problem is that it is hard to see, given Marx's views on ideology, how the proletarian masses could, while subject to the consciousness distorting forces of capitalism, come to rally around a perfectionist ethic or form allegiance to any moral principle that would require the complete overthrow of capitalism. Marx apparently thought that the curtain of ideology would be torn aside by the immiseration of the proletariat—that when they reached the full depths of deprivation and degradation they would come to see that capitalism had to go. But Marx was wrong in his prediction that immiseration would occur: in most societies under capitalism, real wages have risen and the welfare state has alleviated the plight of the workers--just enough. The second problem is that recent empirical work on revolutions indicates that in many cases—perhaps most—what determines whether an individual will participate in the revolution or even support it in any way is whether the regime or the revolutionaries control the area in which the individual lives (Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007). If that is so, then it appears that in many cases moral motivation is causally irrelevant; it is the interest in avoiding the costs imposed by those who wield coercive power over the individual, whether they be agents of the regime or those already committed to the revolution, that determines participation or nonparticipation in revolution. But if that is so, then the topic of the morality of revolution cannot be avoided, because it will always be appropriate to ask whether those who possess coercive power ought to use it and if so how they ought to use it.

As was suggested earlier, in many revolutionary contexts the people are caught in a destructive strategic interaction between the regime and those already committed to revolution, as the regime raises the costs of participation and the revolutionaries raise the cost of nonparticipation. Some of the most difficult moral issues concerning revolution pertain to

the permissibility of coercive means for solving the revolutionary collective action problem in the context of this strategic interaction.

By way of summary and as a broad generalization, it is fair to say that at least since the time of Locke (1689), the dominant view on revolution in Western Political Philosophy, both in the Liberal and Marxist traditions, and perhaps in popular political culture as well, has been considerably more permissive than that of Hobbes (1651) and Kant (1797) and their medieval predecessors. For the remainder of this essay, I will focus on broadly liberal approaches to revolution on the assumption that, for the foreseeable future, the development of a genuine theory of just revolutionary war is most likely to develop by utilizing the resources of liberal political theory. This strategy is perhaps not as restrictive as it might appear, since contemporary liberal thought accommodates not just the idea of individual rights, but also that of the collective right of self-determination. That is an important qualification, because from the 1950s to the 1970s revolution for many people in non-Western societies meant liberation from colonial rule; and in some cases liberation was framed more in terms of collective self-determination than in terms of the vindication of individual rights. One important question a theory of just revolutionary war ought to answer is whether the realization of the right of collective self-determination is in itself a just cause for revolutionary war or whether it is only so when collective self-determination is the remedy for violations of basic individual rights. This issue is addressed in the next section.

3. Distinctive Features of Revolutionary Wars
A key question that will arise at a number of points in this investigation is whether mainstream just war theory, in spite of its implicit focus on interstate wars provides an adequate account of the morality of revolutionary wars. To answer this question, there are at least seven potentially morally significant differences to keep in mind.

First, satisfaction of the traditional jus ad bellum requirement of "rightful authority" to make war, as suggested above, is more difficult in the case

of revolution, especially at the beginning of the conflict, when an often tiny minority undertakes armed struggle against the government and does so supposedly in the name of the people, but where the standard institutional forms or processes for legitimizing the use of violence are unavailable to the revolutionaries. In different terms, the problem is that revolutionaries claim to act on behalf of the people, but under conditions in which it is difficult to see how they could be authorized to do so. Later we will see that attempts to solve this problem by invoking notions of consent, approval, or representation are inadequate in many of the circumstances in which revolutions actually occur—and ironically, especially under those conditions in which the just cause for revolution is most compelling.

Even contemporary theorists acknowledge that the problem of rightful authority is especially difficult in the case of the waging of revolutionary war, the discussion is often at too abstract because it fails to distinguish between different domains of action in which legitimacy can be an issue. Even if, for example, it can be shown that a particular group of revolutionaries is the legitimate leadership in the sense that it can be taken to represent the people as a whole and rightly act on their behalf, it is a separate question as to whether it has the sort of legitimacy required for certain particular activities such as conscripting individuals to fight, using coercion to suppress rival claimants for leadership, or "punishing" traitors or informants.

Second, in interstate wars there is often only one claimant (on each side) to the role of initiating and directing the use of large-scale violence, namely, the state leadership. But in many revolutionary wars, at least at the outset and often far into the conflict, two or more parties engaging in revolutionary violence contend with one another (often violently) to be acknowledged, by the people and by other states and international organizations, as the sole legitimate revolutionary war-maker. So, one difficult moral issue concerns the means that rivals for leadership may use in competition with one another. Revolutions frequently are characterized by violent struggles for leadership, under conditions in

which no contender for leadership can claim exclusive legitimacy if any legitimacy at all.

Third, as already noted, because those who attempt to launch revolutions do not possess standing armies or effective authority to raise them, they face a serious collective action problem that established states have already solved: they must mobilize a sufficient portion of the population to make war effectively, in spite of the fact that it will often be rational for any given individual to refrain from participating. Any ordinary individual may reason as follows: whether I participate or not has virtually zero probability of determining the outcome; but participation is a cost, perhaps an extreme cost, to me and perhaps to my family or other close associates as well. So, regardless of what others do, the rational thing for me to do, whether I consider my own utility narrowly construed or include the utility of those I care most about, is to refrain from participating. If enough individuals reason in this way, an insufficient number of people will be mobilized to make the revolution succeed. Collective action problems are not always insoluble, of course. Later we will consider several solutions to what may be called "the revolutionary mobilization collective action problem" (REMCAP for brevity)—each of which will be shown to raise serious moral issues. In other words, it is one thing to say the REMCAP can be solved; another to say it can be solved in a morally acceptable way. By way of preview, it is worth noting that the REMCAP has a crucial strategic dimension: while the aspiring revolutionary leadership will try to overcome the people's incentives for refraining from participation, whether by providing them with benefits conditional on participation or by imposing costs on them for nonparticipation, the regime will attempt to counter the effort to achieve revolutionary mobilization by providing benefits conditional on nonparticipation or imposing costs on participation. The resulting dynamic takes the game-theoretic structure of an arms race in which both the revolutionary forces and the regime use violence and often terrorism against the people (Buchanan 2013). This spiral of strategic violence is not merely a theoretical possibility: some of the leading empirical work on revolutions indicates that it is typical of the revolutionary

environment. One especially interesting empirical finding is that the best predictor of whether an individual will support the revolution or the regime is which force controls the space the individual occupies. (Kalyvas 2006: 131–132). Empirical studies document that the cycle of coercion and counter-coercion in revolutionary struggles is ubiquitous (Kalyvas 2006: 10, 12, 215, 228–229). A just war theory designed for the quite different environment of interstate wars is not likely to address the moral problems raised by this feature of revolutionary wars.

A fourth morally relevant difference between the typical interstate war and revolutionary war is this: in the former, a change in their own government is not usually a goal of the contending parties (though one or both may aim at imposing a new form of government on the other). The goal of revolutionary war-makers in contrast is to change the government and on the stronger understanding of "revolution" to make a fundamental change in the form or character of government. Yet because revolutionaries have repudiated or cannot avail themselves of existing political processes for determining political aims and have not yet developed new processes for performing that task (at least in the earlier stages of the struggle), there may be serious disagreement among revolutionaries as to what the goal of the revolution is, with no nonviolent, much less legitimate process for resolving it. Many may agree that the regime must fall, but there may be deep—and violent--disagreements as to what should follow. This, too, makes revolution a more morally fraught enterprise. Suppose, as was suggested earlier, that revolution differs from mere rebellion in that the latter is simply a rejection of governmental authority while the former involves that plus a commitment to forming a new political order. If that is so, and if revolutionaries lack the institutional resources to determine a common understanding of what the new political order is to be, then the task of evaluating the justness of a revolutionary struggle becomes more difficult. It may be a mistake to say "X is the aim of the revolutionary war-makers" because there may be no one aim and the plurality of aims may be mutually inconsistent, with some being just and others being unjust. It is true, of course that a state that wars with another state will

often have more than one war aim and may also have inconsistent aims, but at least in the case of reasonably well-functioning states there is an authoritative, that is, legitimacy-conferring process for determining what the aims of the conflict are and which are to be given priority if they conflict.

Fifth, if one party to an interstate war loses, this will not usually involve a complete destruction of its political order or if it does the victor will often quickly impose some order as it gains control over the vanquished country's territory. But revolutionary wars present a greater risk of literal anarchy, with all of the threats to human rights and well-being that this usually entails, because revolutionaries, even when they succeed in defeating the regime, may not yet have (and in some cases may never develop) the capacity to impose order. In that sense, the stakes are often higher in revolutionary wars and the traditional likelihood of success requirement of just war theory may be harder to satisfy. There are two other factors, both of which are present in many violent revolutions that make the problem of creating a new political order that can provide an acceptable level of physical security especially difficult. First, revolutionary conflicts, like other intrastate wars, are often especially brutal, because the lines between combatants and noncombatants tend to be blurred, because of the spiral of coercion stemming from strategic interaction regarding revolutionary mobilization characterized above, and because individuals and groups often use the general context of violence to settle private conflicts that have little or no connection to the issues for which revolution is supposedly undertaken (Kalyvas 2006: 14). So building a secure peace may be hindered by persisting animosity, allegations of atrocities, and the quest for vengeance, while social capital in the form of trust may be in short supply. Second, in the contemporary context, it is often the case that in societies where the just cause for revolution is most compelling, namely, what could be called Resolute Severe Tyrannies, there are deep divisions along religious or ethno-national lines, in large part because the tyrants have fostered such divisions in order to prevent the people from achieving unified opposition to the regime. Where such divisions exist and there is no

culture of tolerance and power-sharing, the destruction of the tyrannical regime may result in violent intergroup conflicts, with no indigenous force capable of imposing a peace settlement and building a condition of persisting physical security. Under these conditions, to undertake revolution is to unleash forces that may result either in violent anarchy or unwanted foreign intervention undertaken on the pretext of establishing order.

Sixth, at least under modern conditions, revolutionary wars have the potential to persist longer than interstate wars as they have traditionally been conducted, and hence are likely to involve more human and material destruction other things being equal, because of interventions that serve not to end them but rather to prolong them. It is a feature of contemporary revolutionary wars that they are seldom left to the primary parties. Instead, rival states or groups of rival states often support different sides. In interstate wars, the conflict typically ends when it is clear that there is an indefinitely persisting stalemate and hence both sides are compelled to seek a negotiated peace or when one side overwhelms the other (Wittman 1979; Jones, Bremer & Singer 1996; Wagner 2000). But when revolutions become proxy wars between rival powers, one state is likely to intervene to resupply or otherwise support its proxy to break a stalemate or prevent the other side from achieving victor. That is why most empirical theorists of intrastate war predict that there is no end in sight to the conflict in Syria (Jenkins 2014). This problem is exacerbated by the fact that one or both of the sponsors of the conflicting sides may not have as its top strategic aim a victory for its side. Instead, the dominant goal may actually be to prolong the conflict. To the extent that revolutionaries or regimes who oppose them ought to take the traditional jus ad bellum requirement of likelihood of success into account and also ought to heed the requirement of proportionality, their task is complicated by strategic dynamic that occurs when revolutions are not simple two party affairs, but proxy contests between other parties as well. Intervention makes calculations of both likelihood of success and proportionality more problematic. And if there is a presumption against war unless likelihood of success and proportionality

are relatively certain, then it follows that the justification for revolutionary war is even more problematic, other things being equal, than for interstate war.

Seventh, and finally, entrenched tyrannical regimes, the most morally compelling targets for revolution, typically use their control over education and the media to instill propaganda designed to prevent the people from recognizing just how rotten the regime is, how poorly the economy is performing, how inferior the quality of life is compared with that in better governed countries, and how widespread dissatisfaction with the regime actually is. Hence, effective revolutionary action may require the dissipation of false consciousness on the part of the people. The aspiring revolutionary leadership thus may be faced with the task of trying to dismantle the false consciousness of those they hope to enlist in the revolutionary struggle. In actual cases, aspiring leaders have often used violence and sometimes terrorism in an effort to overcome the epistemic obstacles to widespread participation in revolution. For example, they have attacked "soft targets"—policemen or government officials—to demonstrate to the people that "we have the power to hurt them". Another tactic often used by revolutionaries to overcome epistemic obstacles is to provoke the regime to undertake brutal responses to relatively peaceful demonstrations, in order to reveal to all just how ruthless the regime is. Such actions, which are condemned by mainstream jus in bello thinking, are said to be necessary to instill the sense of agency that false consciousness has undermined. The need to overcome false consciousness or more generally to overcome serious epistemic obstacles to revolution, combined with the revolutionary leadership's lack of effective peaceful resources for doing so, poses difficult moral choices that are not as frequently encountered by the leaders of states in interstate wars.

For all of these reasons, revolutionary wars tend to present additional moral problems, over and above the daunting issues involved in interstate wars, or, as in the case of likelihood of success and proportionality, to involve more serious instances of difficulties common

to both kinds of war. A theory of just revolutionary war ought to take these differences seriously and not begin with the assumption that the commendable work that has recently been done in just war theory—which as has been noted is mainly geared to interstate war—can be adapted without significant modification or augmentation to the revolutionary case. The assumption that mainstream just war theory provides all or even most of what is needed for a theory of just revolutionary wars seems plausible only if one traffics in unhelpful abstractions and fails to look at the differences revealed by the empirical literature on revolutions and the special moral issues they raise. A major conclusion of this entry is that a plausible moral theory of revolution must be informed by the best empirical studies of what actually goes on in revolutionary struggles.

13.5 REVOLUTIONARY JUS AD BELLUM, REVOLUTIONARY JUS IN BELLO

"The morality of making revolutionary war" is too broad a topic. It is necessary to factor out the distinctive moral problems faced by those who initiate revolutionary war and aspire to recruit and lead others in the struggle[8] and those who join the revolution once it is underway and do so without any pretensions to being leaders. These two classes of agents both face some common moral issues, but they also each must resolve moral issues peculiar to their situation.

It was noted in the preceding section that the question "Does agent X have rightful authority to wage revolutionary war?" needs to be abandoned in favor of more fine-grained questions: Does agent X have the rightful authority to start a revolutionary war, to attempt to function as a leader in the struggle, to exercise various functions ordinarily reserved for governments such as punishing defectors and informants, conscripting soldiers, expropriating resources needed for war, and suppressing rival claimants to leadership? An affirmative answer to the first question does not guarantee affirmative answers to the rest.

We may begin with the first question: when do agents have the rightful authority to try to initiate a revolutionary war? This is an appropriate question to ask if one attempts to apply mainstream jus ad bellum theory to the case of revolutionary war, since rightful authority is generally assumed to be a requirement in jus ad bellum. An initially plausible answer is that the agent must stand in a certain relationship to the people on whose behalf the revolutionary war is to be waged. Different theorists have tried to spell out this relationship in different ways, asserting that the initiator of revolutionary war (i) must have the consent of those on whose behalf she claims to act, (ii) must have their approval, (iii) must represent them, or (iv) must take responsibility for their common good (and have the capacity to pursue it effectively). Each of these proposals will be considered in turn. The distinction between consent and approval is to be understood as follows: consent must be provided ex ante, prior to the action to which consent is given; approval is ex post, a retrospective endorsement of an action that has already occurred.

There are two problems with the view that consent of the oppressed is either necessary or sufficient for rightful authority to initiate revolutionary war. First, in virtually every real world situation, consent will not be unanimous; so two questions immediately present themselves and a plausible answer to either is far from obvious: (1) if consent is necessary for rightful authority, how can anyone have rightful authority over those who do not consent; and (2) if the consent of some is sufficient for rightful authority over all, how many must consent (a bare majority, a supermajority, etc.)? If the point of consent is that without it those who initiate revolutionary war are arbitrarily putting those who do not consent at risk, then the fact that some have consented cannot make the imposition of risks on those who did not consent any less arbitrary. Second, in the very circumstances when the just cause for revolution is most compelling, namely, where the regime exercises thorough-going domination and refuses to reform, it will be difficult if not impossible to obtain valid consent, either because the regime will not allow any plausible process of gaining consent or because people will be afraid to affirm their consent out of fear of retaliation by the regime, or because

the regime's oppression will have distorted their consciousness and preferences to such an extent that they are incapable of giving valid consent. John Simmons (1979) has argued that even where the best democratic political processes are available, genuine consent cannot be obtained; if that is so, then it is hardly likely that consent can be gotten in the much less favorable circumstances in which the aspiring revolutionary leadership might seek it.

Because of these difficulties with consent as a criterion for rightful authority, one might think that approval is the appropriate notion. However, the same problems that afflicted consent render approval dubious. If approval is not unanimous, it is hard to see how the approval of some can confer rightful authority over all or justify the imposition of risks on all. But if unanimity is not required, it is unclear how much approval should be required.

The problems with approval and consent might lead one to opt instead for a notion of hypothetical consent or hypothetical approval: an agent has rightful authority to initiate (and attempt to lead) a revolutionary war only if (or if and only if) her doing so would be consented to or approved by a rational person and who rightly values freedom from oppression, under those circumstances. This move presents two difficulties. First, it assumes something very problematic, namely, that hypothetical consent is as morally potent as actual consent (and, even more dubiously) that hypothetical approval can substitute for actual consent. Second, it appears that if a determination can be made of what a rational agent who rightly values freedom from oppression would consent to or approve of, then the whole exercise becomes otiose, because the same result can be achieved by calculating whether the initiation of the war satisfies the conventional criteria of likelihood of success, just cause, and proportionality. In other words, to the extent that the notion of what a rational agent who rightly values freedom from oppression would consent to or approve of can be ascertained, it appears that such an agent would make that determination by employing the least controversial jus ad bellum requirements. Further, different actual people will be affected

differently by the revolution if it occurs and will weigh the risks and benefits differently, and should do so to the extent that they are rational. If the notion of a rational agent abstracts from these differences, it is hard to see how what she would approve of or consent to could be relevant to whether revolutionaries should subject actual people to the risks of revolution. If the notion of a rational agent is particularized to the situations of all actual individuals who would be affected by a revolution, some would approve or consent and some would not, so there will be no one answer to the question "Does this have rightful authority?" because there will be no one answer to the question "Would a rational individual who rightly values freedom from oppression consent to this agent initiating and leading a revolutionary war?"

Consider now the claim that those who initiate revolutionary wars (and assume leadership of them) have rightful authority to do so if or if and only if they represent the people (or at least those members of the people who are oppressed).

If "represents" means what it does in the context of ordinary democratic politics, namely, A represents B if and only if A is authorized to act on B's behalf through some appropriate public political process (such as an election), then this is a non-starter, since an oppressive regime is unlikely to allow any such process. This standard, institutionally-based understanding of representation would work as a criterion of rightful authority to initiate revolutionary war only if one of two conditions were satisfied. First, those who initiate revolutionary war were duly chosen as representatives prior to the advent of an oppressive regime (as when an authoritarian coup usurps an elected government). Second, the constitutional order included pre-authorization for revolution under certain specified conditions. It is worth noting that the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen explicitly included a right (and indeed a duty) to resist tyranny and that the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces (articles 35 and 85) goes farther, designating an agent of revolution by pre-authorizing the military to depose the government if it violates the constitutional requirement of

secular government. Just as an advance directive for medical care enables a competent patient to pre-authorize agent to act on her behalf in the event of her losing the capacity to act, so a constitutional provision of this sort would enable a people under conditions of political freedom to pre-authorize some agent to initiate revolution on its behalf should the abuse of government authority undermine its ability to perform an act of authorization. Neither of these two conditions will be satisfied if the country in question never had a political system that produced bona fide representatives of the people or never had a constitution that pre-authorized revolution. Interestingly, current discussions of rightful authority for waging revolutionary war do not consider the possibility of pre-authorization for initiating and leading revolutions, thus following the unfortunate but widespread practice of discussing the morality of war as if institutions did not exist or were relevant only as instruments for applying a system of moral principles that can be fully worked out by eliciting intuitions from cases of individual actions considered apart from any institutional background (Buchanan 2006, 2015).

In the absence of any institutional provisions for pre-authorization, a proponent of the notion of representativeness might offer a different understanding of it. An agent represents the people, in a fashion that morally empowers her to initiate and lead revolutionary war, if she is committed to and acts appropriately to realize their shared interest or common good (Biggar 2013). It is worth noting just how distant this view is from any widely accepted notion of rightful authority to make war in other contexts or for that matter of rightful authority in any context, whether private or public. The fact that Jones is committed to Smith's good and able to promote it effectively does nothing whatsoever to establish that Jones has rightful authority over Jones, much less that he has rightful authority to undertake actions supposedly on Jones's behalf that pose a danger to Jones or others. Further, this notion is incapable of establishing exclusive rightful authority, since there may be more than one party, each contending for the role of leadership, all of which are committed to and capable of promoting the common good. That is a significant problem, since one of the traditional rationales for the rightful

authority in just war theories is that there must be someone authority on each side of an armed conflict, both to ensure discipline among the armed forces so as to limit destruction, to achieve adherence to jus in bello principles, and so that it will be clear who should be party to negotiations to end the conflict and ensure a just peace.

If for these reasons one despairs of spelling out rightful authority in terms of actual or hypothetical consent or approval, representativeness, or commitment to the common good, an alternative approach may appear attractive: jettison the assumption that initiating and attempting to lead a revolutionary war always requires rightful authority. Argue instead that where the conditions on the ground make rightful authority unobtainable, it can still sometimes be morally justifiable for an agent to initiate a revolutionary war and attempt to lead it (Fabre 2012). Such a position was sketched earlier, in casting a critical eye on Kant's rejection of revolution; it can be further developed by employing an analogy with the justification of coercion in a state of violent anarchy—something akin to the state of nature as Hobbes understood it.

Suppose that there is a group of agents who have the capacity to create basic order, lifting all out of the state of radical physical insecurity, but who can accomplish this only by imposing a coercively backed set of rules under conditions in which there are no institutional resources for conferring rightful authority to perform these tasks. Suppose in addition that there are no informal means for conferring rightful authority, that for reasons adduced earlier, either consent or approval cannot be ascertained due to severe oppression or that they would fall significantly short of unanimity. Suppose also that these agents are committed to providing physical security for all by the least coercive and fair means that are likely to be effective under the circumstances. Finally, suppose that they are committed to helping to build institutions that would make the legitimate or rightfully authorized continued use of coercion possible and that they are publicly committed to relinquishing power should those processes confer legitimacy on some other agents. Surely under these conditions, such agents would be morally justified in wielding coercive

power, even if they lacked rightful authority. If that is so, then instead of saying that coercive power may only be permissibly wielded by rightful authorities, one ought to say instead that rightful authority is required where the conditions for conferring authority exists, but that where they do not, it may be morally justifiable to wield coercive power nonetheless, at least if this is done in such a way as to promote the emergence of conditions under which legitimate use of coercion can exist.

In extreme cases, tyrannies are sufficiently like a state of violent anarchy that it appears that the same conclusion holds there as well. If a group of agents can end such a tyranny and establish a minimally just order in which all can enjoy physical security and if it is committed to doing so by the least coercive means and in observation of basic principles of fairness and is also committed to helping to establish the conditions under which the exercise of coercive power can become legitimate or rightfully authorized, then it appears that it would be morally justified in initiating and leading a revolutionary war to create such conditions.

Whether or not this sort of argument for abandoning the unqualified commitment to a principle of rightful authority in the case of revolutionary wars is ultimately persuasive, it appears to have sufficient initial plausibility to call into question the assumption that if rightful authority is a requirement for just interstate wars, then it is also so for revolutionary wars in all cases. So, one central issue for a comprehensive theory of just revolutionary war is whether the requirement of rightful authorization for initiating and leading armed revolutionary struggles is unconditionally valid. If the answer is that it is, then it appears that initiating a revolutionary war will rarely if ever be justified.

It does not follow, however, that joining the fight, once it has started, is unjustified whenever the initiation of the conflict was unjustified (Buchanan 2013). Whether various individuals are morally justified in joining the war effort depends upon whether they have morally acceptable reasons for doing so, not upon the morality or immorality of the actions others took to initiate the conflict. If that is the case, then the

earlier suggestion that "the morality of revolutionary war" must be disaggregated into the morality of various parties is vindicated. The justification for initiating revolution will be different from the justification for joining a revolution. This point is not limited to revolutionary wars, but it may be more significant in the revolutionary case, if generally speaking the initiation of revolutionary wars is harder to justify than some interstate wars, especially wars of self-defense or defense of others against aggression.

There are several reasons, as already noted, why revolutionary wars may be especially hard to justify. The most obvious, as noted in Section 3, are that there are many ways in which the aim of establishing a more just political order may be frustrated and hence it may be hard to satisfy the requirement of a reasonable likelihood of success. Another problem is the difficulty of determining that a proportionality requirement is satisfied. Indeed, some of the most daunting moral issues of revolutionary war arise when one attempts to apply the standard just war requirement of proportionality as a necessary condition for justified initiation of revolutionary war.

One issue is whether violent revolutions against "lesser tyrannies" can ever be proportional. "Greater tyrannies" engage in large-scale violations of the right of physical security, killings and maimings, or they literally enslave their peoples. "Lesser tyrannies" refrain from those actions, but violate other important rights, including the right to democratic government and various other civil and political rights, such as the right to freedoms of religion, expression, and assembly. Some theorists have argued that it would be unjustified to make war against any party, whether another country's armed forces or one's own government, that "merely" engaged in "lesser tyranny", because lethal force is only proportional when it is used to combat the wrongful use of lethal force (or to avoid being reduced to a slave). David Rodin (2003), for example, contends that it would be wrong for the people of one country to use lethal force to resist and invasion by another country whose leaders were only intent on imposing a "lesser tyranny". In other words, he denies that

the right of self-defense could ever justify violence against an invader that "merely" wished to destroy a nation's sovereignty. He even goes so far as to say that if an individual invaded one's home and one had reason to believe that if one resisted the invasion the invader would use lethal force, thus triggering one's own right to use lethal force in defense of oneself and one's family, one should hide from the invader in order to avoid this escalation. Jeff McMahan (1994) argues, in contrast, that there is no duty to avoid such an escalation, and that even if it would be disproportionate to initiate lethal force against an invader intent only on "lesser tyranny", it would not be disproportionate to respond with lethal force to an invader who made a "conditional threat" of lethal force, that is, who asserted that she would use lethal force in response to any form of resistance, including nonviolent resistance (Frowe and Lazar 2017). McMahan also asserts that one need not wait for the realization of the "conditional threat" of the invader to be imminent before using lethal force to counter it if that is the only way to be assured of one's safety (McMahan 1994). Finlay (2015) agrees with McMahan's conclusion and explicitly applies it to the case of revolutionary wars, holding that it is justifiable to make revolutionary war against a regime that is merely a "lesser tyranny" if that regime responds with lethal force to nonviolent resistance. The case that McMahan and Finlay develop against Rodin's austere view can be strengthened by noting that under the existing international order, a norm that allows war-making to prevent the loss of sovereignty, at least in the case of reasonably democratic and rights-respecting countries, makes good sense because the state is the primary locus for the establishment of basic justice and the protection of human rights.

The second problematic assumption shared by Rodin, McMahan, and Finlay in their discussions of proportionality is that only harms to the parties directly affected count. But revolutionary war against "lesser tyranny" might well be proportional if, instead, the harm to innocent people the revolution will cause were weighed, not just against the harm the tyranny is doing to the current generation of the people, but against that when combined with the harm to future generations if the tyranny is

not overthrown. And, of course, revolutionaries often try to justify the violence that will result from their conduct by saying that it will be compensated for by the benefits gained or the harm averted for many people to come.

There is yet another way in which the class of harms to be considered in proportionality assessments might be expanded: the effects of revolutionary war against "lesser tyranny" on valid norm compliance might also be included. Suppose the valid norm is that governments are not to be tyrannical, that they are not only to refrain from killings, maiming, and enslavement, but are also to respect civil and political rights, including especially the right to democratic government, primarily because rights to physical security are best realized in democracies. Suppose also that because of weak international institutions, the best prospect for enforcing a norm of good government is the threat of revolution against governments that violate the norm. Under these conditions, it would be problematic to restrict proportionality assessments to immediate, direct harms, ignoring the effects on the enforcement of important norms of justice. Most but not all contemporary discussions of proportionality ignore the possibility of justifying violence for the sake of norm enforcement, because they elaborate on intuitions stimulated by one-off consideration of cases viewed in isolation, rather than taking into account the effect of particular actions on patterns of behavior persisting over time (Fabre 2012, Rodin 2011). And because they largely ignore institutions, they do not consider the requirements of effective international norm enforcement under conditions in which international institutions for enforcement are weak.

Those who exclude from assessments of proportionality effects on future generations and on norm enforcement might reply as follows. Even if in principle it makes sense to consider such wider effects, in practice any attempt to do so would require calculations so difficult and prone to error that, as an action-guiding principle, the proportionality requirement ought to construe harms more narrowly. As it stands, this reply is

unconvincing, because it assumes, without argument, that the risks of error or abuse attendant on a wider construal of harms relevant to proportionality clearly outweigh the apparent impropriety of ignoring what appear to be whole classes of morally relevant harms.

There is one more way in which institutional capacity can affect proportionality. If international or regional institutions provided for effective intervention in support of just revolutions, then the risks of failed or corrupted revolutions and of violent anarchy that lead some theorists to deny that revolution can be justified would be mitigated, with the result that engaging in revolution could satisfy the proportionality requirement. Once again, it is clear that the validity of a theory of just revolutionary war depends upon the validity of empirical assumptions about institutional capacity. Unfortunately, many theorists of the morality of armed conflict either ignore issues of institutional capacity or assume that the current paucity of institutional resources cannot be remedied.

Thus far the moral complexities of revolutionary jus ad bellum have been the focus of the discussion, emphasizing in particular the difficulty of satisfying the requirements of rightful authority and proportionality. The jus in Bello component of a theory of just revolutionary war is also morally complex. A key issue that a theory of the morality of revolutionary war ought to address is whether widely accepted jus in Bello norms apply without exception to war-making by revolutionaries or whether, instead, revolutionaries are morally permitted to undertake acts of war that the military personnel of states are usually prohibited from performing. This is not a merely theoretical issue: revolutionary warriors have often engaged in various morally problematic forms of "irregular" warfare. They have assassinated civilian leaders and other civilians such as government bureaucrats and judges, attacked regime forces while wearing civilian attire (not wearing uniforms or insignia as required by the laws of war and not carrying weapons openly), and engaged in terrorism, deliberately killing individuals who had no discernible connection with the regime by detonating bombs in public

places. Furthermore, in order to mobilize people to join the revolution or to deter them from aiding the regime in suppressing it, they have engaged in acts of terrorism against the oppressed.

Those who argue that it is permissible for revolutionaries to target civilians tend to argue that only those civilians who contribute in some significant way to the oppressive activities of the regime lie beyond the protection of the jus in bello norm of discrimination. The basic idea here, as Finlay puts it, is to justify such acts as the targeting of individuals who are morally liable to be killed because they are not morally innocent, that is, they are active and significant contributors to the regime's violent injustices (Finlay 2015: 55–86, 217–218). But what counts as significant contribution is both unclear and disputed. For example, a farmer who supplies food for a tyranny's secret police or repairs the vehicles that they use to hunt down dissidents clearly makes a contribution to their depredations, but it is unclear whether that sort of contribution makes her liable to lethal attack (Fabre 2009, Frowe 2014).

A second set of issues in revolutionary jus in bello concerns the permissibility of revolutionary warriors engaging in "partisan war"--not wearing uniforms or insignia or carrying arms openly or doing so but then changing into civilian attire immediately after an attack so as to melt back into the population. Those who argue that such actions are permissible typically appeal to fairness. The idea is that, at least in the early stages of their struggle, revolutionaries are at a great disadvantage vis à vis government forces, that this disadvantage is something for which they are not responsible, and that the revolutionaries should not be expected to let it render unsuccessful their struggle against a seriously unjust regime. Revolutionaries typically have inferior arms and logistical capacities, they have no safe rear areas behind which they can regroup and resupply because there are no battle lines as in conventional wars, and when they face a ruthless tyranny it is unlikely that their opponents will observe jus bello norms. Finlay asserts that if these forms of "partisan war" are undertaken to defend innocent people against the regime's wrongful harm to them, then they should be seen as justifiable

efforts to achieve the protection of morally innocent individuals that is the rationale for the discrimination norm (Finlay 2015: 55–86, 217–218).

The argument against the permissibility of "partisan warfare" is that the requirement of uniforms and insignia facilitates better compliance with the discrimination norm, making it easier for regime forces to refrain from killing noncombatants. That argument is of limited force if the regime is likely to violate the discrimination norm anyway. A tyranny that routinely violates basic human rights in peacetime is unlikely to become scrupulous in use of force in a revolutionary conflict (Meisels 2008).

Check Your Progress 2

Note : a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of this unit.

1. How to do analysis of distinctive Features of Revolutionary Wars?

    …………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………

2. What do you know Revolutionary Jus ad bellum, Revolutionary Jus in bello?

    …………………………………………………………………
    …………………………………………………………………
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13.6 LET US SUM UP

The topic of revolution presents a fertile and challenging field for moral theory and applied or practical ethics—and one in which the greater part of systematic thinking remains to be done. Violent revolutions typically present the most serious and difficult moral issues. Until recently, the excellent work done by contemporary just war theories has not given the peculiar moral problems of revolutionary war the attention they deserve,

but there is reason to believe that this deficiency will be remedied. Because the success of a revolution may depend upon whether there is intervention in support of it, a comprehensive theory of the morality of revolution should cohere with a theory of the morality of intervention (Buchanan 2016). Another topic that a comprehensive theory of just revolutionary war should address is the moral assessment of the international Law of Armed Conflict's asymmetry with regard to the rights of combatants acting on behalf of states and revolutionary warriors. The Law of Armed Conflict assigns the latter the same legal duties as the former, but grants them a much leaner set of legal rights.

13.7 KEY WORDS

Moral: Morality is the differentiation of intentions, decisions and actions between those that are distinguished as proper and those that are improper.

Revolution: In political science, a revolution is a fundamental and relatively sudden change in political power and political organization which occurs when the population revolts against the government, typically due to perceived oppression or political incompetence.

13.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you know the Background to the' Chinese Revolution?
2. Please discuss Reform Movement.
3. What do you know Counter Revolutionary Yuan Shikai?
4. What do you understand some Major Figures' Views on the Morality of Revolution?
5. How to do analysis of distinctive Features of Revolutionary Wars?
6. What do you know Revolutionary Jus ad bellum, Revolutionary Jus in bello?

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13.10   ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 13.2
2. See Sub Section 13.2.1
3. See Sub Section 13.2.2
4. Sometimes the term "revolution" is used in a stronger sense, as denoting not just an extra-constitutional attempt to replace one government with another, but also to effect a fundamental change in the type of government, as in a revolution to overthrow an autocracy and create in its stead a democracy. Thus some scholars on the Left have contended that the so-called American Revolution was not really a revolution, because it did not create or even aim at anything other than a new form of the bourgeois state—a state controlled by and in the interest of the class that controls the means of production (Zinn 1980, Jennings 2000). Many American historians have concluded otherwise, asserting that it was a revolution in the stronger sense because it replaced a monarchy with a republic (Nash 2005; Wood 1993). On this stronger understanding of revolution as involving a fundamental change in the type of government, secessionists would also be revolutionaries, if the new government they attempt to establish in part of the territory of the state would be of a fundamentally different type. Obviously, this stronger conception of revolution is no clearer and less contentious than attempts to distinguish fundamentally different types of government (hence the debate over whether the war for the independence of the American Colonies from Britain was "really" a revolution). For the remainder of the discussion I will use "revolution" in the weaker sense, with the understanding that it can also encompasses revolutions in the stronger sense. It is worth noting, however, that the morality of revolution in the stronger sense is, if anything, more complex than that of the weaker sense, because the former involves not only the extra-constitutional overthrow of the

existing government but also the extra-constitutional establishment of a new type of government.

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 13.4

2. Contemporary theorists who have addressed the morality of irregular warfare have generally argued that terrorism, whether its goal is to persuade the regime to capitulate or to coerce the oppressed into joining the revolution or not supporting the regime, is morally impermissible. Most of the controversy concerns whether any or all of the other forms of irregular warfare are permissible and if so under what conditions. This author (Buchanan 2013) has argued that even if terrorism perpetrated against members of the oppressed population is unjustified, some forms of coercion may be permissible, as when revolutionary fighters are conscripted through the threat of penalties such as expropriation of property or even perhaps confinement or lesser restrictions on liberty. The most plausible justification for such methods of coerced mobilization would characterize the goals of the revolution as public goods of extraordinary moral importance and present coercion as a solution to the collective action problem. Whether coercive mobilization would be justified would depend on at least two factors: whether the forms of coercion employed were necessary, whether they were the least restrictive among the effective alternatives and whether the burdens of coercion were distributed fairly (Finlay 2015: 87–124). See Section 13.5

UNIT 14: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF SAARC COUNTRIES

STRUCTURE

14.0 OBJECTIVES

After finishing up this unit we can able to know:

- The concept which related with the comparative studies with the Regionalism Defined.
- To know the Forces Underlying RCAs
- To discuss the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
- To describe SAARC Performance and Prospects
- To know the Issues related with political and economic relation.

14.1 INTRODUCTION

SAARC was established in 1985, with seven members, including Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan too has been admitted into the fraternity, while representatives of China, Japan, Korea, the US and the EU are attending this year's summit as observers.

"India is ready to accept asymmetrical responsibilities, opening its markets to South Asian neighbours without insisting on reciprocity," said Singh, playing the perfect host. He went on to announce duty-free access to the Indian market for the least developed countries in the region and a further reduction in the sensitive list in respect of these countries.

At present, trade within the Saarc region is languishing.

"Starting from such a low base, greater integration among South Asian countries could bring huge benefits to its people. Intra-regional trade in South Asia can increase to $20 billion by 2010 if trade barriers are lifted. Benefits from energy trade can also be huge," said Washington-based Praful Patel, World Bank (WB) vice-president for the South Asia region at a media briefing ahead of the Saarc summit.

South Asia comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan is the newest member of the regional bloc, having joined the SAARC in 2005. Despite common heritage, history, linguistic, cultural and social practices shared by these nations, South Asia has emerged as the least integrated region in the world. South Asia is distinctly characterized by complex security issues, multiple inter-state disputes and yet a high untapped economic potential. The challenges faced by the region are based deep rooted and historic differences. Consequently political issues and conflicts have not allowed economic and strategic interests to take precedence in matters of policy and development. The regional trade in South Asia is dismally low at 4 percent as compared with the regional trade of the European Union at 67 percent, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) at 62 percent, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at 26%, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa at 22%, Gulf Cooperation Council at 8%, Latin America and Caribbean at 22% 1 . Regional trade among the seven SAARC countries in 2002 was US$5 billion out of which India's share was 76 percent (US$3.8 billion) and Pakistan's share was 8 percent (US$0.4 billion)2 . The regional trade

among the remaining five countries is limited to around 16 percent (US$0.8 billion) of the total regional trade. Inspired by the success of economic integration agreements in other parts of the world South Asian countries decided to create the SAARC. The initial proposal of SAARC made by former president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, in May, 1980 was endorsed by Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bhutan. The rationale behind the proposal was to achieve stability, security and peace in the region. India and Pakistan's acceptance was hesitant, gradual and based on the condition of excluding security related and bilateral matters out of the scope of the proposed regional cooperation agreement. The charter of the SAARC was accepted by all the seven members in mid 1985. SAARC is the main vehicle for moving towards greater integration in the region. So far, SAARC has been an ineffective institution, vulnerable to regional politics and with inadequate capacities. There is a divergence of opinions on the prospect of increasing economic integration in South Asia. Some authors argue that unilateral liberalization as is currently underway in South Asia offers greater benefits than regional integration would. Others believe that regional integration will create exciting opportunities and will allow countries to develop comparative advantage, coordinate programs to address challenges in governance, environment, social development, and other areas that most often spill over national boundaries. The objective of this paper is to analyse the political economic factors and challenges affecting regional economic integration5 in South Asia, incentives for increasing integration and finally to draw out lessons from the regional integration experiences in other parts of the world. Part II of the paper discusses the challenges in increasing integration in South Asia. Further, it also discusses the incentives and potential benefits of regional integration to the South Asian countries. In Part III, suggestions to increase economic integration have been made with particular reference to the ASEAN integration process. Part IV discusses the features, significance and limitations of trade and investment agreements in South Asia and the ASEAN region. Finally, Part V of this paper provides the concluding remarks.

14.2 REGIONALISM DEFINED

International relations theorists offer several explanations of regionalism to answer the following question: why do states cooperate and commit themselves to comply with agreed sets of rules, thereby accepting some constraint on their policy autonomy and even sovereignty. The explanations are briefly outlined below in two broad categories: (i) power-centric and (ii) institutionalist.

14.2.1 Power-Centric View

The power-centric view of regionalism considers the international system to be anarchic by nature, which pressures individual nation states to acquire power and maximize self-interest to ensure their own security. As a result, the political–military power of nation states and its distribution among them holds critical influence over inter-state relations.

Coexistence among nation states in such situations can only be achieved through frequent realignments of the balance of power against each other. Following this reasoning, power-centrists see regionalism as a response of nation states within a region to power projection by powerful (hegemonic) state/s from outside the region. When such actions are perceived to threaten their security, the states may form an RCA to pool their resources together for collectively countering the external adversary. If the hegemonic state happens to be from within the region, the states may also consider forming a RCA in order to involve the subject state in a cooperative framework so as to moderate its exercise of power. Likewise, they may form RCAs when such arrangements reflect a convergence of their respective national interests, such as when states band together to leverage their collective strength in international forums for obtaining better terms than they possibly would individually. Lastly, a hegemonic state may itself encourage formation of an RCA to reduce the costs of coordination it has traditionally provided to its smaller allies.

The power-centric view also maintains that the presence of a powerful or hegemonic state is highly desirable since it can act as focal, or pivotal, player and resolve the collective action problem. Power-centric views thus provide important insights into how power relations among member states influence RCA performance. Power-centric views, however, offer only a partial explanation of why nation states cooperate. While power relations among states are important, they do not seem to explain establishment of several RCAs in recent years. Moreover, research finds that the presence of a hegemonic state is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure an RCA's success. Perhaps the main criticism of the power-centric explanation is that it visualizes the state to be a unified, undifferentiated entity that alone defines what constitutes national interests and pursues these interests through its international relations, including RCAs. The assumption of a unified state can be challenged since it ignores the various constituents of a state, their influences on and preferences for defining national interests, and the role and motivations of national decision-makers. Despite such limitations, the power-centric viewpoint offer three important insights that have significant bearing on the performance of RCAs. It finds that nation states will pursue regional integration only to the extent they can enhance their national interests. This can result in uneven commitment to regional integration on the part of individual members. Secondly, since trade can potentially enhance the political–military capacities of states through efficiency gains, it can also influence power relations among member states.

For this reason, states are more likely to expand trade with political–military allies than with actual or potential adversaries (Mansfield and Bronson, 1997). This finding suggests that the effectiveness of an RCA to promote trade and cooperation may depend on the political–military relations among its member states. If subject relations are cordial, cooperation may progress more than in instances where relations are less cordial. Power-centrists also find that the (real or perceived) unequal distribution of gains from RCAs among member states is likely to limit cooperation, unless measures to compensate the disadvantaged states are put in place. The reality or perception of unequal gains for weaker

members may arise because the more powerful members may appropriate to themselves the bulk of the gains owing to their greater market power and bargaining clout. However, similar outcome could also result from the process of trade and economic liberalization, since a disproportionately higher burden of adjustment costs may sometimes fall on the smaller and weaker economies. This highlights the critical importance of compensation mechanisms for sustaining the process of regional integration, especially when member states are at starkly different levels of income and development.

14.2.2 Institutionalist View

Institutionalist explanations are premised on the view that interdependence among nations is so complex and overwhelming that it is beyond the capabilities of any single nation to solve its external problems by itself. Thus, there is a need to create regional and global institutions that can effectively deal with international economic and noneconomic problems facing nation states by resolving the collective action problem. Moreover, such institutions can also supply technical expertise to solve problems in identified issue areas. These considerations encourage states to cooperate and form institutions to meet specific functional needs. Further, when member states begin to receive benefits of efficiency and expertise from an institution in one issue area, they become willing to create similar institutions to deal with problems in other areas. Beneficiary interest groups, political and civil society groups, and outsiders with vested interest (e.g., multinational corporations, global institutions, and foreign powers) contribute to articulating the demand for new institutions. Spillovers of this kind lead to the development of multiple institutions to manage problems in different issue areas. The spread of functional institutions across different issue areas creates cross sectoral linkages and promotes economic integration among member states, laying a foundation for their eventual political union as well.

While the institutionalist view demonstrates the need for regional and global institutions and the important role these now play in global economic and non-economic spheres, it has also been criticized on various grounds. The main criticism is that institutionalists do not adequately appreciate the role of politics in the decision-making processes of nation states. Institutionalists seem to assume that decision-makers in member states are free to select and pursue the best technical solutions to the problems they face. Such an assumption effectively limits the power and function of decision-makers to selecting one of the technocratic solutions offered by functional institutions. In reality, however, several considerations—such as preferences of the public (voters); pressures from political parties, business, and other interest groups, including the military and the bureaucracy; and pressures from external allies—need to be taken into account in making decisions. This requires decision-makers to weigh different considerations and reconcile the conflicts and tensions among them, garner requisite support from relevant constituencies, and calibrate decisions to address the problem under consideration. This requires national decision-makers to go far beyond any given menu of technocratic solutions and exercise political judgment and leadership. For this reason, the nation states and their political systems and processes continue to hold decisive influence on the pace and direction of regionalism (Dash, 2008).

14.3 POLITCS OF SAARC

Government of Nepal

The Government of Nepal (Nepali: नेपाल सरकार),is an executive body and the central government of Nepal. Prior to the abolition of the monarchy, it was officially known as His Majesty's Government

The Head of state is the President and the Prime Minister holds the position of the Head of executive. The role of President is largely ceremonial as the functioning of the government is managed entirely by the Prime Minister who is appointed by the Parliament. The heads of constitutional bodies are appointed by the President on the

recommendation of Constitutional Council, with the exception of the Attorney General, who is appointed by the President on the recommendation of Prime Minister.

Old Bharadari governmentship

The character of government in Kingdom of Nepal was driven from consultative state organ of the previous Gorkha hill principality, known as **Bharadar**. These Bharadars were drawn from high caste and politically influential families. For instance; **Thar Ghar** aristocratic group in previous Gorkha hill principality. Bharadars formed consultative body in the kingdom for the most important functions of the state as Councellors, Ministers and Diplomats. There was no single successful coalition government as court politics were driven from large factional rivalries, consecutive conspiracies and ostracization of opponent Bharadar families through assassination rather than legal expulsion. Another reason was the minority of the reigning King between 1777 and 1847 that led to establishment of anarchial rule. The government was stated to have controlled by regents, Mukhtiyars and alliance of political faction with strong fundamental support. In the end of the 18th century, the central politics was regularly dominated by two notable political factions; Thapas and Pandes. As per historians and contemporary writer Francis Hamilton, the government of Nepal comprised

- 1 *Chautariya*
- 4 *Kajis*
- 4 *Sirdar/Sardars*
- 2 *Subedars*
- 1 *Khazanchi*
- 1 *Kapardar.*

As for Regmi states, the government of Nepal comprised

- 4 *Chautariyas*

- 4 *Kajis*
- 4 *Sirdar/Sardars*. Later, the number varied after King Rana Bahadur Shah abdicated his throne to minor son in 1799. There were 95 Bharadars as per the copper inscription of King Rana Bahadur Shah.

In 1794, King Rana Bahadur Shah came of age and his first act was to re-constitute the government such that his uncle, Prince Bahadur Shah of Nepal, had no official part to play. Rana Bahadur appointed Kirtiman Singh Basnyat as Chief (*Mul*) Kaji among the newly appointed four Kajis though Damodar Pande was the most influential Kaji.[5] Kirtiman had succeeded Abhiman Singh Basnyat as Chief Kaji[6] while Prince Bahadur Shah was succeeded as Chief (*Mul*) Chautariya by Prince Ranodyot Shah, then heir apparent of King Rana Bahadur Shah by a Chhetri Queen Subarna Prabha Devi.[5] Kajis had held the administrative and executive powers of nation after the fall of Chief Chautariya Prince Bahadur Shah in 1794. Later, Kirtiman Singh was secretly assassinated on 28 September 1801, by the supporters of Raj Rajeshwari Devi and his brother Bakhtawar Singh Basnyat, was then given the post of Chief (*Mul*) Kaji. Later Damodar Pande was appointed by Queen Rajrajeshwari as Chief Kaji. When the exiled abdicated King Rana Bahadur Shah prepared his return in 1804, he arrested many government officials including then Chief Kaji Damodar Pande and sacked the reigning government. He took over the administration of Nepal by assuming the position of **Mukhtiyar** (chief authority). A new government was constituted with favoring officials. Bhimsen Thapa was made a second kaji; Ranajit Pande, who was the father-in-law of Bhimsen's brother, was made the *Mul* (Chief) Kaji; Sher Bahadur Shah, Rana Bahadur's half-brother, was made the Mul (Chief) Chautariya; while Rangnath Paudel was made the Raj Guru (royal spiritual preceptor). Later in April 1806, tensions arose between Chief Chautariya Sher Bahadur Shah and Mukhtiyar Rana Bahadur Shah on the night of 25 April 1806 during a meeting at Tribhuvan Khawas's house[15][16] where around 10 pm, Sher Bahadur in desperation drew a sword and killed Rana Bahadur Shah before being cut down by nearby courtiers, Bam

Shah and Bal Narsingh Kunwar, also allies of Bhimsen. The assassination of Rana Bahadur Shah triggered a great massacre in Bhandarkhal (a royal garden east of Kathmandu Durbar) and at the bank of Bishnumati river after which Kaji Bhimsen killed 55 senior officials to benefit from the chaos. He was declared **Mukhtiyar** (Chief Authority) of Nepal and led the new government from a royal mandate of minor King Girvan Yuddha Bikram Shah.

Mukhtiyars ruled over the executive and administrative functions of the state until its replacement by British conventional Prime Minister in 1843 conferred upon then ruling Mukhtiyar Mathabar Singh Thapa.

Ideals of the old Bharadari governmentship

The policies of the old Bharadari governments were derived from ancient Hindu texts as Dharmashastra and Manusmriti.[24] The King was considered as an incarnation of Lord Vishnu and was the chief authority over legislative, judiciary and executive functions. The judiciary functions were decided on the principles of Hindu Dharma codes of conduct.[24] The king had full rights to expel any person who offended the country and also pardon the offenders and grant return to the country.[24] The government on practicality was not an absolute monarchy due to the dominance of Nepalese political clans making the Shah monarch a puppet ruler.[24] These basic Hindu templates provide the evidence that Nepal was administered as a Hindu state.
Head of state

- President : Bidhya Devi Bhandari
- Vice President : Nanda Kishor Pun

Executive

- Prime Minister : Khadga Prasad Oli
- Chief Secretary : Lok Darshan Regmi

Legislative

- Speaker of House of Representatives : Krishna Bahadur Mahara
- Chairman of National Assembly : Ganesh Prasad Timilsina[25]

Judiciary

- Chief Justice of the Supreme Court: Cholendra Shumsher JBR

Constitution of Bhutan

The Constitution of Bhutan (Dzongkha: འབྲུག་གི་རྩ་ཁྲིམས་ཆེན་མོ་; Wylie: 'Druk-gi cha-thrims-chen-mo) was enacted 18 July 2008 by the Royal Government of Bhutan. The Constitution was thoroughly planned by several government officers and agencies over a period of almost seven years amid increasing democratic reforms in Bhutan. The current Constitution is based on Buddhist philosophy, international Conventions on Human Rights, comparative analysis of 20 other modern constitutions, public opinion, and existing laws, authorities, and precedents. According to Princess Sonam Wangchuck, the constitutional committee was particularly influenced by the Constitution of South Africa because of its strong protection of human rights.

On 4 September 2001, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck briefed the Lhengye Zhungtshog (Council of Ministers, or Cabinet), the Chief Justice, and the Chairman of the Royal Advisory Council on the need to draft a formal Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan. The King expressed his desire that the Lhengye Zhungtshog and the Chief Justice should hold discussions on formulating the Draft Constitution. While Bhutan did not have a formal Constitution, the King believed all the principles and provisions of a Constitution were covered under the various written laws and legislation which guided the actions of the King and the functioning of the Royal Government, the judiciary and the National Assembly of Bhutan. Nevertheless, with the country and the people having successfully achieved a high level of development and

political maturity, the time had come for a formal Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan.[3] Royal Government of Bhutan appointed Indian constitutional lawyer K. K. Venugopal to serve as the Constitutional adviser for drafting of the Constitution of Bhutan.

The King emphasized that the Constitution must promote and protect the present as well as the future well-being of the people and the country. He stated the Constitution must ensure that Bhutan had a political system that would provide peace and stability, and also strengthen and safeguard Bhutan's security and sovereignty. The King decided the Lhengye Zhungtshog should, therefore, establish a committee to draft the Constitution for the Kingdom of Bhutan. The King said that the Drafting Committee should comprise government officials, National Assembly members, and eminent citizens who were well qualified, had a good understanding of the laws of Bhutan, and who would be able to contribute towards drafting the Constitution.

On November 30, 2001, the King inaugurated the outset of its drafting with a ceremony. By 2005, the Royal Government had circulated copies of the draft among the civil service and local governments in order to receive locals' feedback.

Basic provisions

The Constitution defines the Kingdom of Bhutan as a democratic constitutional monarchy belonging to the people of the Kingdom. The territory of Bhutan is divided into 20 Dzongkhags (Districts) with each consisting of Gewogs (Counties) and Thromdes (Municipalities). Dzongkha is the national language of Bhutan, and the National Day of Bhutan is December 17.

The Constitution is the supreme law of the State and affirms the authority of legal precedent:

All laws in force in the territory of Bhutan at the time of adopting this Constitution continues until altered, repealed or amended by Parliament. However, the provisions of any law, whether made before or after the coming into force of this Constitution, which are inconsistent with this Constitution, shall be null and void.

The Supreme Court of Bhutan is the guardian of the Constitution and the final authority on its interpretation.

Rights over natural resources vest in the State and are thus properties of the State and regulated by law.

Throughout the Constitution, retirement is mandated for most civil servants upon reaching age 65. Notably, this includes the reigning King whenever possible.

The monarchy and the royal family
Further information: Druk Gyalpo and Dual system of government

Reigning Monarch Druk Gyalpo Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck

The Constitution confirms the institution of monarchy. The Druk Gyalpo (King of Bhutan) is the Head of State and the symbol of unity of the Kingdom and of the people of Bhutan. The Constitution establishes the "Chhoe-sid-nyi" (dual system of religion and politics) of Bhutan as unified in the person of the King who, as a Buddhist, is the upholder of the Chhoe-sid (religion and politics; temporal and secular). In addition, the King is the protector of all religions in Bhutan. The King is also the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Militia of Bhutan. The King is not answerable in a court of law for his actions, and his person is sacrosanct. However, the King is mandated to protect and uphold the Constitution "in the best interest and for the welfare of the people of Bhutan." Furthermore, there are Constitutional provisions for involuntary abdication in the event the King violates the Constitution.

The Constitution entitles the King and the royal family to annuities from the State in accordance with law made by Parliament; all rights and privileges including the provision of palaces and residences for official and personal use; and exemption from taxation on the royal annuity and properties. The Constitution also limits the membership of the royal family to reigning and past Monarchs, their Queens and their Royal Children born of lawful marriage.

Article 2 Section 26 states that Parliament may make no laws nor exercise its powers to amend the provisions regarding the monarchy and Bhutan's government as a "Democratic Constitutional Monarchy" except through a national referendum.

Royal prerogatives

Under the Constitution, the King, in exercise of his Royal Prerogatives (and as Head of State), promotes goodwill and good relations with other countries by receiving state guests and undertaking state visits to other countries. The King may also award titles, decorations, dar for Lhengye and Nyi-Kyelma (conferring a red scarf of rank and honour with the title of "Dasho") in accordance with tradition and custom. Also among the Royal Prerogatives are the grants of citizenship, amnesty, pardon and reduction of sentences; and land "kidu" and other "kidus" (benefits).

The King may, by Royal Prerogative, command bills and other measures to be introduced in Parliament. Furthermore, bills of Parliament are ultimately subject to veto and modification by the King, however he must assent to bills resubmitted after joint sitting and deliberation. The King may also exercise powers "relating to matters which are not provided for under this Constitution or other laws."

Succession and retirement

Druk Gyalpo Ugyen Wangchuck, founder of the Wangchuck Dynasty

The Constitution establishes the law of succession of the Golden Throne of Bhutan. Under this Section, title to the throne vests in the legitimate descendants of King Ugyen Wangchuck, enshrined on December 17, 1907. Title may pass only to children born of lawful marriage, by hereditary succession to direct lineal descendants in order of seniority upon the abdication or demise of the King. Article 2 Section 6 provides that upon reaching age 65, the King must retire (abdicate) in favor of the Crown Prince or Crown Princess, provided the royal heir has reached age 21.

There is a stated preference that a prince take precedence over a princess, however this is subject to the exception that if there are "shortcomings in the elder prince, it is the sacred duty of the King to select and proclaim the most capable prince or princess as heir to the Throne." Title to the throne may also pass to the child of the Queen who is pregnant at the time of the demise of the King if no lineal heir exists. Such is an example of semi-Salic law.

If there are no present or prospective lineal heirs, title passes to the nearest collateral line of the descendants of the King in accordance with the principle of lineal descent, with preference being given for elder over the younger. Title may never pass to children incapable of exercising the Royal Prerogatives by reason of physical or mental infirmity, nor to anyone whose spouse is a person other than a natural born citizen of Bhutan.

The successor to the Throne receives dar (a scarf that symbolizes the conferring of rank) from the Machhen (the holy relic) of Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal at Punakha Dzong, and is crowned on the Golden Throne. Upon the ascension of the King to the Throne, the members of the royal family, the members of Parliament, and the holders of offices requiring appointment by the King must take an oath of allegiance to the King.

Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal, the unifier of Bhutan

Regency

The Constitution provides a procedural framework for a Council of Regency. A Council of Regency is established when the King has temporarily relinquished, by Proclamation, the exercise of the Royal Prerogatives; or when it has been resolved by at least ¾ of the total number of members of Parliament in a joint sitting that the King is unable to exercise the Royal Prerogatives by reason of temporary physical or mental infirmity; or the King abdicates or dies and the successor to the throne has not attained the age 21. These provisions are effective until the royal heir presumptive reaches age 21 and becomes Regent by right.

When the successor to the throne reaches age 21, or when the King resumes the exercise of the Royal Prerogatives, notice must be given by Proclamation. However, when the King regains the ability to exercise the Royal Prerogatives, notice is given to that effect by resolution of Parliament.

The Council of Regency collectively exercises the Royal Prerogatives and the powers vested in the King. The Council of Regency is composed of 6 members: one senior member of the royal family nominated by the Privy Council (below), the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of Bhutan, the Speaker, the Chairperson of the National Council, and the leader of the Opposition Party.

Privy Council

The Constitution establishes a Privy Council of four persons, consisting of two members appointed by the King, one member nominated by the Lhengye Zhungtshog (Council of Ministers), and one member nominated by the National Council. The Privy Council is responsible for: all matters pertaining to the privileges and conduct of the King and the royal family; rendering advice to the King on matters concerning the Throne and the

royal family; all matters pertaining to crown properties; and any other matter as may be commanded by the King.

Royal appointments

Under Article 2 Section 19, the King appoints a significant number of high-level Government officers: Judicial appointees, the Auditor General, and the Chairs of Anti-Corruption, Civil Service, and Election Commissions are holders of Constitutional Office.

The King appoints most of the upper Judicial branch: the Chief Justice of Bhutan and the Drangpons (Associate Justices) of the Supreme Court; the Chief Justice and Drangpons (Associate Justices) of the High Court. These judicial appointments are made from among the vacant positions' peers, juniors, and available eminent jurists in consultation with the National Judicial Commission (below). Dungkhag Court jurists are not appointed by the King.

The King also appoints, from lists of names recommended jointly by the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of Bhutan, the Speaker, the Chairperson of the National Council, and the Leader of the Opposition Party, four kinds of high-level Government: the Chief Election Commissioner and other members of the Election Commission; the Auditor General of the Royal Audit Authority; the Chairperson and other members of the Royal Civil Service Commission; and the Chairperson and other members of the Anti-Corruption Commission. The term for each position is 5 years. Referenced for incorporation are the Bhutanese Audit Act, Bhutanese Civil Service Act, Bhutanese Anti-Corruption Act, and Attorney General Act; references to existing Election Laws also appear throughout the Constitution.

The King appoints positions other than Constitutional Officers on the advice of other bodies. He appoints the heads of the Defence Forces from a list of names recommended by the Service Promotion Board. The King appoints the Attorney General of Bhutan, the Chairperson of the Pay

Commission, the Governor of the Central Bank of Bhutan, the Cabinet Secretary, and Bhutanese ambassadors and consuls on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The King also appoints Dzongdags to head Local Governments, and other secretaries to the Government on the recommendation of the Prime Minister who obtains nominations from the Royal Civil Service Commission on the basis of merit and seniority and in accordance with other relevant rules and regulations. The King appoints the Secretary General of the respective Houses on the recommendation of the Royal Civil Service Commission.

The King also appoints the Je Khenpo (below) as the spiritual leader of Bhutan. Finally, as indicated above, the King appoints 2 of the 4 members of the Privy Council.

Voluntary and involuntary abdication

The Constitution provides substantive and procedural law for two paths of abdication for reigning monarchs: voluntary and involuntary. As stated above, the King may relinquish the exercise of Royal Prerogatives, and such relinquishment may be temporary.

The Constitution provides that the King must abdicate the throne for willful violations of the Constitution or for suffering permanent mental disability. Either must be upon a motion passed by a joint sitting of Parliament. The motion for abdication must be tabled for discussion at a joint sitting of Parliament (presided by the Chief Justice of Bhutan) if at least ⅔ of the total number of the members of Parliament submits such a motion stating its basis and grounds. The King may respond to the motion in writing or by addressing the joint sitting of Parliament in person or through a representative.

If, at such joint sitting of Parliament, at least ¾ of the total number of members of Parliament passes the motion for abdication, then such a resolution is placed before the people in a National Referendum to be approved or rejected. If the National Referendum passes in all the

Dzongkhags in the Kingdom, the King must abdicate in favour of the heir apparent.

Government of Bangladesh

The Government of Bangladesh (Bengali: বাংলাদেশ সরকার Bangladesh Sôrkar GOB) has three branches; the Executive branch, the Legislative branch and the Judicial branch.

The Legislature of Bangladesh is unicameral known as Sangsad. The Speaker presides over meetings of the Sangsad and conducts its business in an orderly fashion. The current Sangsad contains 350 seats, including 50 seats reserved for women and 300 seats for men, which are apportioned on elected party position in the parliament. The 10th National Parliamentary Election was held on 5 January 2014. The current speaker is Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury, who is presiding over the 10th Parliament. She is the only woman to have held this office.

The Executive is led by the Prime Minister, who selects all the remaining Ministers. The Prime Minister and the other most senior Ministers belong to the supreme decision-making committee, known as the Cabinet. The current Prime Minister is Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Bangladesh Awami League, who was appointed by the President on 6 January 2009 following the General Election on 29 December 2008. Bangladesh Awami League led by her, and its Grand Alliance (a total of 14 parties) won the two-thirds majority numerically the party controls 230 seats out of 299.

The judicial branch systematically contains an apex Supreme Court, composed of, Appellate Division and High Court Division. There are various levels of judiciary in Bangladesh – different types of courts form a strict hierarchy of importance, District Courts, City Criminal Courts and Specialized Courts and Tribunals ; all inferior to the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice of Bangladesh is the head of the judiciary and the

Supreme Court. The present and the 22nd Chief Justice of Bangladesh is Syed Mahmud Hossain. He succeeded Justice Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah on 2 February 2018.

Head of state

The President is the Head of State, a largely ceremonial post. The real power is held by the Prime Minister, who is the head of government. The president is elected by the legislature every five years and has normally limited powers that are substantially expanded during the tenure of a caretaker government, mainly in controlling the transition to a new government. Bangladesh has instituted a unique system of transfer of power; at the end of the tenure of the government, power is handed over to members of a civil society for three months, who run the general elections and transfer the power to elected representatives. This system was first practiced in 1991 and adopted to the constitution in 1996.

As head of the state, the president can grant pardon to a man sentenced to death penalty or lessen the punishment. In some cases, it also performs some legislative and judicial functions.

Executive branch

Prime Minister

The prime minister is ceremonially appointed by the president, commanding the confidence of the majority of the MPs. The cabinet is composed of ministers selected

Cabinet

The executive administrates the country and executes the laws, passed by the legislature. It maintains the internal law and order in the country. It also maintains relationship with foreign countries. It works for defence, liberty and sovereignty of the country.

Agencies

The executive calculates the income and expenditure of the government. It also performs various public welfare services such as; education, agriculture, establishment of industry, trade & commerce, land reform, tax and revenue collection. Beside this, it also accepts and implements various development projects.

Local Government

At the local government level, the country is divided into divisions, districts, subdistricts (Upazila), unions, and villages. The lowest level of local government representative are Local officials of union council those who are elected at the union level election. All larger administrative units are run by members of the civil service.

Legislative branch

Parliament of Bangladesh

The legislature of Bangladesh is unicameral. The 300 members are elected by universal suffrage at least every 5 years. It consists of 350 members at present. There is universal suffrage for all citizens at the age of 18.

"On 16 May 2004, the Jatiya Sangsad (the National Parliament) passed the 14th constitutional amendment to reintroduce quotas for women (article 65). The number of seats in parliament is to be raised to 345, 45 (15%) of which will be reserved for women in the next parliament. The seats will be allocated to parties in proportion to their overall share of the vote. This quota system replaces the previous quota law which expired in 2001. Until 2001 a system of reserved seats for women was used, where 30 seats out of 330 were reserved to women (chosen by indirect election by the 300 directly elected MPs). This provision of guaranteeing women reserved seats expired in April 2001. This quota system was first

introduced by the 1972 Constitution (originally providing for 15 reserved seats for women, out of 315 seats, for a period of 10 years). In 1978 a presidential proclamation enlarged the number of reserved seats to 30 and extended the period of reservation to 15 years from the date of promulgation of the constitution of the Republic in December 1972. The constitutional provision lapsed in 1987 and was re-incorporated in the constitution by an amendment in 1990 to be effective for 10 years from the first meeting of the legislature next elected. This provision also lapsed in 2001. The Parliament elected in October 2001 does not have reserved seats for women. Women's groups are lobbying for these seats to become directly elected positions and for the number of reserved seats to be increased."

The 10th Parliament had its first sitting on 25 January 2009 . Currently there are 350 members of the house of which 50 memberships are reserved for women.

Judicial branch

Supreme Court of Bangladesh

The highest judiciary body is the Supreme Court. Until recently, Chief Justice and judges were recommended by the Prime Minister and formally appointed by the President. Since 1991, political parties during their tenure in government have initiated the separation of the judiciary from control by the executive branch brought about by amendment of the Constitution of Bangladesh in 1975. The separation by presidential promulgation acts have signed and passed. Acts on the separation of Judiciary Administration, Remuneration, Pay and Leave, etc. have all been completed. The Supreme Court have now judiciary and administrative authority over all lower courts in the country.

Government of Sri Lanka

The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) (Sinhala: ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජය Śrī Laṃkā Rajaya) is a semi-presidential system determined by the Sri Lankan Constitution. It administers the island from both its commercial capital of Colombo and the administrative capital of Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte.

Constitution

The Constitution of Sri Lanka has been the constitution of the island nation of Sri Lanka since its original promulgation by the National State Assembly on 7 September 1978. It is Sri Lanka's second republican constitution, and its third constitution since the country's independence (as Ceylon) in 1948. As of April 2015 it has been formally amended 19 times.

Executive branch

The President, directly elected for a five-year term, is head of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. The election occurs under the Sri Lankan form of the contingent vote. Responsible to Parliament for the exercise of duties under the constitution and laws, the president may be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of Parliament with the concurrence of the Supreme Court.

The President appoints and heads a cabinet of ministers responsible to Parliament. The President's deputy is the prime minister, who leads the ruling party in Parliament. A parliamentary no-confidence vote requires dissolution of the cabinet and the appointment of a new one by the President.

Elections

Sri Lanka elects on national level a head of state - the president - and a legislature. The president is elected for a five-year term by the people.

The Parliament has 225 members, elected for a five-year term, 196 members elected in multi-seat constituencies through proportional representation system where each party is allocated a number of seats from the quota for each district according to the proportion of the total vote that party obtains in the district.

Legislative branch

The Parliament of Sri Lanka

The Parliament has 225 members, elected for a six-year term, 196 members elected in multi-seat constituencies and 29 by proportional representation. The President may summon, suspend, or end a legislative session and dissolve Parliament any time after it has served for one year. Parliament reserves the power to make all laws.

The primary modification is that the party that receives the largest number of valid votes in each constituency gains a unique "bonus seat" (see Hickman, 1999). Since its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has remained a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

Judicial Branch

Supreme Court Complex, Hultsdorf

The judiciary is the system of courts that interprets and applies the law in the country. It is set out in the constitution, which defines courts as independent institutions within the traditional framework of checks and balances. The Sri Lankan courts are presided over by professional judges, judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President with the nomination of the Parliamentary Council, others by the Judicial Service Commission.

Sri Lanka has a legal system which is an amalgam of English common law, Roman-Dutch civil law and Customary Law.

Government of Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan (Urdu: پاکستان حکومتِ) is a federal government established by the Constitution of Pakistan as a constituted governing authority of the four provinces of a parliamentary democratic republic, constitutionally called the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Effecting the Westminster system for governing the state, the government is mainly composed of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, in which all powers are vested by the Constitution in the Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Supreme Court. The powers and duties of these branches are further defined by acts and amendments of the Parliament, including the creation of executive institutions, departments and courts inferior to the Supreme Court. By constitutional powers, the President promulgates ordinances and passes bills.

The President acts as the ceremonial figurehead while the people-elected Prime Minister acts as the chief executive (of the executive branch) and is responsible for running the federal government. There is a bicameral Parliament with the National Assembly as a lower house and the Senate as an upper house. The most influential officials in the Government of Pakistan are considered to be the federal secretaries, who are the highest ranking bureaucrats in the country and run cabinet-level ministries and divisions. The judicial branch systematically contains an apex Supreme Court, Federal Shariat Court, high courts of five provinces, district, anti-terrorism, and the green courts; all inferior to the Supreme Court.

The full name of the country is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. No other name appears in the Constitution, and this is the name that appears on money, in treaties, and in legal cases. The "Pakistan Government" or "Government of Pakistan" are often used in official documents representing the federal government collectively. Also, the terms "Federal" and "National" in government institutions or program names generally indicate affiliation with the federal government. As the seat of

government is in Islamabad, "Islamabad" is commonly used as a metonym for the federal government.

Federal law and Constitution

The Constitution of Pakistan established and constituted the federal government of four provinces of federation of nation-state, known as State of Pakistan. The Constitution reads as:

The Federal Government is Subject to the Constitution. The executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government, consisting of the Prime Minister and the (Federal) Ministers, which shall act through the Prime Minister, who shall be the chief executive of the Federation.

In the performance of his functions under the Constitution, the Prime Minister may act either directly or through the (Federal) Ministers.

—Constitution of Pakistan: Part III: The Federation of Pakistan—Chapter 3: The Federal Government, Article 196–197, source

The basic civil and criminal laws governing the citizens of Pakistan are set down in major parliamentary legislation (a term inherited from the United Kingdom), such as the Exit Control List, the Pakistan Penal Code, and the Frontier Crimes Regulations. By the Article 246th and Article 247th to the constitution, the Islamic Jirga (or Panchayat) system has become an institution for local governance. The 1950s reforms in the government administration, the constitutional law and jurisprudence in Pakistan have been greatly influenced by the United States Of America ' legal system. Since the 1970s, the traditional jirga-based law has also influenced the country's judicial development.

Branches of government

Legislative branch

The legislative branch is known as the parliament, a term for legislature inherited from the United Kingdom. The parliament has two houses;

The National Assembly is the lower house and has 342 members. 272 are elected directly by the people, while 70 seats are reserved for women and religious minorities.

The Senate is the upper house and has 104 senators elected indirectly by members of provincial assemblies for six-year terms.

The Parliament enjoys parliamentary supremacy. All the Cabinet ministers as well as the Prime Minister must be members of Parliament (MPs), according to the constitution. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet Ministers are jointly accountable to the Parliament. If there is a policy failure or lapse on the part of the government, all the members of the cabinet are jointly responsible. If a vote of no confidence is passed against the government, then the government collapses and a new one must be formed.

Executive branch

By general definition, the executive branch of government is the one that has sole authority and responsibility for the daily administration of the state bureaucracy. The division of power into separate branches of government is central to the republican idea of the separation of powers. The separation of powers system is designed to distribute authority away from the executive branch – an attempt to preserve individual liberty in response to tyrannical leadership throughout history.

Prime Minister and Cabinet

The Prime Minister of Pakistan (Urdu: وزيراعظم; lit: 'Wazir-e- Azam), is the executive head of government of Pakistan, constitutionally designated as the Chief Executive (CE). Popularly elected by direct elections in the parliament, the Prime minister is responsible for appointing a cabinet as well as running the government operations.

The Prime Minister makes key appointments on various important positions, including;

The federal secretaries as head of cabinet- level ministries
The chief secretaries of the provinces
Key administrative and military personnel in the Pakistan Armed Forces
The chairmen of large public sector organisations and corporations such as NHA, TCP, PIA, PNSC etc.
The chairmen and other members of the federal commissions and public institutions

Ambassadors and High Commissioners to other countries

The Cabinet can have a maximum of 11 percent (50 members including the Prime Minister) of the total strength of the Parliament. Each Cabinet member must be a member of Parliament (MP). The Cabinet Ministers chair the Cabinet and are further assisted by the Cabinet Secretary of Pakistan, whose appointment comes from the Civil Services of Pakistan. Other Ministers are Ministers of State, junior members who report directly to one of the Cabinet Ministers, often overseeing a specific aspect of government.

Once appointed by the Prime Minister, all Cabinet Ministers are officially confirmed to their appointment offices by the President in a special oath of ceremony.

President

The President of Pakistan is a ceremonial figurehead, a ceremonial head of state representing the unity of the country.

Elected for a five-year term by an indirect election, the electoral college consisting of members of the Senate, National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies, the president is now not eligible for reelection

(18th amendment). However no individual may hold the office for more than two consecutive terms. The president may resign or be impeached and removed from office for incapacity or gross misconduct by a two-thirds vote of the members of the parliament.

The President enjoys all constitutional powers and exercises them directly or through officers subordinate to him as per the aforesaid Article 41-Article 47.

The President is responsible for making a wide variety of appointments.

These include:

- Governors of the Four Provinces
- The Chief Justice (after concluding the consultation with the Prime Minister)
- The Chief Election Commissioner (Consultation required from the Prime Minister)
- The Attorney General and Comptroller and Auditor General
- The President, as Head of State also receives the credentials of Ambassadors from other countries, whilst the Prime Minister, as Head of Government, receives credentials of High Commissioners from other members of the Commonwealth, in line with historical tradition.

The President is the civilian Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

The President of Pakistan can grant a pardon to or reduce the sentence, reprieve and respite, and remit, suspend or commute any sentence passed by any court, tribunal or other authority, particularly in cases involving a death sentence. The decisions involving pardoning and other rights by the President are independent of the opinion of the Prime Minister or the Parliamentary majority. In most other cases, however, the President

exercises his or her executive powers on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Judicial branch

Pakistan's independent judicial system began under the British Raj, and its concepts and procedures resemble those of Anglo-Saxon countries. Institutional and judicial procedures were later changed, in 1950s, under the influence of American legal system to remove the fundamental rights problems. The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Provincial High Courts, District Courts, Anti-terrorism courts, Sharia courts, and Environmental courts all over the country; Supreme Court being the superior court. The Supreme Court of Pakistan consists of a Chief Justice, and Senior Justices appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan. The Constitution does not fix the number of justices of the Supreme Court, though it can be fixed by Parliament through an act signed by the President.

Judicature transfer

The Constitution grants powers to the Supreme Court to make judicature transfers. Although the proceedings in the Supreme Court arise out of the judgement or orders made by the subordinate courts, the Supreme Court reserves the right to transfer any case, appeal or proceedings pending before any High Court to any other High Court.

Supreme Judicial Council

Misconduct of judges is highly intolerable as is mentioned in the constitution. Under the mainframe of the Supreme Judicial Council Article 209 an inquiry into the capacity or conduct of a Judge, who is a member of the Council, may be conducted.

Civil service

The civil service of Pakistan is the permanent bureaucracy of the Government of Pakistan. The civil servants are the permanent officials of the government, occupying a respected image in the civil society. Civil servants come from different cadres (e.g. Pakistan Administrative Service, Police Service of Pakistan etc.) after passing the CSS examinations. Not all the employees of the Government of Pakistan are civil servants; other employees of the Government of Pakistan come from the scientific institutions, state-owned corporations and commissioned military science circles.

In the parliamentary democracy, the ultimate responsibility for running the administration rests with the elected representatives of the people which are the ministers. These ministers are accountable to the legislatures which are also elected by the people on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The cabinet and its ministers are expected to lay down the policy guidelines, and the civil servants are responsible for implementing and enforcing it.

Federal secretaries

The federal secretaries are the most senior, experienced, and capable officials in the country. Each ministry/division has its Secretary to oversee and enforce the public policy matters.

The secretaries, who are basic pay scale (BPS)-22 grade officers, are largely considered to be the most powerful officials in the country. Due to the importance of their respective assignments, there are twelve specific federal secretaries which are considered to be the most vital in the Government of Pakistan. These include the Secretary Establishment (responsible for civil service matters), Secretary Commerce (responsible for trade), Secretary Cabinet (responsible for Cabinet Division), Secretary to the Prime Minister (responsible for Prime Minister's Office), Secretary Interior (responsible for law and order), Secretary Finance (responsible for the country's treasury), Secretary Foreign Affairs (responsible for foreign relations), Secretary Maritime Affairs

(responsible for ports and shipping), Secretary Power (responsible for the electricity and power sector), Secretary Planning and Development (responsible for development projects), Secretary Petroleum (responsible for the petroleum sector) and Secretary Industries (responsible for industrial development).

Management of major crisis situations in the country and coordination of activities of the various Ministries in such situations are the functions of the Cabinet Division. Appointment for the chairman of the FPSC, the prestigious body responsible for the recruitment of elite bureaucrats, is made by the President after consulting the Prime Minister, according to Article 242 of the Constitution.

Elections and voting system

Since 1947, Pakistan has an asymmetric federal government, with elected officials at the national (federal), provincial, tribal, and local levels. Constitution has set the limit of government for five years, but if a Vote of no confidence movements takes place in the parliament (and prelude of movements are proved at the Judicial branch), the government falls and immediately replaced with caretaker government initiated by the president (consultation of Prime Minister also required to make such move), in regards to Article 58 of the constitution.

There has been four times that the martial law has been in effect, and controversially approved by the supreme court. Through a general election where the leader of the majority winning party is selected to be the Prime Minister. All members of the federal legislature, the Parliament, are directly elected. Elections in Pakistan take place every five years by universal adult suffrage.

Administration and governments

Provincial, Tribal, and Local governments

There are four provincial governments that rule the four provinces of the state; the Chief Minister heads the state government. All provincial assemblies are unicameral, elected for five years. The Governors appointed by President after consulting the Prime minister, act only as representatives of federal government in the province and do not have any part in running the government.

The provincial governments tend to have the greatest influence over most Pakistanis' daily lives. The tribal and Local government functions at the basic level. It is the third level of government, consisting Jirga in rural tribal areas.

Finances

Taxation and budget

Pakistan has a complex taxation system of more than 70 unique taxes administered by at least 37 tax collection institutions of the Government of Pakistan. Taxation is a debated and controversial issue in public and political science circle of the country, and according to the International Development Committee, Pakistan had a lower-than-average tax take.Only 0.57% of Pakistanis, or 768,000 people out of a population of 190 million pay income tax.

The Finance Minister of Pakistan presents the annual federal budget in the Parliament in the midst of the year, and it has to be passed by the both houses of the Parliament. The budget is preceded by an economic survey which outlines the broad direction of the budget and the economic performance of the country for the outgoing financial fiscal year.

National Finance Commission program overview

Constituted under the Article 160 of the Constitution of Pakistan by the Constitution, the National Finance Commission Award (NFC) program is a series of planned economic programs to take control of financial

imbalances and equally manage the financial resources for the four provinces to meet their expenditure liabilities while alleviating the horizontal fiscal imbalances.

According to stipulations and directions of the Constitution, the provisional governments and Federal government compete to get higher share of the program's revenues in order to stabilize their own financial status.

Check Your Progress 1

Note : a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of this unit.

1. Discuss the concept which related with the comparative studies with the Regionalism Defined.

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2. Discuss the comparison with Sri Lanka and Bhutan Government.

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14.4 SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

14.4.1 Background

SAARC, which was established in 1985, has now been in existence for a quarter century. SAARC is characterized by India's centrality to the region and the extreme asymmetry of power balance among member states. India accounts for 75% of SAARC's population and nearly 80% of GDP, while the next largest SAARC member state accounts for about

11% of each. India also holds an overwhelming advantage in military power over all other SAARC members combined. India shares borders with all other member states (except Afghanistan and the Maldives), while no other member (except Pakistan) shares a border with any country other than India. Two member states, Nepal and Bhutan, are land-locked and depend on India for transit to the outside world. Another member, Bangladesh, has direct access to international seas from one side but is surrounded by India on all other sides. There are also unresolved bilateral disputes among members that mostly involve India. The combination of these structural features generates security concerns and domination fears in other SAARC member states. Concerns are also aggravated by the recent historical experience of the region. The partition of India on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory created a deep ideological divide between the two largest nations in the region: secular India and an Islamic Pakistan. The Kashmir issue became a test of the respective creeds of the two countries. Pakistan feared that if a Muslim majority province could remain a part of India, then the very raison d'etre of Pakistan would collapse, eventually leading to the collapse of Pakistan itself (Bhutto, 1969). India, on the other hand, feared that giving up Kashmir would undercut its secular construct and promote separatists tendencies. In the past 6 decades, the two countries have fought three wars over Kashmir, while a low-level insurgency has persisted more or less throughout this period. With such history between them, many in Pakistan consider India as not only a threat to its security but to its very existence as well. The security concerns of other smaller states vis-à-vis India are perhaps less intense but equally serious. At least two of these states (Bangladesh and Nepal) also worry about economic domination by India. Bangladesh, which was formerly the eastern part of Bengal in colonial India, had a longstanding dependency on the western part of Bengal, which was to remain in India after independence. This led to the exploitation of eastern Bengal, which largely comprised poor Muslim farmers and tenants, by the primarily Hindu landlords and merchants of western Bengal. This history is still bitterly remembered in Bangladesh (Sobhan, 1991). Nepal, being effectively land-locked, is nearly wholly dependent on India for transit to the outside world as well as for much of

its essential imports. Such dependency gives India considerable leverage over Nepal in all areas of its life, which puts Nepal at a disadvantage in dealing with its far larger neighbor. Because of their geography and lack of economic development, a certain degree of dependence on India seems unavoidable for both Bangladesh and Nepal. However, these circumstances also heighten their fears about dependence on India and possible domination. Other smaller states within SAARC share similar concerns, although perhaps in smaller measure.

Consequently, India is perceived as a threat and potential (or actual) adversary by most states in South Asia, and SAARC member countries' inter-state relations with India are generally fraught with distrust and apprehension, and even latent (or overt) hostility. Against the backdrop of such regional dynamics, the proposal for an RCA was first mooted by Bangladesh on the grounds of achieving peace, stability, and security in the region. The proposal was thus likely aimed more at achieving regional stability and peace, and improved inter-state relations, than promotion of trade among member economies. In the 1970s, when efforts to launch an RCA were initiated, South Asian nations were committed to the goal of self-sufficiency through import substitution. Hence, trade was probably not very high on their agenda. More likely, the region's smaller states wanted a bulwark against the threat of real or perceived dominance by India more than they sought access to markets in India and Pakistan. The RCA proposal received enthusiastic support from all states except India and Pakistan, which feared that any regional arrangements might restrict their policy autonomy. However, both finally agreed to join on the condition that security issues and bilateral matters would be excluded from the scope of the RCA.

Therefore, while security concerns and fear of dominance by India were acutely felt in South Asia at the time of SAARC's establishment, both of these had to be excluded from the SAARC framework in order to win agreement from India and Pakistan. Such exclusions rendered SAARC incapable of addressing issues that were urgent and important to most member states, and confined it to focus on trade and economic

cooperation, which was not the immediate priority of its members. While the issues of security and Indian domination disappeared from SAARC's agenda, they did not disappear from the real world and, in fact, spawned conditions that severely restricted cooperation in the region. Security concerns about India did not abate as India was not able to engender enough confidence and trust among its neighbors about its commitment to non-interference and peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes. On the contrary, several events exacerbated such concerns over the years, including India's posture towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) movement in Sri Lanka, its perceived interference in political developments in Nepal, and continued stalemate over several bilateral issues. To the extent that member states continued to see India as a threat and possible adversary, there was little incentive for them to cooperate on other issues as long as their security concerns remained unresolved. Moreover, as a consequence of their continuing concerns, several SAARC members concluded security arrangements with extra-regional powers that were eager to insert themselves in South Asia. Member states also began to externalize their bilateral issues with India. Since India considered such externalization to adversely affect its own security, mutual distrust and tension among members continued to escalate. Involving outside powers in regional disputes, instead of seeking their resolution within the region.

also diluted member states' commitment to SAARC and impeded its potential evolution into an effective regional entity. Disharmony and a lack of consensus on India's primacy and leadership role in the region meant that there was no ―focal state‖ to facilitate the coordination of policies and activities among members. 4 While the presence of a focal state is seen to help in resolving coordination problems and providing momentum to an RCA, its absence can create a ―coordination dilemma, promote disharmony among members, and lead to an RCA's failure. Ayoob (1999) suggests that several RCAs including LAFTA, the Andean Pact, Caribbean Community, Arab Common Market, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were affected by the absence of leadership from a focal state. An unintended consequence of

the absence of a focal state in SAARC was that there were no resources to compensate poorer states that were not in a position to bear the costs associated with trade liberalization. This created a degree of built-in reluctance among such states to support SAARC's agenda on trade liberalization. Yet another consequence of the failure to address the security and domination fears of smaller states in the region was that inter-state relations between India and several SAARC states continued to be marked by distrust and suspicion. Such an atmosphere reinforced and even further escalated negative public attitudes towards partner states in the region in general and between India and other states in particular. As noted earlier, negative public perceptions of partner state/s can turn into an issue-blind barrier to cooperation with them, as seems to happen from time to time within SAARC, particularly between India and other member states.

A recent survey of public attitudes in SAARC member countries towards fellow member states and the RCA itself revealed considerable negativity towards both, suggesting a lack of strong public support for regional cooperation (Dash, 2008). Since India and Pakistan view each other as adversaries, neither has had much incentive to trade with the other based on the view that nation states are disinclined to trade with present or potential adversaries. Studies of trade possibilities and barriers between the two countries confirm that India and Pakistan limit their mutual trade. Pakistan does not accord most-favored nation (MFN) status to India and reportedly also maintains a substantial negative list specific to Indian goods, thereby effectively banning or crippling potential trade between the two countries. India, on the other hand, effectively discriminates against Pakistani products through several NTBs.

14.5 SAARC PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS

14.5.1 Performance

According to Dubey (2008), —If political differences among countries can be ignored, South Asia offers several desirable features for regional

cooperation. It is a contiguous land mass, with several rivers crisscrossing the region. The region has a common history, languages, and cultures, as well as common inherited legal and administrative systems. And over the last decade, all of the region's economies have been liberalizing and generally growing at respectable rates, which should further facilitate deeper cooperation in the region.‖ However, politics continues to play a role in deeply constraining SAARC's performance. Within a few years of its establishment, SAARC launched dozens of initiatives for promoting regional cooperation in several priority areas, including region-level action on food security, poverty alleviation, the suppression of terrorism, energy development, and the environment. The initiatives also aimed at creating SAARC Regional Centers, people-to-people contact programs, and a SAARC Development Fund. While some visible progress has been made, much of it remains on paper and comprises the repeated summit declarations of members' commitment to underlying objectives. Even very important regional initiatives such as poverty alleviation, food security, and the suppression of terrorism have made little progress over the past decades. As a result, ―none of the activities and initiatives has had any major direct impact on strengthening the regional cooperation and integration process in South Asia‖ (Mahendra, 2010). Moreover, SAARC's attempt to fast-track trade liberalization among members under a Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) also failed to produce worthwhile growth in intra-regional trade. As a result, SAARC's achievements to date have remained very modest. Several factors have contributed to this sub-par performance in regional cooperation. The constraining influence of regional politics and poor inter-state relations among members has been the most important factors. Disharmony among member states and their fluctuating levels of commitment to SAARC has affected implementation of even agreed-upon programs. Progress has also often been hampered because of a divergence among members about the priority goals of SAARC. India has attached primacy to the goal of economic cooperation, while the other members are focused on issues of regional stability, security, and development. Moreover, SAARC has suffered from a leadership vacuum since members cannot develop

consensus on specific issues. Consequently, SAARC initiatives have made progress only when tensions among members were low and political relations were relatively normal. Whenever inter-state relations deteriorated, progress stopped altogether. The constraining role of regional politics on SAARC operations is reflected in the fact that 10 out of 24 possible SAARC Summits since the organization's founding have had to be cancelled or postponed because of poor political conditions. Another major constraint on SAARC's performance has been the lack of institutional capacity to support and monitor implementation of its initiatives. The SAARC Secretariat, while well organized, suffers from inadequate budgetary and human resources, and lacks technical and professional expertise to plan, monitor, and support implementation of SAARC initiatives. Moreover, the Secretariat also lacks a mandate to initiate proposals and explore possibilities for expanding cooperation. As such, it has been unable to actively help in converting high-level recommendations and summit meeting declarations into actionable programs and concrete achievements. The absence of civil society champions for regional cooperation has also been a factor in SAARC's mediocre performance. While substantial support for regional cooperation exists among constituents of civil societies in all member countries, this has not as yet crystallized into informal but effective support groups for cooperation at the regional or national levels. As a result, support for regional cooperation from sections of civil society (e.g., private sector, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], professionals, and academia) does not aggregate into effective demand for cooperation. On the other hand, the presence of such groups within SAARC would contribute to the more effective articulation of public demand for regional cooperation and put pressure on governments to pursue it more vigorously.

14.5.2 Platform for Leaders' Meetings

SAARC's failure to effectively promote cooperation in trade and other economic areas has been sufficiently highlighted in several studies. However, SAARC's significant achievements in non-economic areas

have remained largely unappreciated. SAARC Summits offer an extremely useful platform for the region's political leaders to come together and interact with one another in an informal atmosphere. During summits, leaders are free to discuss issues they may choose, form impressions about one another, and revisit their own preconceived ideas and perceptions. The importance of such interactions cannot be overstated in a region marked by persistent mutual suspicion, recrimination, and confusion. In such an environment there are very few occasions for leaders to meet and informally sound out their counterparts without the pressure of having to bargain hard that usually accompanies bilateral meetings in the region. Thanks to SAARC, the region's leaders have had opportunities to meet and interact with one another dozens of times over the past decades. On a majority of these occasions, the leaders' informal interactions on the sidelines of SAARC Summits contributed to lowered tensions and improved understanding, which in some instances also led to important breakthroughs and political initiatives. In particular, a meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and Sri Lankan President at the 1986 SAARC Summit produced a significant peace accord between the two countries in the following year. Likewise, meetings of the leaders of India and Pakistan at various summits have led to important outcomes, including the diffusion of tensions, agreement on mutual nuclear installations, and a re-launching of the peace process, among others. Some observers have noted that such outcomes probably may not have materialized in the absence of SAARC Summits. Perhaps in recognition of SAARC's unique role in this respect, no member has shown indifference to its fate. Whenever SAARC's continued existence has come under threat, all members have collectively acted to diffuse the crisis and save SAARC from any potential fallout. SAARC's unique ability to bring leaders together in a broader regional framework is in itself a highly significant contribution to strengthening the spirit and process of cooperation in the region. The idea of regional cooperation may be getting stronger among SAARC members. For instance, members' willingness to establish the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA), despite the unsatisfactory outcomes of SAPTA, probably reflects their assessment that SAARC can effectively safeguard and

possibly expand their market access in the region, rather than waiting indefinitely for multilateral negotiations to be completed. While SAFTA is not free from issues and problems, there seems to be greater commitment to its implementation than was evident for SAPTA.

14.6 ISSUES

Progress in regional cooperation and integration, even in a truncated form, can bring significant benefits to the region. Even more substantial benefits could accrue to South Asia if SAARC were to become an effective catalyst for bringing its members together to harness shared resources and manage the major issues confronting the region. However, such outcomes are predicated on the successful management of three deficits that challenge the region's policymakers: (i) the trust deficit among all SAARC members, (ii) the trade account deficit of smaller SAARC economies with India, and (iii) the institutional capacity deficit to support regional cooperation.

14.6.1 Trust Deficit

An extreme imbalance of power among member states has given rise to fears over security resulting from domination by India, and fostered an environment of suspicion and mistrust. Such a situation generates built-in retardants to cooperation among members. In the case of SAARC, this process has given rise to several distortions such as avoiding and/or restricting trade with India, discouraging FDI coming from India, creating an unwillingness to work together to resolve regional issues, and externalizing bilateral and regional issues. If the environment of mistrust and suspicion among SAARC members remains unaddressed, it will be a long time before significant progress in regional cooperation and economic integration can be realized. This is because cooperation and integration requires aligning member states' economic structures more closely with that of the Indian economy, which would further deepen interdependence with India. In the absence of trust and amid prevalent fears of Indian domination, however, smaller SAARC members will continue to tread this path very cautiously. The critical need to develop

congenial interstate relations for deepening and accelerating the process of cooperation in the region cannot be over-emphasized. While a growing awareness of the economic costs of the lack of cooperation seems to have pushed SAARC members towards increased cooperation in recent years, the overarching influence of inter-state relations cannot be overlooked. All major achievements in cooperation in the region have materialized only when such relations were reasonably favorable. The finalization of SAFTA was delayed for several years because of the deterioration of India–Pakistan relations during 1998–2001. The signing of the India–Sri Lanka FTA and progress towards a possible Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was underpinned by India's ―hands-off policy‖ on the sensitive issue of the Tamil insurgency after its controversial Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) experience. Similarly, the significant India–Bangladesh initiatives launched in early 2010 could have only materialized on the back of a major shift in political relations between the two countries. As noted earlier, cooperation in South Asia has progressed more along the lines of a bilateral and/or plurilateral basis than on a region-wide SAARC platform. As the pre-eminent power in South Asia, and hence a party to a majority of other member countries' respective concerns, India should proactively initiate the process of trust building in South Asia. To start, India could show openness and seriousness in exploring arrangements to allay the security and domination concerns of its neighbors. This could involve formal ministerial-level discussions, agreements, and pacts, as well as including informal channels provided by civil society organizations and people-topeople contacts. Likewise, India could also give consideration to revisiting past reservations about the inclusion of security issues, and perhaps also bilateral issues, in the SAARC agenda. Such efforts would signal India's firm intent to develop closer and collegial relationships with neighbors, and help dispel their misunderstandings while building confidence in Indian intentions. Such developments would require significant changes in India's traditional policy towards neighboring countries. Fortunately, there is now increasing recognition in India that it has much more to gain than just a marginal increase in its exports from a more congenial South Asia. India

would also significantly benefit from valuable externalities emanating from improved regional cooperation. For example, India is likely to gain enhanced credibility in global forums if and when it is seen to be the anchor in a stable and congenial region, rather than a hostile one. Such gains would strengthen India's claims to assuming a bigger role on the global stage. India would also gain by reducing the space for non-regional players to insert themselves into regional matters, thereby alleviating security and strategic pressures currently facing India. In order to realize these gains, India should be prepared to be accommodating, if not generous, whenever possible in negotiating with its neighbors by avoiding the temptation to insist on strict reciprocities and technicalities in all matters. India seems to have signaled a major shift towards such an approach during the recent visit of the Bangladeshi Prime Minister. In a spirit of cooperation and appreciation of each other's needs, several important and long-pending issues were addressed during this visit. 9 If this spirit is sustained and consistently adopted by India, and if it inspires other SAARC states to do likewise, the Bangladeshi Prime Minister's visit could turn out to be a game-changing event for SAARC. Of course, other SAARC members would also need to fully involve themselves in the process of trust building and re-examine their own long-held attitudes and strategies towards cooperation with India and other fellow member states.

On their part, they would need to acknowledge India's centrality to the South Asian region. They need to appreciate that an approach of accommodation and cooperation is likely to be more productive and sustainable in the long run than that of suspicion and externalization. Improved political relations and cohesion among member states should reduce tensions and promote stability in the SAARC region. While economic integration would result in enhanced mutual dependency vis-à-vis India, it would also promote faster growth and peaceful co-existence. Integration can thus become an effective option for SAARC member countries to overcome impediments imposed by their respective market sizes and geography. More importantly, several issues of critical importance to member states—such as the development of common

water resources, protection of the Himalayan environment, prevention of cross-border crime and terrorism, and health epidemics—cannot be adequately resolved without cooperation among members, especially India. The failure to cooperate can only result in sub-optimal solutions that deprive the region and its residents of the significant gains that could otherwise be realized through cooperation.

14.6.2 Trade Deficit

Between 60% and 90% of the intra-regional trade of all SAARC member states, except Pakistan and Afghanistan, is with India. India's more diversified and relatively-better developed economy makes it a competitive supplier of several imports to SAARC's smaller economies. With trade liberalization, the imports of smaller economies from India are growing very rapidly. On the other hand, owing to their relatively narrow resource base and less diversified economies, they are unable to increase exports to India in a corresponding manner. This imbalance between imports and exports vis-à-vis India is in the ratio of 10:1 and even widening in some instances. This has given rise to unacceptably high and mounting trade deficits with India and prompted serious concerns across the region. However, to the extent that less expensive Indian imports replace more costly imports from other sources, the trade balance of importing countries would improve on a global basis even while it may deteriorate vis-à-vis India. While such a shift might make for sound economics, practical considerations—such as the availability of tied bilateral grants and export credits from other sources, and concerns about overdependence on a single supply source—dictate that a trade deficit with any single country cannot be sustained beyond a certain point. This means that trade imbalances with India have to be addressed if the goal of more free trade in South Asia is to be pursued.

Check Your Progress 2

Note : a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answer with those provided at the end of this unit.

1. Discuss the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

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2. Describe SAARC Performance and Prospects.

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3. How do you know the Issues related with political and economic relation?

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14.7 LET US SUM UP

The number of regional cooperation arrangements (RCAs) has grown multifold since the early 1990s, with several new ones are being formed every year. Despite their popularity, however, RCAs have not always lived up to expectations. Some have been very successful while several have been less so, and still others have collapsed or become dysfunctional not long after being established. Research into the relative performance of RCAs tends to consider all RCAs to be identical and aimed at promoting trade and economic integration among member countries, and, as such, primarily driven by the logic of trade and economic opportunities. In reality, however, all RCAs are not identical and they differ from one another in several important aspects, including

the pursuit of noneconomic objectives such as regional stability and protection against external threats. Moreover, the balance of power among member states, as well as their respective political structures and processes, uniquely conditions the functioning of individual RCAs. A thorough assessment of RCA performance needs to take all of these factors into account.

• An assessment of the 25-year performance of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) using the above approach reveals the dominant influence of interstate power relationships and the impact of internal political forces. SAARC is characterized by an extreme imbalance of power among member states, with India enjoying more than a threefold advantage over all other members combined in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) and population, as well as considerable military prowess. Several SAARC members, therefore, perceive India as a risk to their security and a source of possible economic domination. Such perceptions are aggravated by a lack of trust and poor interstate relations, particularly between India and Pakistan. Consequently, several SAARC members have made security arrangements with extra-regional players and externalized bilateral issues vis-à-vis India, which has further strained relations with India and exacerbated an environment of suspicion and distrust in the region.

• These regional dynamics have stunted trade and cooperation by (i) pushing members to restrict trade and economic exchanges with India in order to moderate the risk of economic domination; and (ii) making the progress of regional cooperation dependent upon the status of relations among member states, rather than on economic opportunities, thereby introducing uncertainty and arbitrary factors into the cooperation process. This severely hampers SAARC's achievements in promoting trade and economic integration. SAARC, however, has succeeded in contributing to the moderation of tensions among member states by enabling the region's leaders to interact in a cooperative framework through its summit meetings. These occasions have helped the region's leaders to

develop firsthand assessments of one another's views and, in some instances, facilitated high-level political decision-making.

- Uncertainty about further progress in cooperation has prompted individual member states—mainly India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan—to conclude preferential trade and cooperation arrangements with willing states from within and outside the region. This trend will likely contribute to trade liberalization and integration in South Asia, albeit in a fragmented manner that bypasses the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and SAARC platforms.

- Trade liberalization and integration in the region, even in a truncated form, has the potential to yield considerable benefits to participating SAARC members. However, given the defining constraints of interstate relations on cooperation in South Asia, further progress will be contingent upon erasing the ―trust deficit‖ that exists and creating improved relations among member states. If distrust and suspicion persist and interstate relations remain shaky, smaller SAARC members will continue to be wary of further deepening their integration with the Indian economy. As the preeminent member state, India needs to take the initiative in building better relations in the region by allaying other members' security concerns and fears of domination. Other members, in turn, need to acknowledge India's primacy in the region and recognize that integration with the Indian economy could help them overcome the constraints of market size and geography.

- Improved interstate relations would provide an enabling environment for economic cooperation. Yet, it is also necessary to effectively address two other deficits in the region: the ―institutional capacity deficit‖ and the ―trade account deficit.‖ The lack of institutional capacity to support and implement cooperative programs in the region has hampered progress towards integration. Such capacity needs to be rapidly built-up by empowering and strengthening the SAARC Secretariat to promote, support, and monitor SAARC initiatives, and persuade members to work together in managing the region's collective challenges and exploiting its

opportunities. Proposals of critical significance to the region, such as development of the region's shared rivers, are unlikely to move forward without a strong and effective Secretariat.

• The progress of cooperation within SAARC, particularly in intra-regional trade, is facing the constraint of widening trade account deficits between India and smaller member economies. Lower tariffs and trade barriers in these smaller economies have led to rapidly expanding imports from India, while supply constraints in partner countries have failed to expand exports proportionately. There is a need to upgrade and diversify the supply structures of smaller member economies to expand their export capacity and attain sustainable trade account balances with India and others. Towards this purpose, the smaller member countries need to introduce policies and measure to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology from all sources, including India. It is also necessary to ramp up operations of the SAARC Development Fund to provide adequate support to member countries' programs for upgrading and diversifying their respective economies.

14.8 KEY WORDS

SAARC: The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation is the regional intergovernmental organization and geopolitical union of states in South Asia. Its member states comprise Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Regionalism: In national politics (or low politics), **regionalism** is a political notion which favours regionalization—a process of dividing a political entity (typically a country) into smaller regions, and transferring power from the central government to the regions. Opposite process is called unitization.

Cooperation: Cooperation is the process of groups of organisms working or acting together for common, mutual, or some underlying benefit, as opposed to working in competition for selfish benefit. Many animal and plant species cooperate both with other members of their own species and with members of other species.

14.9 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss the concept which related with the comparative studies with the Regionalism Defined.

2. Compare the government of Sri Lanka and Bhutan?

3. Discuss the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

4. Describe SAARC Performance and Prospects

5. How do you know the Issues related with political and economic relation?

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14.11 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. Several empirical studies have concluded that most of the preconditions required for successful regional integration are not present in South Asia. A review of some of these studies suggests the following key challenges to regional integration in South Asia.

2. i. The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) (Sinhala: ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජය Śrī Laṃkā Rajaya) is a semi-presidential system

determined by the Sri Lankan Constitution. It administers the island from both its commercial capital of Colombo and the administrative capital of Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte.

ii.The Constitution of Bhutan (Dzongkha: འབྲུག་གི་རྩ་ཁྲིམས་ཆེན་མོ་; Wylie: 'Druk-gi cha-thrims-chen-mo) was enacted 18 July 2008 by the Royal Government of Bhutan. The Constitution was thoroughly planned by several government officers and agencies over a period of almost seven years amid increasing democratic reforms in Bhutan. The current Constitution is based on Buddhist philosophy, international Conventions on Human Rights, comparative analysis of 20 other modern constitutions, public opinion, and existing laws, authorities, and precedents. According to Princess Sonam Wangchuck, the constitutional committee was particularly influenced by the Constitution of South Africa because of its strong protection of human rights.

Check Your Progress 2

1. South Asia in the mainstream global marketplace. Harmonizing standards by adopting best practices would increase reliability and meet health, safety and environment requirements and consequently lead to a larger market and greater international acceptance of South Asian products. A more integrated South Asia would also have a stronger voice in multilateral standard setting bodies. See Section 14.3

2. See Section 14.4.

3. A recent development has been Pakistan's commitment to grant India the MFN status by the end of this year and to reduce items on the negative list. Apart from being in constant state of turmoil due to political instability, Pakistan is at crossroads in terms of its foreign policy options. There has been a clear shift in the United States' policy towards India, marked by increasing support to India and a decline in support to Pakistan. Pakistan has over .See Section 14.5.